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Abstract
Over the last years, security kernels have played a promising role in re-
shaping the landscape of platform security on today’s ubiquitous embedded
devices. Security kernels, such as separation kernels, enable constructing
high-assurance mixed-criticality execution platforms. They reduce the soft-
ware portion of the system’s trusted computing base to a thin layer, which
enforces isolation between low- and high-criticality components. The reduced
trusted computing base minimizes the system attack surface and facilitates
the use of formal methods to ensure functional correctness and security of the
kernel.
In this thesis, we explore various aspects of building a provably secure
separation kernel using virtualization technology. In particular, we examine
techniques related to the appropriate management of the memory subsystem.
Once these techniques were implemented and functionally verified, they pro-
vide reliable a foundation for application scenarios that require strong guar-
antees of isolation and facilitate formal reasoning about the system’s overall
security.
We show how the memory management subsystem can be virtualized to
enforce isolation of system components. Virtualization is done by using direct
paging that enables a guest software under some circumstances to manage its
own memory configuration. We demonstrate the soundness of our approach
by verifying that the high-level model of the system fulfills the desired security
properties. Through refinement, we then propagate these properties (semi-)
automatically to the machine-code of the virtualization mechanism.
An application of isolating platforms is to provide external protection to
an untrusted guest operating system to restrict its attack surface. We show
how a runtime monitor can be securely deployed alongside a Linux guest on
a hypervisor to prevent code injection attacks targeting Linux. The monitor
takes advantage of the provided separation to protect itself and to retain a
complete view of the guest software.
Separating components using a low-level software, while important, is
not by itself enough to guarantee security. Indeed, current processors ar-
chitecture involves features, such as caches, that can be utilized to violate
the isolation of components. In this thesis, we present a new low noise at-
tack vector constructed by measuring cache effects. The vector is capable
of breaching isolation between components of different criticality levels, and
it invalidates the verification of software that has been verified on a mem-
ory coherent (cacheless) model. To restore isolation, we provide a number
of countermeasures. Further, we propose a new methodology to repair the
verification of the software by including data-caches in the statement of the
top-level security properties of the system.
Sammanfattning
Inbyggda system finns överallt idag. Under senare år har utvecklingen
av platformssäkerhet för inbyggda system spelat en allt större roll. Säker-
hetskärnor, likt isoleringskärnor, möjliggör konstruktion av tillförlitliga exe-
kveringsplatformar ämnade för både kritiska och icke-kritiska tillämpningar.
Säkerhetskärnor reducerar systemets kritiska kodmängd i ett litet tunt mjuk-
varulager. Detta mjukvarulager upprättar en tillförlitlig isolering mellan olika
mjukvarukomponenter, där vissa mjukvarukomponenter har kritiska roller och
andra inte. Det tunna mjukvarulagret minimerar systemets attackyta och un-
derlättar användningen av formella metoder för att försäkra mjukvarulagrets
funktionella korrekthet och säkerhet.
I denna uppsats utforskas olika aspekter för att bygga en isoleringskärna
med virtualiseringsteknik sådant att det går att bevisa att isoleringskärnan är
säker. I huvudsak undersöks tekniker för säker hantering av minnessystemet.
Implementering och funktionell verifiering av dessa minneshanteringstekniker
ger en tillförlitlig grund för användningsområden med höga krav på isolering
och underlättar formell argumentation om att systemet är säkert.
Det visas hur minneshanteringssystemet kan virtualiseras i syfte om att
isolera systemkomponenter. Virtualiseringstekniken bakom minnessystemet
är direkt paging och möjliggör gästmjukvara, under vissa begränsningar, att
konfigurera sitt eget minne. Denna metods sundhet demonstreras genom veri-
fiering av att högnivåmodellen av systemet satisfierar de önskade säkerhetse-
genskaperna. Genom förfining överförs dessa egenskaper (semi-) automatiskt
till maskinkoden som utgör virtualiseringsmekanismen.
En isolerad gästapplikation ger externt skydd för ett potentiellt angri-
pet gästoperativsystem för att begränsa den senares attackyta. Det visas hur
en körningstidsövervakare kan köras säkert i systemet ovanpå en hypervi-
sor bredvid en Linuxgäst för att förhindra kodinjektionsattacker mot Linux.
Övervakaren utnyttjar systemets isoleringsegenskaper för att skydda sig själv
och för att ha en korrekt uppfattning av gästmjukvarans status.
Isolering av mjukvarukomponenter genom lågnivåmjukvara är inte i sig
tillräckligt för att garantera säkerhet. Dagens processorarkitekturer har funk-
tioner, som exempelvis cacheminnen, som kan utnyttjas för att kringgå iso-
leringen mellan mjukvarukomponenter. I denna uppsats presenteras en ny
attack som inte är störningskänslig och som utförs genom att analysera cache-
operationer. Denna attack kan kringgå isoleringen mellan olika mjukvarukom-
ponenter, där vissa komponenter har kritiska roller och andra inte. Attacken
ogiltigförklarar också verifiering av mjukvara om verifieringen antagit en min-
neskoherent (cachefri) modell. För att motverka denna attack presenteras ett
antal motmedel. Utöver detta föreslås också en ny metodik för att återvalidera
mjukvaruverifieringen genom att inkludera data-cacheminnen i formuleringen
av systemets säkerhetsegenskaper.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, for better or worse, the demand for new (embedded) devices and ap-
plications to manage all aspects of daily life from traffic control to public safety
continues unabated. However, as reliance on automated sensors and software has
improved productivity and people’s lives, it also increases risks of information theft,
data security breaches, and vulnerability to privacy attacks. This also raises con-
cerns about illicit activities, sometimes supported by governments, to exploit bugs
in systems to take over the control of security-critical infrastructures or gain access
to confidential information. Series of attacks that hit Ukrainian targets in the com-
mercial and government sectors [200], including power grid and the railway system,
are examples reinforcing how vulnerable a society can be to attacks directed at its
core infrastructure.
Ever-evolving cyber-attacks are expanding their targets, and techniques used
to mount these attacks are becoming increasingly complex, large-scale, and multi-
faceted. The advent of new attack techniques in rapid succession and the number
of daily uncovered zero-day vulnerabilities [201] are convincing evidences that if
the approach to security does not become more formal and systematic, building
trustworthy and reliable computing platforms seems as distant as ever.
1.1 Overview
In order to secure a system against attacks, including those that are currently un-
known, one needs to consider the security of all layers from hardware to applications
available to the end users. Nevertheless, among all constituents, the correctness of
the most privileged software layer within the system architecture, henceforth the
kernel, is an important factor for the security of the system. This privileged layer
can be the kernel of an Operating System (OS) or any other software that directly
runs on bare hardware, manages resources, and is allowed to execute processor priv-
ileged instructions. Therefore, any bug at this layer can significantly undermine the
overall security of the system.
5
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
It is widely acknowledged that the monolithic design and huge codebase of main-
stream execution platforms such as Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) operating
systems make them vulnerable to security flaws [124, 126, 229]. This monolithic
design is also what makes integrating efficient and fine-grained security mecha-
nisms into current OSs, if not impossible, extremely hard. The vulnerability of
modern desktop platforms to malwares can be attributed to these issues, and it re-
veals the inability of the underlying kernel to protect system components properly
from one another. In order to increase the security and reliability, existing operat-
ing systems such as Linux use access control and supervised execution techniques,
such as LSM [228] or SELinux [144], together with their built-in process mediation
mechanisms. However, while these techniques represent a significant step towards
improving security, they are insufficient for application scenarios which demand
higher levels of trustworthiness. This is essentially because the kernel of the host-
ing OS as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)1 of the system is itself susceptible
to attacks which can compromise these security mechanisms.
A practical solution to increase the system security and to mitigate the impact
of any probable malfunctioning is reducing the size and complexity of the kernel.
Minimizing the kernel can be done by splitting it into smaller components with
restricted2 privileges that are isolated from each other and can interact through
controlled communication channels. This concept is an old one. Systems based
on such a design principle are usually said to implement the Multiple Independent
Levels of Security (MILS) philosophy [13]. MILS is a design approach to build
high-assurance systems and is the main idea behind the development of security
kernels.
A security kernel, in the context of this thesis, is an executive that parti-
tions system components into different security classes, each with certain privi-
leges, manages system resources, allocates resources to partitions, and controls the
interaction of partitions with each other and the outside world. Among others,
microkernels [142, 107, 133], separation kernels [180, 108], and security hypervi-
sors [182, 183, 147] are important representatives of security kernels.
Rushby was the first to introduce the notion of separation kernels [180]. A
separation kernel resembles a physically distributed system to provide a more robust
execution environment for processes running on the kernel [180] (cf. Figure 1.1).
The primary security property enforced by a separation kernel is isolation; i.e.,
separation of processes in a system to prevent a running process from unauthorized
reading or writing into memory space and register locations allocated to other ones.
Separation kernels reduce the software portion of the system’s TCB to a thin layer
which provides the isolation between partitions and implements communication
channels.
The reduced TCB minimizes the attack surface of the system and enables the
1The TCB of a system is the set of all components that are critical to establishing and
maintaining the system’s security
2The least authority necessary for a component to function correctly.
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Figure 1.1: Traditional design (left) isolating components using discrete hardware
platforms. A separation kernel (right) provides isolation on single processor.
use of rigorous inspection techniques, in the form of a formal proof, to ensure bug-
freeness of the partitioning layer. Formal verification lends a greater degree of
trustworthiness to the system and ensures that — within an explicitly given set of
assumptions — the system design behaves as expected.
Separating components using a low-level system software, assisted with some
basic hardware features, reduces overhead in terms of the hardware complexity and
increases modularity. However, it is not by itself enough to guarantee security.
In fact, current processor architectures involves a wealth of features that, while
invisible to the software executing on the platform, can affect the system behavior
in many aspects. For example, the Memory Management Unit (MMU) relies on a
caching mechanism to speed up accesses to page-tables stored in the memory. A
cache is a shared resource between all partitions, and it thus potentially affects and
is affected by activities of each partition. Consequently, enabling caches may cause
unintended interaction between software running on the same processor, which
can lead to cross-partition information leakage and violation of the principle of
isolation. Therefore, it is essential to consider the impact of such hardware pieces
while designing and verifying isolation solutions.
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this thesis, we investigate various aspects of building a provably secure separa-
tion kernel using virtualization technology and formal methods. In particular, we
examine techniques related to the appropriate management of the memory subsys-
tem. Once these techniques were implemented and verified, they provide reliable
mechanisms for application scenarios that require strong guarantees of isolation and
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Figure 1.2: Contribution areas.
facilitate formal reasoning about the system functional correctness and its security.
We are concerned with understanding how formal verification influences the design
of a separation kernel and its trustworthiness, and what the impact of resource
sharing on the verification of the system is (cf. Figure 1.2).
We limit our discussion to single-core processors to provide a detailed analysis,
rather than dealing with complexities which arise due to the use of multiple cores.
More specifically, in this work we tried to address the following issues:
• How can we build a light-weight and performant virtualized memory manage-
ment subsystem that allows dynamic management of the memory and is small
enough to make formal verification possible? This is important since support-
ing dynamic memory management is essential to run commodity operating
systems on separation kernels.
• How can we formally ensure that machine code executing on hardware im-
plements the desired functionalities and complies with the security properties
verified at the source-code level? This obviates the necessity of trusting the
compilers and provides a higher degree of security assurance.
• How can we take advantage of isolation of system components on a separation
kernel to guarantee that only certified programs can execute on the system?
• What are the effects of enabling low-level hardware features such as caches on
the security of the system? How can one neutralize these effects to ascertain
proper isolation of the system components?
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1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part provides the required back-
ground to understand the results, and gives a summary of the papers. This part
is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the general context and different ap-
proaches to formal verification and process isolation, describes the tools we have
used and provides the formalization of our main security properties; Chapter 3
gives an overview of related work, including some historical background and recent
developments; Chapter 4 describes briefly each of the included papers together with
the author’s individual contribution; Chapter 5 presents concluding remarks. The
second part includes four of the author’s papers.

Chapter 2
Background
Embedded computing systems face two conflicting phenomena. First, security is
becoming an increasingly important aspect of new devices such as smartphones and
Internet of Things (IoT) systems. Secondly, the design of current operating systems
and hardware platforms puts significant limitations on the security guarantees that
these systems can provide. The problem arises mainly because:
• Commodity operating systems are mostly designed with focus on usability
rather than security and inadequately protect applications from one another,
in the case of mission-critical scenarios. Therefore, bugs in one application
can potentially lead to the compromise of the whole system. This limits
the capability of the system to securely execute in parallel applications with
different criticality levels.
• Mainstream operating systems are very complex programs with large software
stacks. This complexity undermines the system trustworthiness [124, 126, 229]
and imposes significant hurdles on building applications with high-criticality
on these platforms.
• Current platforms do not provide the end users with any reliable method to
verify the identity of applications. For example, a user has no way of verifying
if they are interacting with a trusted banking application or with a malicious
or compromised program which impersonates the original one.
• Finally, modern processor architectures comprises a wealth of features that,
while important for performance, could potentially open up for unintended
and invisible paths for sensitive information to escape.
A possible mitigation of these problems is employing special-purpose closed
platforms [85], customized for particular application scenarios, e.g., missile control-
ling systems and game consoles. The design of such closed systems, both at the
hardware level and for the software stack, can be carefully tailored to meet required
11
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security guarantees, thus significantly reducing vulnerability to attacks and the cost
of formal verification.
Despite multiple security benefits of using closed platforms, in most cases, flex-
ibility and rich functionalities offered by general-purpose open systems make the
choice of these systems preferable. In this thesis, we look for a compromise between
these two rather conflicting approaches. We try to keep a well-defined structure (i.e.,
minimal and suitable for a formal analysis) and security guarantees of the closed
systems while taking the advantages of using a general-purpose open platform. Our
solution is based on a separation kernel that brings together the capabilities of these
two systems. Further, we apply mathematical reasoning to show correctness and
security of our solution. Even though the focus of the work in this thesis is on
design and verification of a system software for embedded devices, namely ARM
processors, our results can be adapted to other architectures.
In the following, we give some preliminaries that will be used in this thesis.
In particular, Section 2.1 briefly surveys techniques used in practice to provide a
trusted execution environment for high-criticality applications on commodity plat-
forms, introduces the concept of security kernel and compare it to other approaches
to clarify the advantage of using such kernels. This section also shows how a secu-
rity kernel can be used to help a commodity OS to protect itself against external
attacks and explains why enabling low-level hardware features can potentially af-
fect the security of a system. Section 2.2 introduces the notion of formal analysis
and explains techniques that can be used to verify a software. Additionally, in this
section, we formalize properties which we have used to analyze the security of a
separation kernel and explain our verification methodology.
2.1 Platform Security
2.1.1 Process Protection
Anderson [16] argued that resource sharing is the key cause of many security issues
in operating systems, and programs together with their assigned resources must
be securely compartmentalized to minimize undesired interaction between appli-
cations. The classical method of preventing applications concurrently executing
on the same processor from interfering with one another is process1 isolation [16].
Isolation is a fundamental concept in platform security, and it aims to segregate
different applications’ processes to prevent the private data of a process from being
written or read by other ones; the exception is when an explicit communication
channel exists. Process isolation preserves the integrity of processes and guarantees
their confidentiality.
Integrity refers to the ability of the system to prevent corruption of information,
as both program and data. Corruption can happen either intentionally with the aim
1A process is an instance of an executable program in the system.
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Figure 2.1: Hierarchical protection domains. Ring 0 denotes the most privileged
domain.
of benefiting from information rewriting or erasure, or unintentionally, for example,
due to hardware malfunction. The integrity property restricts who can create and
modify trusted information.
Confidentiality is the property of preventing information disclosure; i.e., making
information unreachable by unauthorized actors. This property covers both the
existence of information and its flow in the system.
Isolation of processes can be done by hardware or software based solutions;
however both these approaches try to limit access to system resources and to keep
programs isolated to their assigned resources. In what follows we briefly describe
some of the widely applied techniques to achieve isolation.
Memory Management Unit
The notion of isolation in current operating systems is provided at a minimum by
abstraction of virtual memory, constructed through a combination of core hard-
ware functionalities and kernel level mechanisms. For all but the most rudimentary
processors, the primary device used to enable isolation is the memory management
unit, which provides in one go both virtual addressing and memory protection.
Operating systems use the MMU to isolate processes by assigning to each a sep-
arated virtual space. This prevents errors in one user mode program from being
propagated within the system. It is the role of the kernel to configure the MMU
to confine memory accesses of less privileged applications. Configurations of the
MMU, which are also called page-tables, determine the binding of physical mem-
ory locations to virtual addresses and hold restrictions to access resources. Hence
page-tables are critical for security and must be protected. Otherwise, malicious
processes can bypass the MMU and gain illicit accesses.
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To protect security-critical components such as configurations of the MMU, most
processors allow execution of processes with different criticality in separate processor
modes or protection rings (c.f. Figure 2.1). On these processors, a privileged
program such as the kernel of an OS runs in a special kernel domain, also called
kernel space/mode, that is protected from the user specific domains, also referred to
as user space/mode, in which less privileged and potentially malicious applications
execute.
Some processors such as ARM family CPUs — instead of providing a memory
management unit — protect system resources through a Memory Protection Unit
(MPU). The MPU is a light weight specialization of the MMU which offers fewer
features and is mainly used when the software executing on the platform is far
simpler than off-the-shelf operating systems. In contrast to the MMU which uses
hardware protection together with the virtual memory capability, the MPU provides
only hardware protection over software-designated memory regions.
Process isolation solely based on these approaches has been proven inadequate to
guarantee isolation in most cases. Due to the security concerns related to weak isola-
tion, research on platform security has been focused on complementary techniques
to strengthen isolation of processes, e.g., access control mechanisms, sandboxing,
and hardware based solutions.
Access Control
To improve the basic protection provided by the virtual memory abstraction, tra-
ditionally operating systems also use access enforcement methods to validate pro-
cesses’ request (e.g., read, write) to access resources (e.g., files, sockets). Each
access control mechanism consists of two main parts: an access policy store and
an authorization module. The access policy describes the set of allowed operations
that processes can perform on resources and is specific to each system. An example
of such a policy is Lampson’s access matrix [137]. At the heart of this protec-
tion system is the authorization module which is commonly referred to as reference
monitor. For a given input request, the reference monitor returns a binary response
showing if the request is authorized by the monitor’s policy. AppArmor [31] is an
example of such an access control mechanism, which is used in some Unix-based
operating systems.
Sandbox Based Isolation
Sandboxing, as defined in [218], is the method of encapsulating an unknown and
potentially malicious code in a region of memory to restrict its impact on the system
state. Accesses of a sandboxed program are limited to only memory locations that
are inside the assigned address space, and the program cannot execute binaries not
placed in its code segment. In this approach effects of a program are hidden from
the outside world. However, for practical reasons sometimes this isolation has to
be violated to allow data transmission.
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Instruction Set Architecture based sandboxing is the technique of controlling
activities of a program at the instruction level, through adding instructions to the
binary of the program to check its accesses. Software Fault Isolation [218] and Inline
Reference Monitors [80] are two examples of sandboxes that are implemented using
this technique. Application sandboxing can also be achieved by taking control of
the interface between the application and its libraries or the underlying operating
system [217]. Further, one can restrict permissions of a program to access system
resources using access control mechanisms [52, 50].
Hardware-Extension Based Isolation
Process isolation through features embedded in hardware provides a strong form of
separation. These features are either part of the processor or hardware extensions
that augment basic protection supplied with the CPU. Examples of these features
include IOMMU [35], ARM TrustZone [1], and Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [148, 15]. The Input/Output Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) is a
hardware extension to control memory accesses of I/O devices. The IOMMU pre-
vents malicious devices from performing arbitrary Direct Memory Access (DMA)
operations and can be used to isolate device drivers.
TrustZone (c.f. Figure 2.2) is a set of security extensions added to some ARM
architecture CPUs to improve the system security. TrustZone creates a secure exe-
cution environment, also called secure world, for software that must be isolated from
less critical components. These extensions allow the processor to switch between
two security domains that are orthogonal to the standard capabilities of the CPU.
TrustZone can be used to execute an unmodified commodity OS in the less secure
domain, and to run security-critical subsystems (e.g., cryptographic algorithms)
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inside the secure domain. This hardware feature guarantees that the critical sub-
systems will remain safe regardless of malicious activities influencing the system
outside the secure world.
Intel’s SGX are extensions to x86 processors that aim to guarantee integrity
and confidentiality of the code executing inside SGX’s secure containers, called
enclaves. The main application of the SGX is in secure remote computation. In
this scenario the user uploads his secret data and computation method into an
enclave and SGX guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of the secret user
data while the computation is being carried out.
2.1.2 Strong Isolation and Minimal TCB
Process isolation is essential to platform security. Nevertheless, in today’s increas-
ingly sophisticated malware climate, methods commonly used to achieve isolation,
such as the ones we have discussed above, are gradually proving insufficient. The
main typical problems related to the kernel-level solutions like access control and
sandboxing mechanisms is that they enlarge the trusted computing base of the
system and their trustworthiness depends heavily on the characteristics of the un-
derlying OS. Language-based techniques [184] are mostly experimental, and tools
available to enforce them are research prototypes and not applicable to large-scale
real-world systems. Using type systems [184] to enforce isolation is not feasible
since most system software mix C (which is not generally a type-safe program-
ming language [156]) with assembly (which does not support fine-grained types).
Hardware-based solutions are helpful, but they do not solve the problem entirely
either. They increase the bill-of-materials costs, and (potential) bugs in their im-
plementation can be exploited by attackers to violate isolation enforced using these
features [193, 64, 120, 197, 95].
Isolation can be most reliably achieved by deploying high- and low-criticality
components onto different CPUs. This, however, leads to higher design complex-
ity and costs. These make such an approach less appealing and emphasize the
significance of software based solutions again. Security kernel (e.g., microker-
nels [142, 107, 133], separation kernels [174], and hypervisors [26, 189]) are rec-
ognized as practical solutions to mitigate the problems of the aforementioned tech-
niques that bring together the isolation of dedicated hardware and the enjoyments
of having a small TCB.
Microkernels
The primary objective of microkernels is to minimize the trusted computing base
of the system while consolidating both high- and low-criticality components on a
single processor. This is usually done by retaining inside the most privileged layer of
the system only those kernel services that are security-critical such as memory and
thread management subsystems and inter-process communication. Other kernel
level functionalities can then be deployed as user space processes with limited access
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rights. Using a microkernel the user level services are permitted to perform only
accesses that are deemed secure based on some predefined policies.
A fully-fledged operating system can be executed on a microkernel by delegating
the process management of the hosted OS completely to the microkernel (e.g.,
L4Linux) through mapping the guest’s threads directly to the microkernel threads.
However, this generally involves an invasive and error-prone OS adaptation process.
Alternatively, the microkernel can be extended to virtualize the memory subsystem
of the guest OS (e.g., using shadow-paging [8] or nested-paging [39]).
Separation Kernels
Separation kernels are software that enforce separation among system components
and are able to control the flow of information between partitions existing on the
kernel [180]. Programs running on separation kernels should behave equivalently
as they were executing on distributed hardware. Communication between parti-
tions is only allowed to flow as authorized along well-defined channels. Similar to
microkernels, separation kernels implement the MILS philosophy [13].
The idea of separation kernels is primarily developed to enforce (security-) iso-
lation and many such kernels do not support essential functionalities to host a
complete operating system including device drivers and file systems. The com-
monly used technique to compensate this shortcoming is virtualization. The ad-
vent of virtualization technologies provides significant improvements in efficiency
and capabilities of the security kernel. Virtualization allows building high-assurance
systems having the same functionalities as the commodity execution platforms. In
this thesis, we use virtualization as an enabler for isolation and to implement a
separation kernel capable of hosting a complete operating system.
Virtualization
Virtualization, as it is used in this thesis, is the act of abstracting the underlying
hardware to multiplex resources among multiple guests and security-check accesses
to system resources before executing them. The virtualization layer, which is also
called hypervisor, executes at the most privileged mode of the processor and can
interpose between the guests and hardware. This enables the hypervisor to intercept
guests’ sensitive instructions before being executed on hardware. The complete
mediation of events allows the creation of isolated partitions (sometimes referred
to as Virtual Machine (VM)) in which applications with an unknown degree of
trustworthiness can execute safely. Platform virtualization can be done in many
ways, two predominant approaches to virtualization are: full virtualization and
paravirtualization.
• Full virtualization is the technique of providing a guest software with the
illusion of having sole access to the underlying hardware; i.e., the virtual-
ization layer is transparent to the guest. In this approach, the hypervisor
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Figure 2.3: Different virtualization approaches.
resides at the highest privilege level and controls the execution of sensitive
(or privileged) instructions. Whenever the deprivileged guest software tries
to execute one of these sensitive instructions, the execution “traps” into the
virtualization layer and the hypervisor emulates the execution of the instruc-
tion for the guest (c.f. Figure 2.3a). The advantage of using this approach is
that binaries can execute on the hypervisor without any changes, neither the
operating systems nor their applications need any adaptation to the virtual-
ization layer. However, this technique increases complexity of the hypervisor
design and introduces relatively high performance penalties.
• In contrast, in a paravirtualized system, the guest is aware of the virtualiza-
tion layer. Using this technique, the execution of sensitive instructions in the
guest software is replaced with an explicit call, by invoking a hypercall or a
software interrupts, to the hypervisor (c.f. Figure 2.3b). Each hypercall is
connected to a handler in the hypervisor which is used to serve the requested
service. Paravirtualization is proven to be more performant. However, it re-
quires adaptation of the guest to the interface of the hypervisor, which can
be a very difficult task.
Paravirtualization can be implemented using the same hardware features that
operating systems use. Nevertheless, efficient full virtualization of the system usu-
ally requires support from hardware primitives such as the processor or I/O devices.
Essential to full virtualization is the reconfiguration of the guests’ privileges so that
any attempt to execute sensitive instructions traps into the hypervisor. This en-
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tails emulation of hardware functionalities, such as interrupt controller, within the
hypervisor to allow execution of hosted software inside partitions.
Modern processors provide features that can be used to simplify hypervisors
design and increase their performance, e.g., extended privilege domains and 2-stage
MMUs. However, since our main goal is formal verification of the virtualization
software we intentionally avoid using these features, which otherwise complicate
formal analysis by shifting the verification burden from a flexible software to the
fixed hardware.
In order for a hypervisor to host a general-purpose OS, it is generally necessary
to allow the guest software to dynamically manage its internal memory hierarchy
and to impose its own access restrictions. To achieve this, a mandatory security
property that must be enforced is the complete mediation of the MMU settings
through virtualizing the memory management subsystem. In fact, since the MMU
is the key functionality used by the hypervisor to isolate the security domains,
violation of this security property enables an attacker to bypass the hypervisor
policies which could compromise the security of the entire system. This criticality
is also what makes a formal analysis of correctness a worthwhile enterprise.
Widely adopted solutions to virtualize the memory subsystem are shadow pag-
ing, nested paging, microkernels, and direct paging. A hypervisor implemented
using shadow paging keeps a copy of the guest page-tables in its memory to per-
form (intermediate-) virtual to physical address translation. This copy is updated
by the hypervisor whenever the guest operates on its page-tables. Nested paging, is
a hardware-assisted virtualization technology which frees hypervisors from imple-
menting the virtualization mechanism of the memory subsystem (e.g., [117, 146]).
Direct paging was first introduced by Xen [26] and is proved to show better per-
formance compared to other techniques. In paper A we show a minimal and yet
verifiable design of the direct paging algorithm and prove its functional correctness
and the guarantees of isolation at the machine code level.
PROSPER kernel Our implemented separation kernel is called PROSPER ker-
nel, which is a hypervisor developed using the paravirtualization technique to im-
prove the security of embedded devices. The hypervisor runs bare bone in the
processor’s most privileged mode, manages resource allocation and enforces access
restrictions. Implementation of the hypervisor targets BeagleBoard-xM and Bea-
glebone [60] equipped with an ARM Cortex-A8 processor (with no hardware virtu-
alization extensions support) and allows execution of Linux (kernel 2.6.34 and 3.10)
as its untrusted guest. Both user space applications and kernel services (or other
trusted functionalities) on the PROSPER kernel execute in unprivileged mode. To
this end, the hypervisor splits user mode in two virtual CPU modes, namely virtual
user mode and virtual kernel mode, each with their own execution context. The
hypervisor is in charge of controlling context switching between these modes and
making sure that the memory configuration is setup correctly to enable separation
of high- and low-criticality components. In ARM these virtual modes can be im-
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plemented through “domains”. These domains implement an access control regime
orthogonal to the CPU’s execution modes. We added a new domain for the hyper-
visor to reside in, and with the help of MMU configurations and the Domain Access
Control Register (DACR), the hypervisor can set the access control depending on
the active virtual guest mode.
The PROSPER kernel2 has a very small codebase, and its design is kept in-
tentionally simple (e.g., the hypervisor does not support preemption) to make the
formal verification of the hypervisor affordable.
2.1.3 Secure Runtime Monitoring
The increasing complexity of modern computing devices has also contributed to the
development of new vulnerabilities in the design and implementation of systems.
Among dangerous vulnerabilities are those that enable an adversary to impersonate
trusted applications by either injecting malicious binaries into the executable mem-
ory of the applications or causing anomalies in the system control flow to execute
arbitrary code on target platforms.
The success of these attacks mostly hinges on unchecked assumptions that
the system makes about executables in the memory. Therefore, countermeasures
against vulnerabilities of these types include certifying all binaries that are safe to
execute, and employing a monitoring mechanism which checks events at runtime
to prevent the execution of uncertified programs. A runtime monitor is a classical
access enforcement method. A monitor checks validity of the requests to execute
binaries through placing hooks (e.g., by patching system calls) that invoke the mon-
itor’s authorization module (c.f. Figure 2.4a). The main application domain for a
2A full virtualization variant of the PROSPER kernel was also developed by HASPOC
project [32], which supports additional features such as multicore support and secure boot.
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runtime monitor is inside a rich execution environment such as a COTS OS, where
the monitor runs in parallel with other applications in the system and enforces some
security policy.
Essential to making the monitoring process trustworthy and effective is to pro-
vide the monitor with a complete view of the system and to make it tamper re-
sistant. Linux Security Module (LSM) [228] is an example of such a monitoring
mechanism that is integrated into the Linux kernel. However, kernel-level tech-
niques are not trustworthy as the hosting OS is itself susceptible to attacks [124].
An interesting use-case scenario for isolation provided by a security kernel is
when the trusted isolated components are used as an aid for a commodity operating
system to restrict the attack surface of the OS. In a virtualized environment the
monitoring module can be deployed in a different partition (c.f. Figure 2.4b).
Since the hypervisor runs in most privileged mode, it has full control over the
target operating system and can provide the monitor with a complete view of the
events happening in the system. Such a virtualization assisted monitoring was first
introduced by Garfinkel and Rosenblum [86]. Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI),
in the terminology of [86], places the monitoring subsystem outside of the guest
software, thus making the monitoring module tamper proof. A further advantage
of VMI-based solutions is that access enforcement can be done based on information
retrieved directly from the underlying hardware, which can not be tampered by an
attacker. Security mechanisms that rely on the ability of observing the system state
can also benefit from VMI’s properties, e.g., isolation.
2.1.4 Side-Channel Attacks
Despite ongoing efforts, developing trusted unbypassable mechanisms to achieve
isolation remains a challenge. The problem arises due to the design of current
hardware platforms and operating systems. Contemporary hardware platforms
provide a limited number of resources such as caches that are shared among several
processes by operating systems to enable multitasking on the same processor. While
resource sharing is fundamental for the cost-effective implementation of system
software, it is essential to do so carefully to avoid initiating unintentional channels
which may lead to the disclosure of sensitive information to unauthorized parties.
This raises the potential of attack vectors that are not specified by the system
specification and some of which are available for user applications to exploit.
Broadly speaking, leakage channels are classified, based on the threat model,
into two types:
(i) Covert-channels that are channels used to deliberately transfer secret infor-
mation to parties not allowed to access it by exploiting hidden capabilities of
system features, and
(ii) Side-channels that refer to paths, which exist accidentally to the otherwise
secure flow of data, for sensitive information to escape through.
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In covert-channel attacks, both sides of the communication are considered ma-
licious. However, in side-channels attacks, only the receiver has malicious intents
and tries to get access to secret information through measuring (unintended) side
effects of victim computations. Therefore, in COTS system software, we are mostly
interested in studying side-channels.
Side-channels can be further subdivided into two groups, namely storage chan-
nels and timing channels. Storage channels, in the current usage, are attacks con-
ducted by exploiting aspects of the system that are directly observable by the
adversary, such as values stored in memory locations accessible by the attacker or
registers content. In contrast to storage channels, timing attacks rely on monitoring
variations in execution time to discover hidden hardware state. Timing channels
are, in general, believed to have severe impact and they can occur even when the
capability of the attacker to observe system resources is fully understood. However,
the noise introduced by actuators operating on the system usually makes timing
analysis hard.
One very important representative of side-channels are attacks based on mea-
suring effects of caching on system performance. Caches are hardware components
that are widely adopted in computing devices and used to provide quicker response
to memory requests to avoid wasting precious processor cycles. Caches can hold
recently computed data, not existing in the main memory, or they can be dupli-
cates of original values in the memory. For each memory access, if the requested
data is in the cache (cache hit) the request can be served by simply reading the
cache line containing data. If data is not present in the cache (cache miss), it has
to be recomputed or loaded from its original storage location. The MMU controls
accesses to caches, that is, it checks if data can be read from or written into the
cache.
While enabling caches is important for performance, without proper manage-
ment they can be used to extract sensitive information. Cache timing side-channels
are attack vectors that have been extensively studied, in terms of both exploits
and countermeasures, cf. [198, 162, 224, 129, 90, 55]. However, cache usage has
pitfalls other than timing differentials. For instance, for the ARMv7 architecture,
memory coherence may fail if the same physical address is accessed using different
cacheability attributes. This opens up for Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use, asdas-
dasd (TOCTTOU)3- like vulnerabilities since a trusted agent may check and later
evict a cached data item, which is subsequently substituted by an unchecked item
placed in the main memory using an uncacheable alias. Moreover, an untrusted
agent can similarly use uncacheable address aliasing to measure which lines of the
cache are evicted. This results in storage channels that are not visible in information
flow analyses performed at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level.
In practice, chip and IP manufacturers provide programming guidelines that
3Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use is a class of attacks mounted by changing the victim system
state between the checking of a (security related) condition and the use of the results of that
check.
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Figure 2.5: Harvard architecture with separate data and instruction caches.
guarantee memory coherence, and they routinely discourage the use of mismatched
memory attributes such as cacheability. However, in rich environments like hyper-
visors or OSs, it is often essential to delegate the assignment of memory attributes
to user processes that may be malicious, making it difficult to block access to the
vulnerable features.
There are more side-channel attacks that deserve further studies, for instance,
attacks based on analysis of power, electromagnetic patterns, acoustic emanations.
However, exploring their impact on the system security is out the scope of this
thesis. Note also, in contrast to timing and storage channel attacks which can be
conducted remotely [46] these attacks need physical access to the victim machine.
We are mainly interested in improving aspects of platform security that are rel-
evant to the memory management subsystem. In particular, in paper C we use
the L1 data-cache to create low noise storage channels to break isolation between
system components. Moreover, we show how these channels can be neutralized by
exploiting proper countermeasures.
2.1.5 ARM Architecture
The ARM family processors are based on Reduced Instruction Set Computing
(RISC) architecture. The RISC architecture aims to provide a simple, yet powerful
set of instructions that are able to execute in a single CPU cycle. This is achieved
mostly by placing greater demands on the compiler to reduce the complexity of
instructions that hardware executes. In this thesis, we consider Harvard imple-
mentations of the ARM cores. The Harvard architecture uses separate buses, and
consequently separates caches, for data and instructions to improve performance
(cf. Figure 2.5).
The ARM architecture can operate in several execution modes; e.g., ARMv7
has seven modes. Among them, unprivileged user mode is used to execute user
space applications, and the others are protected modes each having specific inter-
rupt sources and are reserved for the privileged operations. Privileged modes are
accessible through the interrupt vector table, which is a table associating interrupt
handlers with the corresponding interrupt request.
ARM processors are load-store architectures; i.e., the processor operates on data
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held in registers. Registers are hardware stores that act as the fast local memory
and hold both data and addresses. Among others, general-purpose registers are
accessible in all modes and of which the register 15 is the program counter and
contains the address of the next instruction that CPU will execute, the register
number 14 is called link register and holds the return address of function calls,
and the register 13 is used as the stack pointer. In addition to the general-purpose
registers, ARM processors also include a number of control registers that are used
to determine the current execution mode, the active page-table, and to control
context switching between modes.
2.2 Formal Verification
The increasing importance of security kernels in system security makes them an
interesting target for attackers. This emphasizes the significance of applying formal
methods to verify the correctness and isolation guarantees of these kernels. A key
research contribution of this work is the formal verification of the PROSPER kernel.
We discuss our verification approach in papers A,B,D and provide more details on
properties that we have verified. In this section, we give a short exposition of our
verification methodology and describe tools that are involved in this exercise.
Establishing trust on software can be achieved in a number of ways. We can
make sure that the program design is fully understood and experienced developers
are chosen to implement it; we can conduct an extensive software testing proce-
dure to check the quality of the program and its conformance with the system
requirements; etc. Unfortunately, while these techniques are helpful to implement
high-quality programs with fewer bugs, still we keep finding errors in extensively
adopted code, such as the binary search algorithm of the Java API [160] and the
open-source cryptographic software library OpenSSL [105, 106]. OpenSSL is be-
hind many secure communication protocols over the Internet and the bug, dubbed
Heartbleed, discovered in this cryptographic library could seriously compromise
the security of systems using this protocol. Such incidents underline the need of
using more rigorous methods to verify the trustworthiness of programs that are
security/safety-critical.
Over the last decades, formal verification has emerged as a powerful tool to pro-
vide enhanced trustworthiness to systems software like hypervisors, microkernels,
and separation kernels [133, 10, 225, 71, 108, 233, 199, 97]. Formal verification
provides strong guarantees backed by mathematical proofs that all behaviors of a
system meet some logical specification.
There exist several approaches to formal verification with various degrees of
automation. For example, model checking [79] is a method of automatically proving
the correctness of a program based on a logical specification, which expresses certain
(temporal) properties of the program such as termination. While model checking
is a widely adopted verification approach in industry, it suffers from the state space
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explosion problem4, and its use is limited to prove properties about programs with
a finite state space. In what follows we briefly describe the techniques used to
formally verify computer programs most relevant to the work presented in this
thesis.
2.2.1 Static Program Analysis
Program analysis is the process of examining a program to find bugs and to detect
possible misbehavior. In general, research in program verification categorizes this
process along two dimensions: dynamic vs. static, and binary vs. source [185]. In
static analysis, reasoning is done without actually running programs to determine
their runtime properties through analyzing the code structure. This is in contrast
to the dynamic approach which verifies a program by inspecting values assigned to
variables while the program executes.
The main idea underlying static verification is to specify properties of programs
by some assertions and to prove that these assertions hold when the execution
reaches them. Each assertion is a first-order formula constructed using the pro-
gram’s constants, variables, and function symbols, and it describes logical proper-
ties of program variables. In this approach, a program is a sequence of commands
C (or statements). The correctness condition of each command is described by
an annotation of the form {P} C {Q}, also called a Hoare-triple [111]. We say
the command C is partially correct if whenever C is executed in a state satisfying
the precondition P and if C terminates, then the state in which the execution of
C terminates must meet the postcondition Q. By extending this notion, using an
inference system, the entire program can be verified using this technique. The in-
ference system is specific to the language of the program’s source-code and consists
of a set of axioms and rules that allow to derive and combine such triples based on
the operational semantics of the language. Note that to prove the total correctness
of the program, proving that execution will eventually terminate is an additional
proof obligation.
For a given postcondition, rules of this inference system also allow computing
a weakest (liberal) precondition. The weakest precondition (wp) computed using
this method can be utilized to verify the triple {P} C {Q} by checking the validity
of a first-order predicate P ⇒ wp(C,Q) [41]. Such a predicate often (e.g., if it is
quantifier-free) can be resolved using an SMT solver.
Binary Verification
Verifying programs at the level of their source-code, while necessary, is not sufficient
on its own. Indeed, most program verification (e.g., verification of a hypervisor)
should reach the binaries (or machine-code) of programs, as object code that ulti-
mately will execute on hardware. Machine-code needs to be examined to ensure
4State space explosion refers to the problem that the memory needed to store the states
required to model a system exceeds the available memory.
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that properties established at the source-code level hold for programs binary as
well.
Binary analysis has its roots in work published by Goldstein and von Neu-
mann [93], where they studied specification and correctness of machine-code pro-
grams. Later, Clutterbuck and Carré [54] stressed the significance of formal analysis
at the binary level and applied Floyd-Hoare-style verification condition generator
to machine codes. Similarly, Bevier [38] showed in his PhD thesis how the kernel
of an operating system can be verified down to its binary. Myreen [155] automates
the whole binary verification process inside the HOL4 theorem prover [114] by in-
troducing a proof-producing decompilation procedure to transform machine codes
to a function in the language of HOL4, which can be used for reasoning.
At the binary level, machine state contains few components (e.g., memory and
some registers and status bits), and instructions perform only very minimal and
well-defined updates [154]. Analysis of machine codes provides a precise account of
the actual behavior of the code that will execute on hardware. Programs’ behavior
at the level of source-code is generally undefined or vaguely defined; e.g., enabling
some aggressive optimization in C compilers can lead to missing code intended to
detect integer overflows [220]. Moreover, low-level programs mix structured code
(e.g., implemented in C) with assembly and use instructions (e.g., mode switching
and coprocessor interactions) that are not part of the high-level language. This
makes it difficult to use verification tools that target user space codes. A further
advantage of using the binary verification approach is that it obviates the necessity
of trusting compilers.
Despite the importance of machine-code verification, it suffers from some prob-
lems. Binary codes lack abstractions such as variables, types, functions, and control-
flow structure, which makes it difficult to use static analysis techniques to examine
machine codes. Furthermore, the indirect jumps existing at the binary level prevent
constructing a precise Control Flow Graph (CFG) of programs, which are often used
by static analyses. Tackling these sorts of problems researchers have been focused
on developing techniques to over-approximate the CFG of programs [25] and to
generate an intermediate representation of binaries (or IL) [45, 47]. The IL repre-
sentation is useful since it helps to mitigate complexities of modern instruction sets
and to restore required abstractions. Paper A elaborates on our solution to produce
a certified IL representation of the PROSPER kernel and shows how we resolved
indirect jumps at the kernel’s binary to facilitate machine-code verification.
Binary verification can be automated to a large extent, for example, Bitblaze [196]
and Binary Analysis Platform [47] are tools developed to automate verification of
functional and safety properties at the machine-code level.
Binary Analysis Platform
The Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) [47] (cf. Figure 2.6) is a framework for ana-
lyzing and verifying binary codes. The BAP front-end includes tools to lift input
binaries to the BAP Intermediate Language (BIL). BIL provides an architecture
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Figure 2.6: Binary Analysis Platform work-flow
independent representation which exposes all the side-effects of machine instruc-
tions. BIL code is represented as an Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) that can be
traversed and transformed using several methods to perform desired analysis. The
back-end of BAP supports utilities to construct and analyze control-flow graphs
and program dependence graphs, to perform symbolic execution and to compute
and verify contracts by generating the weakest preconditions. The weakest precon-
dition algorithm of BAP provides an effective method to speed up the verification
of loop-free assembly fragments, by reducing the problem of verifying Hoare-triples
to proving a first-order formula. This formula can in many cases be validated by
an external SMT solver (e.g., [74]).
Satisfiability Modulo Theories Solver
Deciding whether a formula that expresses a constraint5 has a solution (or a model)
is a fundamental problem in the theoretical computer science. There are several
problems that can be reduced to constraint satisfiability, including software and
hardware verification, type inference, static program analysis, etc. Many of these
problems, if expressed using first-order Boolean formulas, can be solved by a Boolean
Satisfiability (a.k.a. SAT) solver.
A SAT solver determines whether a formula over boolean variables can be made
true. For a first-order formula, this amounts to finding an interpretation of its
variables, function and predicate symbols which makes the formula true. Gener-
alizing concept of SAT solving, solvers for Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT)
can also be used to decide satisfiability of boolean formulas. SMT solvers allow
to include domain-specific theorems (e.g., real numbers or arrays theories) into the
reasoning. This makes SMT solvers more efficient for propositional formulas, but
restricts application of these solvers to more specific areas.
2.2.2 Interactive Theorem Proving
Interactive theorem provers, or proof-assistants, are computer programs commonly
utilized as an aid for the human user to write and machine-check formal proofs.
5Constraints are formulas in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF).
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Interactive provers rely on hints given by the user in constructing proofs rather
than generating proofs fully automatically. In this approach, the user specifies the
proof-structure and provides some guidance communicated via a domain-specific
language to the prover, while the machine checks the proofs and uses the provided
hints to automate the process as much as possible. The automation can be achieved
by proving proof slices (i.e., sub-goals) that are automatically inferable. In contrast
to model checking, theorem proving can be used to verify programs with probably
infinitely many states and is the leading approach to deal with new verification
challenges, such as verification of system software.
HOL4 Theorem Prover
Among the most popular interactive theorem provers are Isabelle/HOL [159], HOL4
[114], and Coq [61]. HOL4 is a LCF-style [94, 168] proof assistant for Hight-
Order-Logic built on a minimal proof kernel that implements the axioms and basic
inference rules. Higher-Order-Logic is an extension of first-order logic with types
and quantification over functions. HOL4 uses Standard ML as its meta-language 6
and provides a rich environment with a variety of libraries and theories to prove
theorems and to implement proof tools. False statements have no possibility of
being proved in HOL4. This is coded through the ML type system to force all
proofs to pass the logical kernel of HOL4.
A user of HOL4 has the possibility of steering the system via a number of
constructs; namely (i) proof tactics, which reduce a goal (i.e. theorem to be proved)
to simpler subgoals and are used to automate the process of theorem proving, (ii)
proof rules, which can be used to transform theorems to new ones, (iii) conversions,
which convert a logical expression into a theorem that establishes the equivalence
of the initial expression to the one computed by the applied conversion, and (iv)
custom built-in ML programs. HOL4 uses backward reasoning to prove goals. Using
this technique, the input theorem is transformed into simpler subgoals by applying
proper tactics. Generated subgoals can then be either directly discharged using a
simplifier or will be further split into simpler subgoals until they are discharged.
2.2.3 Security Properties
In this subsection, we turn to formalize properties we have used to analyze the secu-
rity of a hypervisor. The hypervisor plays the role of a security kernel that provides
a minimal software base to enforce separation and control the flow of information
within a single-core processor. Heitmeyer et al. [108] showed that data-separation
and information flow security properties are strong enough to demonstrate isola-
tion, modulo the explicit communication link, between partitions executing on the
hypervisor.
6The language used to implement the prover itself.
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Data Separation
Informally, separation means prohibiting processes running in one partition from
encroaching on protected parts of the system, such as the memory allocated to
other guests or the hypervisor internal data-structures. Separation, as discussed in
Subsection 2.1.1, can be expressed in terms of two properties, namely integrity and
confidentiality or no-exfiltration and no-infiltration in the terminology of [108].
In the following, we first present formalization of the data-separation property
as presented in [108]. Then, we instantiate the separation property with a model
analogous to the model of our target platform to get properties similar to the ones
we have shown in papers A, B, and D. To this end, we start with a gentle description
of notions that are needed to understand the formalism.
We assume the behavior of the kernel is modeled as a state machine defined using
a set of states σ ∈ Σ, an initial state σ0, an input alphabet E , and a transition
function T : Σ×E → Σ. Each partition is assigned an identifier i and a dedicated
region of the memory Mi marked with the partition identifier 7. The memory of
partitions is further subdivided into two parts: (i) a “data memory” area M{i,d}
which contains all the data-structures belonging to the partition i, and (ii) a number
of “input and output buffers” Bi ∈ M{i,b} to communicate with other partitions.
The input alphabet consists of a number of internal actions ein ∈ D and external
actions eext ∈ P. The internal actions are used to invoke a service handler or to
manipulate the data memory, and external actions are those that can be executed
by fellow partitions or the kernel and have access to the communication buffers.
We use Di (Pi) to denote the internal (external) actions of the partition i and D
(P) is the union of the internal (external) actions of all the existing partitions in
the system. Moreover, the transition function T transforms the system states by
consuming the input events. Having defined this machinery, we can now proceed
to give the formal account of no-exfiltration and no-infiltration properties.
No-exfiltration guarantees the integrity of resources not allocated to the active
partition (i.e., protected data). This property is defined in terms of the entire
memory M, including the data memory and I/O buffers of all partitions, and says
that: for every partition i, event e ∈ Di ∪ Pi, and states σ and σ′ such that σ′ is
reachable from σ by the event e, if a transition from σ to σ′ changes the content of
a memory location m, then m is inside a memory region that is modifiable by i.
Property 1. (No-exfiltration) For all partition i, states σ and σ′ in Σ, event
e ∈ Di ∪ Pi, and memory location m ∈ M such that σ′ = T (σ, e), if mσ 6= mσ′ ,
then m ∈ Mi.
On the other hand, no-infiltration enforces confidentiality by ensuring that data
processing of a partition is free of any influences from “secret” values stored in
7While in [108] an additional memory area is defined that is shared among partitions, we skip
presenting it here to simplify definition of the main properties. This also allows us to combine
no-exfiltration with the kernel integrity property of [108].
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resources that are inaccessible to the partition. No-infiltration is a 2-safety prop-
erty [53, 202] and requires reasoning about two parallel executions of the system.
This property requires that for every partition i, event e ∈ D ∪ P, and states σ1,
σ2, σ′1, and σ′2 such that σ2 and σ′2 are, respectively, reachable from σ1 and σ′1, if
two executions of the system start in states having the same value in m (which is
located inside memory of the partition i), after the event e, the content of m should
be changed consistently in both the final states.
Property 2. (No-infiltration) For all partition i, states σ1, σ2, σ′1, and σ′2 in Σ,
and event e ∈ D ∪P, such that σ2 = T (σ1, e) and σ′2 = T (σ′1, e), if for all m ∈ Mi,
mσ1 = mσ′1 then it must hold that for all m ∈ Mi, mσ2 = mσ′2 .
The no-exfiltration and no-infiltration properties impose constraints on the be-
havior of the active partition. On models allowing communication, an additional
property would be needed to restrict effects of the communication protocol on the
partitions’ state. Separation of control expresses how information can flow through
input/output buffers. In particular, this property says that the external events are
only allowed to change the buffers of the receiving partition, and this write should
not modify the private data memory of the receiver.
Property 3. (Separation of Control) For all partitions i, i ′ and i ′′, states σ and
σ′ in Σ, and event e ∈ D ∪ P such that i ′ and i ′′ are the identifiers of the active
partitions in σ and σ′ respectively and σ′ = T (σ, e), if i 6= i ′ and i 6= i ′′ then for
all m ∈ M{i,d}, mσ′1 = mσ′2 .
This last property is not covered in this thesis. However, the writer co-authored
the paper, “Formal Verification of Information Flow Security for a Simple ARM-
Based Separation Kernel” [71], which presents the verification of the (simplified)
PROSPER kernel for partitions communicating through message boxes (a variant
of input/output buffer). A property which subsumes Separation of Control and is
proved for the kernel in this verification exercise is to show that, while the hypervisor
is able to change message boxes, it cannot modify the other state components
belonging to guests.
The hypervisor we use here has the full control of the platform and provides
for each guest a virtual space in much the same way that a process runs in an
OS-provided virtual memory area. The hypervisor hosts a few guests each assigned
statically allocated and non-overlapping memory regions. Execution of the guests
is interleaved and controlled by the hypervisor. That is, at the end of a specific time
slice (when a timer interrupt happens) or when the active guest explicitly invokes
a functionality of a fellow partition (through explicitly invoking a hypercall), the
hypervisor suspends the active guest and resumes one of idle guests (e.g., the one
which hosts the functionality invoked by the active partition). The guests are
virtualization aware (paravirtualized) software running entirely in unprivileged user
mode and ported on the hypervisor to use the exposed APIs. Moreover, the only
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software that executes in privileged mode is the hypervisor and its execution cannot
be interrupted, i.e., the hypervisor does not support preemption.
The models of our system in this thesis are (ARM-flavoured) instruction set
architecture models. The memory in these models is partitioned into two segments,
namely a code segment and a data segment. Executable code (i.e., a sequence of
instructions) resides in the memory code segment, and the processor fetches and
executes instructions according to the value of a hardware store, called program
counter. In such models the data memory M{−,d} is the aggregation of both the code
and data memories, and events can be replaced by execution of instructions, which
makes the notion of internal/external events superfluous. Also, in this section, we
assume that the partitions on the hypervisor are non-communicating.
System state A state σ ∈ Σ in our model consists of the values of various
machine (i.e., the hardware platform) components such as registers (including both
general-purpose and control registers), memory, and caches.
Execution An execution in this model is defined as a sequence of configurations
from the state space Σ. We represent the transition of states using a deterministic
Labeled Transition System (LTS) →nm ⊆ Σ × Σ, where n ∈ N is the number of
taken steps, and m ∈ {0, 1} determines the execution mode (i.e., either privileged
mode 1 or unprivileged mode 0). Then, for states σ and σ′ a transition from σ to
σ′ can be defined as the following: if the number of taken steps is greater than zero
n > 0 then there exist an intermediate state σ′′ which is reachable from σ in n− 1
steps and σ′ is the state immediately after σ′′, otherwise σ and σ′ are the same.
σ →nm σ′
def≡
{
∃ σ′′. σ →n−1m σ′′ ∧ σ′′ →1m σ′ : n > 0
σ = σ′ : n = 0
In this transition system, single step transitions are denoted as σ →m σ′
def≡
σ →1m σ′, we use σ →∗m σ′ for arbitrary long executions, and if σ →m σ′ then σ is
in modem. Moreover, we use σ0 σn to represent the weak transition relation that
holds if there is a finite execution σ0 → · · ·→ σn such that σn is in unprivileged
mode and all the intermediate states σj for 0 < j < n are in privileged mode (i.e.,
the weak transition hides internal states of the hypervisor).
For models having states consisting of components other than memory, the
no-exfiltration and no-infiltration properties as we defined above are not sufficient
to ensure separation. The behavior of the system in such models does not solely
depend on the memory and interference with other components can lead to un-
expected misbehavior. Therefore, we try to extend the definition of the security
properties to accommodate these additional components. To this end, we give some
auxiliary definitions.
Definition (Observation) For a given guest g on the hypervisor, we define the
guest observation Og as all state components that can affect its execution.
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Definition (Secure Observation) The remaining part of the state (i.e., the memory
of other partitions and some control registers) which are not directly observable by
the guest constitute the secure observations Os of the state.
Definition (Consistent State) We define consistent states as states in which value
of components are constrained by a functional invariant. The invariant consists
of properties that enforce well-definedness of states; e.g., there is no mapping in
a page-table that permits guest accesses to the hypervisor memory. Moreover, Q
represents the set of all possible states that satisfy the functional invariant.
The extended no-infiltration guarantees that instructions executed in unprivi-
leged user mode and services executed inside the hypervisor on behalf of the guest
maintain equality of the guest observation if the execution starts in consistent states
having the same view of the system.
Property 4. Let σ1 ∈ Q and σ2 ∈ Q and assume that Og(σ1) = Og(σ2), if σ1 σ′1
and σ2 σ′2 then Og(σ′1) = Og(σ′2).
Proving the no-infiltration property over the course of several instructions entails
showing the inability of the guest software in changing the critical state components.
This prevents a guest from elevating its permissions to access resources beyond its
granted privileges, such as the memory allocated for the page-tables or the value
of control registers. This can be done by showing that guest transitions preserve
the consistency of states and that the secure observation remains constant in all
reachable states.
Property 5. Let σ ∈ Q, if σ →0 σ′ then Os(σ) = Os(σ′) and σ′ ∈ Q.
Due to the interleaving of the hypervisor and guests executions, one has to check
that context switching (i.e., changing processor’s execution mode) to the hypervisor
is done securely to prevent a guest from gaining privileged access rights. More
importantly, it must be ensured that program counter cannot be loaded with an
address of the guest’s choice, and all entry points into privileged mode should be in
an exception handler. This guarantees that the guest cannot execute arbitrary code
in privileged mode. Likewise, it needs to be ensured that interrupts are correctly
masked, and the return address belongs to the interrupted guest and is properly
stored. To check these properties, we define a switching convention that serves to
restore the context for the activated mode and checks that mode switching from
unprivileged mode to privileged mode is done securely.
Property 6. Let σ ∈ Q be an arbitrary state in unprivileged mode and σ′ be a
state in which the hypervisor is active. If σ →0 σ′ then context switching complies
with the switching convention.
Additionally, it is also essential to show that execution of hypervisor handlers
maintains the functional invariant. Since the hypervisor’s transitions can break the
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(Top Secret, {A}) (Top Secret, {B})
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(Secret,    )
Figure 2.7: A lattice of security labels. Arrows show the intended information
channels, moreover, A, B, C, and D are objects in the system.
invariant, we do not check the intermediate privileged steps. However, it must be
ensured that the hypervisor yields control to the guest only in a state which satisfies
the invariant.
Property 7. Let σ ∈ Q is the state immediately after switching to the kernel, if
σ σ′ then σ′ ∈ Q.
Information Flow Security
Information flow analysis, for systems implementing the MILS concept, is the study
of controlling the propagation of information among security levels. The primary
objective of this study is to rigorously ensure that there are no “illegal” flows of high-
criticality data to low-criticality observers. Denning [75] used a lattice of security
labels to perform this analysis. In her approach security labels indicate criticality
level of objects (e.g., files or program variables) or information receptacles, and
the lattice structure represents the information flow policy within the system. An
example of such a lattice is depicted in Figure 2.7.
The seminal paper by Goguen and Meseguer [92, 91] was first to coin the concept
of noninterference. They divide the system into a number of security domains
and information can flow between domains only according to the information flow
policy of the system. Goguen-Meseguer noninterference prevents actuators in one
domain from learning about the occurrence of certain events in other ones. Pure
noninterference, which is also commonly known as no-infiltration, forbids any flow
of information among domains. This would ensure that actions performed by one
domain cannot influence subsequent outputs seen by another one, and thus the
system does not leak confidential data.
Rushby defined the notion of intransitive noninterference [181] as a declassifi-
cation of classical noninterference, which can accommodate the flow of information
between domains. In a later work, von Oheimb [216] revisited noninterference de-
fined by Rushby and proposed concepts of nonleakage and noninfluence for state-
based systems. Nonleakage is a confidentiality property prohibiting domains from
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Abstract System
Concrete System
Figure 2.8: Forward simulation.
learning about private data of one another, but it does not forbid them from learn-
ing about the occurrence of transitions of other domains. Noninfluence is defined
as the combination of nonleakage and Goguen-Meseguer noninterference.
2.2.4 Verification Methodology
We conclude this section by giving an overview of our proof strategy and drawing a
connection between tools that we have used for formal verification. Our strategy to
analyze the PROSPER kernel, to examine its security and correctness, consists of
lifting the main body of our reasoning to a high-level (design) model of the system,
which is derived from the real implementation of the kernel. The main purpose
of defining such an abstraction is to facilitate formal reasoning. This abstract
model, which is also called Top Level Specification (TLS) or ideal model, defines
the desired behavior of the system and serves as a framework to check the validity
of the security properties [177].
The connection between different layers of abstraction relies on data refine-
ment [21, 177]. Refinement establishes the correspondence between the high-level
(abstract) model and real implementation, and it shows that results of the analysis
on the abstract model can be transferred to the system implementation, too. Since
verifying properties is in general easier on an abstract model, a refinement-based
approach simplifies the verification process.
Back was first to formalize the notion of stepwise refinement, as a part of the
refinement calculus [22, 23]. This approach is later extended by Back and von
Wright to support refinement of data representations, called data refinement [21].
Data refinement correctness is often validated by establishing either bisimulation
or forward simulation [145], as logical tools to show the behavioral equivalence
between two systems.
For the given concrete implementation C and abstract model A , the implemen-
tation C refines A, or equivalently A simulates C, if starting at the corresponding
initial states, execution of C and A terminates in the corresponding final states
(cf. Figure 2.8). The proof of such a refinement is usually done by defining an
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Figure 2.9: Executions of a real machine (middle), and the Top Level Specification
(top) and the relations between them. In addition the binary verification method-
ology (bottom) is depicted. Here, “Lifting” refers to the process of translating the
binary code of the kernel to BAP’s IL, P and Q are pre- and post-conditions serving
as the contract for a kernel handler, and WP is the weakest precondition computed
by taking into account effects of the handler machine code.
abstraction relation R ⊆ ΣA × ΣC8 between states of the models and showing (by
an inductive proof) that R is a simulation relation if A and C are advanced (step
forward) in parallel. Note that for deterministic systems whose executions depend
on the initial state, since for every corresponding initial states there is only one pair
of corresponding executions, it is enough to prove the simulation once.
The validity of the simulation relation R between the two models ensures that
the abstraction A models all possible behavior of C; this is called soundness of the
simulation. However, the inverse relation does not necessarily hold. On the other
hand, the relation R is called a bisimulation relation between the two models if,
and only if, both the models are simulating each other9. This requires showing
completeness of the relation; i.e., it must be proved that for every execution of A
there exists a simulating execution in C.
If the bisimulation relation is proved to hold for all executions of A and C, any
security property shown for A also holds on all executions of the implementation
C. Additionally, hyperproperties (i.e., properties relating different executions of
the same system) proven about A can be transferred to C as well.
Figure 2.9 illustrates our verification strategy. In particular, it depicts the differ-
8Establishing the simulation relation R between two models usually entails showing several
properties, among which demonstrating observational equivalence between the models is an im-
portant property in this thesis.
9This condition does not necessarily is true for nondeterministic systems. That is, it is possible
to have two machines that simulate each other, but are not bisimilar.
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ent layers of abstraction, how they are related, and the tools we have used to verify
properties at each layer. White circles in Figure 2.9 represent states in unprivileged
user mode, and black circles indicate states where the hypervisor is active. In this
figure the “Abstract model” represents the top level specification, “Real model” is
actual implementation of the system where each transition represents the execution
of one binary instruction, and the relation R denotes the refinement relation.
In our approach, the (bi)similarity of unprivileged transitions in two models is
established in HOL4. For the privileged transitions, however, proof of the refine-
ment relation R is done using a combination of HOL4 and the BAP tools. Since
during the execution of handlers no guest is active, internal hypervisor steps cannot
be observed by guests. Moreover, as the hypervisor does not support preemption,
the execution of handlers cannot be interrupted. Therefore, we disregard internal
states of the handlers and limit the relation R to relate only states where the guests
are executing. To show refinement, we use HOL4 to verify that the refinement re-
lation transfers security properties to the Real model and to prove a theorem that
transforms the relational reasoning into a set of contracts for the handlers and guar-
antees that the refinement is established if all contracts are satisfied. Contracts are
derived from the hypervisor specification and the definition of the relation R. Then
we use BAP to check that the hypervisor code respects the contracts, which are
expressed as Hoare triples.
Paper A elaborates more on this pervasive approach that we have adopted to
verify the hypervisor. Verification presented in paper B is restricted to proving
the correctness of a runtime monitor only in an abstract model of the system.
Moreover, paper D shows how properties transferred to an implementation model
(using a similar approach as of paper A) can be further transferred down to a model
augmented with additional hardware features, namely caches.
2.3 Summary
A hypervisor is a system software that enables secure isolation of critical programs
from less trusted (potentially malicious) applications coexisting on the same proces-
sor. Hypervisors reduce software portion of the system TCB to a thin layer which
is responsible for isolating partitions and handling communication between them.
The small codebase of hypervisors minimizes their attack surface and enables the
use of rigorous reasoning to prove their security and correctness.
Commonly used properties in verification of hypervisors are data-separation and
information flow security. One way of verifying these properties is by constructing
an abstract model of the system, proving the properties at this abstract level, and
then transferring the verified properties to the system’s machine-code by showing
a refinement relation.
When modeling a system, one has to take also into account hardware features
such as caches which their effects on the system state can invalidate properties
verified in the absence of these features.
Chapter 3
Related Work
In this chapter, we review works on different aspects related to the main contri-
butions of this thesis, namely formal verification of low-level execution platforms
(Section 3.1), provably secure supervised execution (Section 3.2), and attacks on
isolation (Section 3.3).
Verification of system software is a goal pursued for several decades. Past works
on formal verification of operating systems include analysis of Provably Secure Op-
erating System (PSOS) [81] and UCLA Secure Unix [219]. Neumann et al. [81]
used the Hierarchical Development Methodology (HDM) [176] to design an oper-
ating system with provable security properties. HDM is a software development
methodology to facilitate formal verification of the design and implementation.
UCLA Secure Unix [219] aimed to formally prove that data-separation is properly
enforced by the kernel of a Unix-based OS. Verification of UCLA Secure Unix was
based on a refinement proof from a top-level abstraction down to the Pascal code
of the kernel, and verification assumed the correctness of underlying hardware.
KIT [37], for Kernel of Isolated Tasks, is probably the first fully verified operat-
ing system. Software used in this exercise was a small idealized kernel which was
proved to implement distributed communicating processes. Bevier [37] showed that
properties verified at an abstract model of KIT could be refined to hold also for its
real implantation. Among others, the VFiasco[113] and Robin [204] projects were
also conducted to verify system level software.
3.1 Verification of Security-Kernels
Next, we look at a selection of projects on verification of microkernels, separation
kernels, and hypervisors; a rather comprehensive list of formally verified kernels
can be found in [235].
Formal verification of the seL4 microkernel [133] is probably the leading work in
verification of system software. The functional correctness of seL4 has been verified
in Isabelle/HOL [159] by proving a refinement. The refinement relation shows the
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correspondence between different layers of abstractions from a high-level abstract
specification down to the machine code [190] of seL4. Murray et al. [152, 153] later
extended the verification of seL4 by showing its information flow security based on
the notions of nonleakage and noninfluence as introduced in [216]. The verification
of seL4 assumes a sequential memory model and ignores leakages via cache timing
and storage channels. Nevertheless, the bandwidth of timing channels in seL4 and
possible countermeasures were examined, later, by Cock et al. [56].
Heitmeyer et al. [108] proposed a practical approach to security analyze separa-
tion kernels for embedded devices. The top-level specification used in that project
was a state-machine model of the system which provides a precise description of the
required behavior and is proved to enforce separation properly. The information
flow security of the kernel is shown by annotating its source-code by Floyd-Hoare
style assertions and showing that non-secure information flows cannot occur. Ver-
ification is done in the PVS theorem prover using a memory coherent (cacheless)
model of the system. However, no machine-checked verification was directly done
at the implementation level of the kernel.
The primary verification objective of the Verisoft project [213] was to achieve
a pervasive formal analysis of the system from hardware to programs running in
unprivileged user mode. Verisoft aimed to dismiss the assumption of compiler
and instruction set model correctness. Verisoft-XT [214] continued the verification
started under the Verisoft project. Verisoft-XT initially targeted the verification
of the Microsoft Hyper-V hypervisor using the VCC tool [57]. For this exercise,
guests are modeled as full x64 machines, and caches are not transparent if the same
memory location is accessed in cacheable and uncacheable mode. The verification
of Hyper-V was later dropped to use the developed techniques in verification of an
idealized hypervisor for a baby VAMP architecture [11]. They fully automate the
verification process using VCC and proved that the virtualization of the memory
management subsystem is correct [8]. Verisoft-XT also made contributions to multi-
core concurrency and verification under weak memory models [59]. A subproject of
Verisoft-XT was to demonstrate the functional correctness of the PikeOS [33] mi-
crokernel at its source-code level. The verification is done in VCC by establishing a
simulation relation between a top-level abstract model and the real implementation
of the system.
mCertiKOS [98] is a hypervisor that uses the hardware virtualization exten-
sions to virtualize the memory subsystem and to enforce isolation of partitions.
mCertiKOS runs on a single-core processor, and its functional correctness [98] and
noninterference property [65] has been verified based on a sequential memory model
within the proof assistant Coq. The follow-up work by Gu et al. [99] extended the
CertiKOS hypervisor to run on a multi-core processor. The Contextual functional
correctness of the extend kernel also has been verified using the Coq theorem prover.
CertiKOS is implemented in ClightX, and they used CompCertX to compile and
link kernel programs.
Among other related works, Ironclad [104] is a research project which applied
formal methods to verify the system’s entire software stacks, including the kernel,
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user mode applications, device drivers, and cryptographic libraries. The verification
of Ironclad to prove its functional correctness and information flow security has
been performed on a cacheless model down to the assembly implantation of the
system. Similarly, Barthe et al. [29, 30] applied formal reasoning to show security
of an idealized hypervisor, they also included an abstract model of caches in their
analysis and demonstrated how the isolation property can be verified when caches
are enabled.
To formally verify the INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel [174] the GWV
policy [96]1 was extended to describe the dynamic scheduling of the kernel [103].
This extended policy was also able to capture the flow of information within the
system completely. The analysis is done by creating three specifications, namely a
functional specification which represents the functional interfaces of the system, a
high- and low-level designs that are the semi-formal representation of the system
with different levels of details. The correspondence between the specifications was
shown by a “code-to-spec” review process. The verification of INTEGRITY-178B
to some extent is accomplished using the ACL2 theorem prover.
3.1.1 Trustworthy MMU Virtualization
The memory subsystem is a critical resource for the security of low-level software
such as OS kernels and hypervisors. Since devices like MMUs determine the binding
of physical memory locations to locations addressable at the application level, cir-
cumventing the MMU provides a path for hostile applications to gain illicit access
to protected resources. It is therefore of interest to develop methods for the MMU
virtualization that enables complete mediation of MMU settings and can protect
trusted components. Examples of systems that use virtualization of the memory
subsystem to protect security-critical components include KCoFi [66] based on the
Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA) [69], Overshadow [49], Inktag [112], and Virtual
Ghost [67].
KCofi [66], for Kernel Control Flow Integrity, is a system to provide complete
Control-Flow Integrity protection for COTS OSs. KCofi relies on SVA [69] to trap
sensitive operations such as the execution of instructions that can change MMU
configurations. SVA is a compiler-based virtual machine that can interpose between
hardware and the operating system. The functional correctness of KCofi has been
verified in Coq. The verification covers page-table management, trap handlers,
context switching, and signal delivery in KCofi.
Overshadow [49] is a hypervisor to protect confidentiality and integrity of legacy
applications from commodity operating systems. Overshadow provides OS with
only an encrypted view of application data. This encrypted view prevents the OS’s
kernel from performing unauthorized accesses to application data while enabling
1The GWV security policy allows controlled communication of partitions executing on a sep-
aration kernel. GWV restricts effects on memory segments in a partition to memory regions
that are (i) associated with the current partition and (ii) allowed to interact with the segments,
according to the Direct Interaction Allowed (dia) function.
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the kernel to manage system resources. Overshadow yields a different view of the
memory depending on the context performing a memory operation.
Techniques mostly used to virtualize the memory subsystem are shadow paging,
nested paging, and microkernels. The functional correctness of mechanisms based
on shadow page-tables has been verified in [8, 11, 107, 138]. XMHF [211] and
CertiKOS [98] are examples of verified hypervisors for the x86 architecture that
control memory operations through hardware virtualization extensions.
XMHF [211], or eXtensible and Modular Hypervisor Framework, is a formally
verified security hypervisor, which relies on hardware extensions to virtualize the
memory subsystem and to achieve high performance. The XMHF hypervisor design
does not support interrupts. This design choice enabled automated verification of
the memory subsystem integrity using model checking techniques.
3.2 Trustworthy Runtime Monitoring
Security kernels [14] or reference monitors are programs used traditionally to enforce
access control policies in the kernel of mainstream operating systems. To fulfill
the requirements of having an efficient monitoring subsystem (i.e., providing the
monitor with a complete view of the system and making it tamper-resistant), the
monitor can be implemented as a loadable kernel module. Nevertheless, kernel level
solutions [144, 228] are not reliable, as the kernel itself is vulnerable to attacks, such
as code injection attacks and kernel rootkits.
An alternative is protecting the monitor by a more privileged layer, such as a
hypervisor. The protection can be done through either making inaccessible from
the hypervisor, memory of the monitor, e.g., [192], or integrating the monitor into
the virtualization layer [189, 128]. The later, however, has the inconvenience of in-
creasing the complexity of the hypervisor itself, invalidating the principle of keeping
the TCB as minimal as possible. Secvisor [189, 83] is a formally verified hypervi-
sor based runtime monitor to preserve the guest’s kernel integrity. Secvisor uses
the MMU virtualization to protect the kernel memory and to defend itself against
attacks. SecVisor was verified using the model checking approach to ensure that
only user-approved code can execute in privileged mode of the CPU.
More reliable solutions to implement a secure runtime monitor are protecting
the monitor using hardware extensions, e.g., ARM TrustZone [1], or security ker-
nel. Example of softwares which use hardware extensions to protect the monitoring
module includes [165, 222]. Lares [165] is a runtime monitor built on a hypervisor.
Lares consists of three components: a partition to execute a guest software, a mon-
itoring module deployed in a separate partition, and the hypervisor which creates
isolated partitions and supplies the monitor with a complete view of the guest.
Hypervision [222] uses isolation at the hardware level to protect the monitoring
subsystem and to have full control over the target kernel’s memory management.
Hypervision is entirely located within ARM TrustZone and uses hardware features
to intercept security-critical events of the software that it protects.
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3.3 Attack On Isolation
Creating an isolated, integrity-protected processing environment for security-critical
computations is an active research area in platform security. Over the last years, the
advent of new technologies [15, 148, 1] has made this long-standing goal (almost)
attainable. However, attacks targeting these mechanisms raised concerns about se-
curity of these technologies themselves as the system root of trust. There is a large
body of papers that demonstrate attacks successfully conducted to subvert tech-
niques employed to create trusted execution environments. This section overviews
a few works on exploiting vulnerabilities to compromise isolation solutions.
Hypervisor level attacks can be, in general, categorized into two groups: side-
channel attacks and hypervisor level malware attacks. Side-channels, as defined in
Chapter 2, are paths that exist accidentally to the otherwise secure flow of data and
through which confidential information can escape. Side-channels are usually built
using hidden features of system components; among others, memory and caches
are extensively used to construct such channels. Jankovic et al. [167] showed how
to construct a side-channel between virtual machines on a hypervisor using the
Flush+Reload attack. Apecechea et al. [122] used Bernstein’s correlation attack [40]
to create a side-channel between partitions executing on Xen and VMware [178] to
extract the secret key of the AES cryptographic algorithm. Similarly, in [230] the
last level cache (i.e., L3 cache) is used to mount a side-channel attack.
Hypervisor level malware attacks are used mostly to detect the presence of the
virtualization layer [140] and to mimic the structure of a hypervisor [130]. The
later, also called hyperjacking, installs as a bare-metal hypervisor and moves the
victim software inside a partition without being detected. An example of this
type of attacks is the Blue-Pill root-kit developed by security researcher Joanna
Rutkowska.
Hypervisors are not the only victim of attacks on isolation. There is an extensive
list of attack techniques that target hardware level solutions such as ARM Trust-
Zone and Intel SGX. TrustZone was first introduced in ARMv6 to create an isolated
execution environment. However, it is vulnerability to attacks from unprivileged
user space, to execute arbitrary code inside TrustZone’s secure world, is shown
in [193]. Intel Software Guard Extensions is a technology to protect select data
from disclosure or modification. Nevertheless, a study by Costan and Devadas [64]
and similarly [42, 95] revealed the vulnerability of this technology to cache attacks
and software side-channel attacks. It is also acknowledged by Intel [120] that SGX
does not provide protection against side-channel attacks including those that con-
structed through exploiting performance counters.
3.4 Summary
Formal verification of system software has made great strides in recent years. Veri-
fications are mostly done on models that are simpler than current processors. These
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verification exercises represent significant investments in development and verifica-
tion. However, excluding hardware features such as caches, TLBs, and pipelines
from the analysis makes properties verified in the absence of these features not
reliable in a richer setting.
Taking control of the memory management subsystem, e.g., through virtualizing
the MMU, is a widely adopted technique to enforce isolation of components in the
system. Many projects used memory isolation to deploy a runtime monitor to
control system activities securely.
Chapter 4
Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis can be split into three parts: (i) design and
implementation of a security hypervisor, (ii) attacking the isolation guarantees of
the hypervisor through constructing a low-noise cache storage side-channel, and
(iii) formal verification of the hypervisor down to its machine-code. Our approach
to secure the hypervisor is based on taking control of the memory management
subsystem by designing an algorithm to virtualize the MMU. Furthermore, we use
formal methods to verify the functional correctness and security of the virtualization
mechanism.
This thesis consists of four articles, some of which originally published in peer-
reviewed journals and conference proceedings. In this chapter, we give a summary
of these papers together with a statement of the author’s contributions. Some
papers are revised to improve presentation and to include proofs of key theorems.
In particular, some details in paper B concerning the proof of important theorems
have been changed from the original paper.
4.1 Summary of Included Papers
Paper A: Provably secure memory isolation for Linux on ARM.
Originally published as Roberto Guanciale, Hamed Nemati, Mads Dam,
and Christoph Baumann. Provably secure memory isolation for Linux on
ARM. Journal of Computer Security, 24(6):793-837, 2016.
Content Necessary for a hypervisor to host a general purpose operating system
is permitting the guest software to manage its internal memory hierarchy dynam-
ically and to impose its access restrictions. To this end, a mandatory security
requirement is taking control of the memory management subsystem by the hyper-
visor through virtualizing the MMU to mediate all its configurations. The MMU
virtualization allows isolating security-critical components from a commodity OS
running on the same processor. This enables the guest OS to implement noncritical
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Figure 4.1: Binary verification workflow: Contract Generation, generating pre-
and post conditions based on the system specification and the refinement relation;
Contract Simplification, massaging contracts to make them suitable for verification;
Lifter, lifting handlers machine-code and the generated contracts in HOL4 to BIL;
Ind Jump Solver, the procedure to resolve indirect jumps in the BIL code; BIL
constant jumps, BIL fragments without indirect jumps; Contract Verification using
SMT solver to verify contracts. Here, gray boxes are depicting the tools that have
been developed/extended to automate verification.
functionalities while critical parts of the system are adequately protected. In this
paper, we present the design, implementation, and verification of a memory virtu-
alization mechanism. The hypervisor targets a common architecture for embedded
devices, namely ARMv7 architecture, and it supports execution of Linux without
requiring special hardware extensions. Our virtualization approach is based on di-
rect paging, which is inspired by the paravirtualization mechanism of Xen [26] and
Secure Virtual Architecture [69]. We show that direct paging can be implemented
using a compact design that is suitable for formal verification. Moreover, using
a refinement-based approach, we prove complete mediation along with memory
isolation, and information flow correctness of the virtualization mechanism. Ver-
ification is done on a high-level model that augments a real machine state with
additional components which represent the hypervisor internal data structure. We
also demonstrate how the verified properties at the high-level model of the system
can be propagated to the hypervisor’s machine-code.
The binary verification relies on Hoare logic and reduces the high-level (rela-
tional) reasoning in HOL4 into verification of some contracts expressed in terms of
Hoare triples {P} C {Q}. To validate contracts, we compute the weakest precon-
dition of binary fragments in the initial state to ensure that the execution of the
fragment terminates in a state satisfying the postcondition. We then prove that
the precondition entails the weakest precondition. The validity of these contracts
shows properties verified at high-level models are also valid for the machine-code
of the hypervisor.
The binary verification of the hypervisor is automated to a large extent using
the BAP tool (cf. Figure 4.1). To use BAP we lift the ARMv7 assembly to the
intermediate language of BAP. Lifting is done by utilizing a tool developed in HOL4
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that generates for each expression a certifying theorem showing the equality of the
expression’s BIL fragment and the corresponding predicate in HOL4. Several other
tools have also been developed to automate the verification process and to optimize
the weakest precondition generation algorithm of BAP. The optimization is needed
to reduce the size of generated predicates, which otherwise can grow exponentially
due to the number of instructions. Validating contracts by computing the weakest
precondition relies on the absence of indirect jumps. To fulfill this requirement, we
have implemented a simple iterative procedure that uses STP (an SMT solver) [84]
to resolve indirect jumps in the code. Moreover, writing predicates and invariants
usually need information on data types together with location, alignment, and size
of data structure fields. Since machine-code (and BIL) lacks such information, we
developed a set of tools that integrate HOL4 and the GNU Debugger (GDB) [87] to
extract the required information from the C source code and the compiled assembly.
In this paper, we also present several applications of the hypervisor. For in-
stance, we show how a runtime monitor can be deployed on the hypervisor to check
internal activities of a Linux guest executing in a separate partition.
Statement of Contributions For this paper, I was responsible for adapting the
direct paging algorithm to the PROSPER kernel, implementing the memory man-
agement subsystem of the hypervisor, porting the Linux kernel on the hypervisor,
and developing the new front-end for the BAP tool. The Linux port is done jointly
with other coauthors and our colleagues from Swedish Institute of Computer Sci-
enc (SICS). Further, I together with Roberto Guanciale did all the modeling and
verification of the hypervisor. I also contributed to preparing the text.
Paper B: Trustworthy Prevention of Code Injection in Linux on Embed-
ded Devices.
Originally published as Hind Chfouka, Hamed Nemati, Roberto Guanciale,
Mads Dam, and Patrik Ekdahl. Trustworthy prevention of code injection in
Linux on embedded devices. In Computer Security - ESORICS 2015 - 20th
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Vienna, Austria,
September 21-25, 2015, Proceedings, Part I, pages 90-107, 2015.
Content This paper demonstrate a use-case of isolation provided by the PROS-
PER hypervisor. In particular, the paper presents the design, implementation, and
verification of a VMI-based runtime monitor. The primary goal of the monitor is
thwarting code injection attacks in an untrusted guest OS. The monitor is placed
in an isolated virtual machine to check internal activities of a Linux guest run-
ning in a separate partition. Deploying the monitor inside a dedicated partition
has the advantage of decoupling the policy enforcement mechanism from the other
hypervisor’s functionalities and keeping the TCB of the system minimal. The se-
curity policy enforced by the monitor is W ⊕ X; i.e., each memory block within
the Linux memory space can be either writable or executable but not both at the
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same time. This prevents buffer overflow attacks and guarantees that the untrusted
guest is not able to directly modify executable memory blocks. The monitor uses
a signature-based validation approach to check the authenticity of executables in
the Linux memory. For this, the monitor keeps a database of valid signatures for
known applications. Whenever Linux tries to run an executable, the monitor inter-
cepts this operation, due to the executable space protection policy, and checks if
this executable has a valid signature in the database. If not, the monitor prohibits
this operation.
The verification is carried out on an abstract model of the system to show that
the monitor guarantees the integrity of the system. The verification is performed
using the HOL4 theorem prover and by extending the existing hypervisor model
with the formal specification of the monitor.
Statement of Contributions For this paper, I contributed to the design, im-
plementation, and verification of the monitor. The design and implementation are
done together with Roberto Guanciale, and I also contributed to the verification of
the monitor and writing the paper text.
Paper C: Cache Storage Channels: Alias-Driven Attacks and Verified
Countermeasures.
Originally published as Roberto Guanciale, Hamed Nemati, Christoph Bau-
mann, and Mads Dam. Cache storage channels: Alias-driven attacks and
verified countermeasures. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
SP 2016, San Jose, CA, USA, May 22-26, 2016, pages 38-55, 2016.
Content Resource sharing, while inevitable on contemporary hardware platforms,
can impose significant challenges to security. First level data-cache is one such
shared resource that is transparent to programs running in user mode. However, it
influences the system’s behavior in many aspects.
Great as the importance of caches for the system performance is, caches are
widely used to construct side-channels. These channels enable unauthorized parties
to gain access to confidential data through measuring caches’ effect on the system
state. As an instance, cache-timing channels are attack vectors built via monitoring
variations in execution time, due to the presence of caches, and used in several cases
to extract secret key of cryptographic algorithms.
This paper presents a new attack vector on ARMv7 architecture, which ex-
poses a low-noise cache side-channel. The vector uses virtual aliasing with mis-
matched cacheability attributes and self-modifying code to build cache “storage”
side-channels. We use this attack vector to break the integrity of an ARMv7 hy-
pervisor and its trusted services, such as a runtime monitor which was verified on
a cacheless model, as presented in paper B of this thesis. Furthermore, we show
how this vector can be used to attack the confidentiality of an AES cryptographic
algorithm that was placed in the secure world of platform’s TrustZone.
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To counter the cache storage side-channel attack we propose several counter-
measures and implemented some of them to show their effectiveness. Additionally,
we informally discuss how the formal verification of software which has been previ-
ously verified in a memory coherent (cacheless) model can be restored on platforms
with enabled caches.
Statement of Contributions Roberto Guanciale and I initially developed the
idea of building cache storage side-channels using mismatched cacheability at-
tributes. Then, I investigated more the possibility of constructing such channels
and implemented the poof-of-concept attack based on the code provided by Arash
Vahidi (at SICS). I was also responsible for developing the integrity attack against
the PROSPER kernel and implementing some of the countermeasures inside the
hypervisor and the Linux kernel. Moreover, I contributed to discussions on fix-
ing the formal verification of software previously verified in a cacheless model, and
writing the paper text.
Paper D: Formal Analysis of Countermeasures against Cache Storage
Side Channels
Hamed Nemati, Roberto Guanciale, Christoph Baumann, and Mads Dam.
Formal Analysis of Countermeasures against Cache Storage Side Chan-
nels.
Content Over the past decades, formal verification has emerged as a powerful
tool to improve the trustworthiness of security-critical system software. Verification
of these systems, however, are mostly done on models abstracting from low-level
platform details such as caches and TLBs. In [100] we have demonstrated several
attacks built using caches against a verified hypervisor. Such attacks are facts show-
ing that excluding low-level features from formal analysis makes the verification of
a system unreliable and signify the need to develop verification frameworks that
can adequately reflect the presence of caches.
We informally discussed in [100] how to restore verified (on a cacheless model)
guarantees of software when caches are enabled. In a similar vein, in paper D we
formally show how a countermeasure against cache attacks helps (1) restoring the
integrity of a software and (2) proving the absence of cache storage side-channels.
To ease the burden of verification task, we also try to reuse the previous analysis
of the software on the cacheless model, as much as possible.
To carry out the analysis, we define a cacheless model, which is memory coher-
ent by construction, and a cache-aware model. The cache-aware model is a generic
ARM core augmented with caches and is sufficiently detailed to reflect the behavior
of an untrusted application that can break memory coherence. We show for priv-
ileged transitions that integrity and confidentiality can be directly transferred to
the cache-aware model if the two models behave equivalently. However, since user
level applications are unknown and free to break their coherency, these properties
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cannot be transferred without overly restricting applications’ transitions. Instead,
we revalidated security of unprivileged transitions in the cache-aware model.
Showing behavioral equivalence of the models entails proving that countermea-
sures are correctly implemented and are able to restore memory coherence. This, in
turn, generates some proof obligations that can be imposed on the cacheless model,
thus permitting to use existing tools [24, 47, 196] (mostly not available on a cache
enabled model) to automate verification to a large extent.
The main feature of our approach is the decomposition of proofs into (i) software
dependent (ii) countermeasure dependent and (iii) hardware dependent parts. This
helps to verify the countermeasures once and independent of the software executing
on the system and makes easier to adopt the verified properties for different software
or hardware platforms. We used HOL4 to machine-check our verification strategy
to prove kernel integrity and user level properties. However, kernel confidentiality
is so far mainly a pen-and-paper proof.
Statement of Contributions Initially, I tried to develop a proof methodology
to fix verification of a low-level execution platform on a cache-aware model, and I
wrote the initial draft of the paper. Then, all authors contributed to improve the
technical development and writing the text.
4.2 Further Publications
In addition to the included papers, the following papers have been produced in part
by the author of this thesis:
• Mads Dam, Roberto Guanciale, Narges Khakpour, Hamed Nemati, Oliver
Schwarz: Formal verification of information flow security for a simple arm-
based separation kernel. ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security 2013: 223-234.
• Mads Dam, Roberto Guanciale, Hamed Nemati: Machine code verification of
a tiny ARM hypervisor. TrustED@CCS 2013: 3-12.
• Hamed Nemati, Mads Dam, Roberto Guanciale, Viktor Do, Arash Vahidi:
Trustworthy Memory Isolation of Linux on Embedded Devices. TRUST 2015:
125-142.
• Hamed Nemati, Roberto Guanciale, Mads Dam: Trustworthy Virtualization
of the ARMv7 Memory Subsystem. SOFSEM 2015: 578-589.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this thesis, we explore the design, implementation, and verification of a security
hypervisor as an enabler for isolation between system components. The provided
isolation allows building mixed-criticality systems which consolidate critical func-
tionalities with convenience features on the same processor. The hypervisor reduces
the size of the system’s TCB, and its small codebase permitted us to apply formal
methods to show that the virtualization layer is functionally correct and behaves
as specified. Further proofs are also used to ensure that the hypervisor preserves
the system integrity and confidentially, guaranteeing that separated components
are not able to affect each other.
5.1 Contribution
The contributions of this thesis are summarised as follows. In paper A, we use direct
paging to implement a provably secure virtualized memory management subsystem
for embedded devices. We formally verify on a high-level model of the system
that our approach is functionally correct, and it properly isolates partitions. By
proving a refinement theorem, we then show how these properties can be (semi-)
automatically propagated to the binary code of the hypervisor. A use-case scenario
for isolation obtained using memory virtualization is presented in paper B. In that
paper, we show how a trustworthy runtime monitor can be securely deployed in
a partition on the hypervisor to prevent code injection attacks within a fellow
partition, which hosts a COTS operating system. The monitor inherits the security
properties verified for the hypervisor, and we proved that it enforces the executable
space protection policy correctly.
In the related works chapter, we have seen that verification of system software
is mostly done on models that are far simpler than contemporary processors. As a
result, there are potential attack vectors that are not uncovered by formal analysis.
Paper C presents one such attack vectors constructed by measuring caches effects.
The vector enables an adversary to breach isolation guarantees of a verified system
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on sequential memory model when is deployed on richer platforms with enabled
caches. To restore integrity and confidentiality, we provide several countermea-
sures. Further, in paper D, we propose a new verification methodology to repair
verification of the system by including data-caches in the statement of the top-level
security properties.
5.2 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
Whether the results presented in this work will contribute to any improvement in a
system’s overall security posture depends on many factors. In particular, it depends
on characteristics of hardware, software executing on the platform, and capabilities
of adversaries. In this thesis, we tried to address only a subset of problems related
to platform security and soundness of our results are constrained by the hypervisor
design, model of the processor in HOL4, and hardware platforms that we have used
as our testbeds.
For instance, the model of the memory management subsystem which we have
used in our formal analysis is manually derived from ARM Architecture Reference
Manuals [17, 63, 2]. ARM specifications are mostly written in a combination of
natural language and pseudocode and leave some aspects of the processor behavior
(e.g., effects of executing some system-level instructions) under-specified. This in-
formal and imprecise description makes developing formal models from such specifi-
cations laborious and error-prone and potentially undermines results achieved based
on these models. ARM admits this problem and declares the significance of having
more precise and trustworthy specifications as a motivation behind their recently
published machine-readable and executable specifications [173]. A future direc-
tion for our work is adopting models produced directly from such machine-readable
specifications, which also makes easier to keep up-to-date the formal model of the
system as hardware changes.
Moreover, the complexity of today’s hardware and system software is such that a
verification approach allowing reuse of models and proofs as new features are added
is essential for formal verification of low-level execution platforms to be economi-
cally sustainable. The HASPOC project [32] showed how to adopt a compositional
verification strategy to attain this goal. They modeled system using several au-
tomatons, each with a separate specification, which interact via message passing.
Such compositional approach allows delaying the implementation of detailed models
for some components while making feasible to verify high-level security properties
of the system like integrity and confidentiality. A further advantage of decompos-
ing the model of a system into separate components is that guarantees on constant
parts can be reused when other parts change.
There are a few other issues that should be addressed before our hypervisor
can get adopted in real-world scenarios. For example, the current hypervisor does
not allow explicit communication between partitions. Enabling communication,
however, makes formal verification challenging. The reason for this is that permit-
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ting the flow of information between system components makes it infeasible to use
classical noninterference properties like observational determinism [150] to show
system confidentiality. In such a setting, proving isolation requires a careful anal-
ysis to ensure partitions cannot infer anything more that what is allowed by the
information flow policy about one another’s internal states, e.g., the secret key of
a cryptographic algorithm stored in partition memory.
Finally, in this thesis, we restrict our experiments to software running on a
single-core processor connected to first-level caches, namely L1- data and instruc-
tion caches. Further investigations would be needed to understand the security
impact of other components such second-level caches, pipelines, branch prediction
unit, TLBs, and enabling multi-core processing on the platform, some of which are
left for future work and discussed in more details in respective papers.
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APaper A
Provably secure memory isolation
for Linux on ARM
Roberto Guanciale, Hamed Nemati, Mads Dam, Christoph Baumann
Abstract
The isolation of security-critical components from an untrusted OS allows
to both protect applications and to harden the OS itself. Virtualization of the
memory subsystem is a key component to provide such isolation. We present
the design, implementation and verification of a memory virtualization plat-
form for ARMv7-A processors. The design is based on direct paging, an
MMU virtualization mechanism previously introduced by Xen. It is shown
that this mechanism can be implemented using a compact design, suitable
for formal verification down to a low level of abstraction, without penalizing
system performance. The verification is performed using the HOL4 theorem
prover and uses a detailed model of the processor. We prove memory iso-
lation along with information flow security for an abstract top-level model
of the virtualization mechanism. The abstract model is refined down to a
transition system closely resembling a C implementation. Additionally, it is
demonstrated how the gap between the low-level abstraction and the binary
level-can be filled, using tools that check Hoare contracts. The virtualization
mechanism is demonstrated on real hardware via a hypervisor hosting Linux
and supporting a tamper-proof run-time monitor that provably prevents code
injection in the Linux guest.
A.1 Introduction
A basic security requirement for systems that allow software to execute at different
levels of security is memory isolation: The ability to store a secret or to enforce
data integrity within a designated part of memory and prevent the contents of this
memory to be affected by, or leak to, parts of the system that are not authorised to
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access it. Without the usage of special hardware, trustworthy memory isolation is
dependent on the OS kernel being correctly implemented. However, given the size
and complexity of modern OSs, the vision of comprehensive and formal verification
of commodity OSs is as distant as ever.
An alternative to verifying the entire OS is to delegate critical functionality
to special low-level execution platforms such as hypervisors, separation kernels, or
microkernels. Such an approach has some significant advantages. First, the size
and complexity of the execution platform can be made much smaller, potentially
opening up for rigorous verification. The literature has many recent examples of
this, in seL4 [133], Microsoft’s Hyper-V project [138], Green Hills’ CC certified
INTEGRITY-178B separation kernel [174], and the Singularity [116] microkernel
Second, the platform can be opened up to public scrutiny and certification, inde-
pendent of application stacks.
Virtualization-like mechanisms can also be used to support various forms of ap-
plication hardening against untrusted OSs. Examples of this include KCoFi [66]
based on the Secure Virtual Architecture (SVA) [69], Overshadow [49], Inktag [112],
and Virtual Ghost [67]. All these examples rely crucially on memory isolation to
provide the required security guarantees, typically by virtualizing the memory man-
agement unit (MMU) hardware. MMU virtualization, however, can be exceedingly
tricky to get right, motivating the use of formal methods for its verification.
In this paper we present an MMU virtualization API for the ARMv7-A proces-
sor family and its formal verification down to the binary level. A distinguishing
feature of our design is the use of direct paging, a virtualization mechanism intro-
duced by Xen [26] and used later with some variations by the SVA. In direct paging,
page tables are kept in guest memory and allowed to be read and directly manip-
ulated by the untrusted guest OS (when they are not in active use by the MMU).
Xen demonstrated that this approach has better performance than other software
virtualization approaches (e.g. shadow page tables) on the x86 architecture. More-
over, since direct paging does not require shadow data structures, this approach
has small memory overhead. The engineering challenge inherent to this project is
to design a minimal API that (i) is sufficiently expressive to host a paravirtual-
ized Linux, (ii) introduces an acceptable overhead and (iii) whose implementation
is sufficiently small to be subject to pervasive verification for a commodity CPU
architecture such as ARMv7.
The security objective is to allow an untrusted guest system to operate freely,
invoking the hypervisor at will, without being able to access memory or processor
resources for which the guest has not received static permission. In this paper we
describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of our memory virtualization
API, and the formal verification of its security properties. The verification is per-
formed using a formal model of the ARMv7 architecture [82], implemented in the
HOL4 interactive theorem prover.
The proof strategy is to establish a bisimilarity between the hypervisor execut-
ing on a formal model of the ARMv7 instruction set architecture and the top level
specification (TLS). The TLS describes the desired behaviour of the system con-
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sisting of handlers implementing the virtualization mechanism and the behaviour
of machine instructions executed by the untrusted guest. The specification of the
MMU virtualization API involves an abstract model state that is not represented
in memory and thus by design invulnerable to direct guest access. Due to the direct
paging approach, however, the page tables that control the MMU are residing in
guest memory and need to be modelled explicitly. Hence, it is no longer self-evident
that the desired memory isolation properties, no-exfiltration and no-infiltration in
the terminology of [108], hold for guests in the TLS, and an important and novel
part of the verification is therefore to formally validate that these properties indeed
hold.
To keep the TLS as simple and abstract as possible, the TLS addresses page
tables directly using their physical addresses. A real implementation cannot do
this, but must use virtual addresses instead, in addition to managing its internal
data structures. To this end an implementation model is introduced, which uses
virtual addresses instead of physical ones and stores the abstract model state explic-
itly in memory. This provides a very low-level C-like model of handler execution,
directly reflecting all algorithmic features of the memory subsystem virtualization
implemented by the binary code of the handlers, on the real ARMv7 state, as
represented by the HOL4 model. We exhibit a refinement from the TLS to the
implementation model, prove its correctness, and show, as a corollary, that the
memory isolation properties proved for the TLS transfer to the implementation
model. This constitutes the second part of the verification.
The next step is to fill the gap between the verification of this low-level ab-
straction and the binary level. To accomplish this an additional refinement must
be established. Using the same approach as [72], we demonstrate how this can be
achieved using a combination of theorem proving and tools that check contracts for
binary code. The machine code verification is then in charge of establishing that
the hypervisor code fragments respect these contracts, expressed as Hoare triples.
Pre and post conditions are generated semi-automatically starting from the spec-
ification of the low-level abstraction and the refinement relation. They are then
transferred to the binary analysis tool BAP [47], which is used to verify the hyper-
visor handlers at the assembly level. Several tools have been developed to support
this task, including a lifter that transforms ARM code to the machine independent
language that can be analysed by BAP and a procedure to resolve indirect jumps.
The binary verification of the hypervisor has not been completed yet. However, we
demonstrate the methodology outlined above by applying it to prove correctness of
the binary code of one of the API calls. The scalability of the approach has been
shown in [71], where it was used to verify the binary code of a complete separation
kernel.
An alternative approach would be to focus the code verification at the C level.
First, such an approach does not directly give assurances at the ISA level, which
is our objective. This can be partly addressed by a certifying compiler such as
CompCert[139]. However, system level code is currently not supported by such
compilers. Moreover, this type of code is prone to break the standard C-semantics,
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for example by reconfiguring the MMU and changing the virtual memory mapping
of the program under verification as is the case here.
The verification highlighted three classes of bugs in the initial design of the
virtualization mechanism:
1. Arithmetic overflows, bit field and offset mismatches, and signed operators
where the unsigned ones were needed.
2. Missing checks of self referencing page tables.
3. Approval of guest requests that cause unpredictable behaviours of the ARMv7
MMU.
Moreover, the verification of the implementation model identified additional bugs
exploitable by requesting the validation of physical blocks residing outside the guest
memory. This last class of bugs was identified because the implementation model
takes into account the virtual memory mapping used by the handlers. Finally, the
binary code verification identified a buffer overflow.
We report on a port of Linux kernel 2.6.34 and demonstrate the prototype im-
plementation of a hypervisor for which the core component is the verified MMU
virtualization API. The complete hypervisor augments the memory virtualization
API by handlers that route aborts and interrupts inside Linux. Experiments demon-
strate that the hypervisor can run with reasonable performance on real hardware
(Beagleboard-xM based on the Cortex-A8 CPU). Furthermore an application sce-
nario is demonstrated based on a trusted run-time monitor. The monitor executes
alongside the untrusted Linux system, enforces the W⊕X policy (no memory area
can be writable and executable simultaneously) and uses code signing to prevent
binary code injection in the untrusted system.
A.1.1 Scope and limitations
The binary verification of the hypervisor has not been completed yet. However, we
demonstrate the methodology outlined above by applying it to prove correctness of
the binary code of one of the API calls. The scalability of the approach has been
shown in [71], where it was used to verify the binary code of a complete separation
kernel. In Section A.9.5 we comment on the tasks that are not automated and need
to be manually accomplished to complete the verification.
A.2 Related Work
The size and complexity of commodity OSs make them susceptible to attacks that
can bypass their security mechanisms, as demonstrated in e.g. [206, 124]. The abil-
ity to isolate security-critical components from an untrusted OS allows non critical
parts of a system to be implemented while the critical software remains adequately
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protected. This isolation can be used both to protect applications from an un-
trusted OS as well as to protect the OS itself from internal threats. For example,
KCoFI [66] uses Secure Virtual Architecture [69] to isolate the OS from a run-time
checker. The checker instruments the OS and monitors its activities to guarantee
the control-flow integrity of the OS itself. Related examples are application hard-
ening frameworks such as Overshadow [49], Inktag [112], and Virtual Ghost [67].
In all these cases some form of virtualization of the MMU hardware is a critical
component to provide the required isolation guarantees.
Shadow page tables (SPT) is a common approach to MMU virtualization. The
virtualization layer maintains a shadow copy of page tables created and maintained
by the guest OS. The MMU uses only the shadow pages, which are updated after
the virtualization layer validates the OS changes. The Hyper-V hypervisor which
uses shadow pages on x86, has been formally verified using the semi automated
VCC tool [138]. Related work [11, 164] uses shadow page tables to provide full vir-
tualization, including virtual memory, for “baby VAMP”, a simplified MIPS, using
VCC. This work, along with later work [9] on TLB virtualization for an abstract
mode of x64, has been verified using Wolfgang Paul’s VCC-based simulation frame-
work [58]. Also, the OKL4-microvisor uses shadow paging to virtualize the memory
subsystem [107]. However, this hypervisor has not been verified.
Some modern CPUs provide native hardware support for virtualization. The
ARM Virtualization Extensions [5] augment the CPU with a new execution mode
and provide a two stage address translation. These features greatly reduce the
complexity of the virtualization layer [210]. XHMF [211] and CertiKOS [98] are
examples of verified hypervisors for the x86 architecture that control memory op-
erations of guests . using virtualization extensions. The availability of hardware
virtualization extensions, however, does not make software based solutions obsolete.
For example, the recent Cortex-A5 (used in feature-phones) and the legacy ARM11
cores (used in home network appliances and the 2014 “New Nintendo 3DS”) do not
make use of such extensions. Today, the Internet of Things (IoT) and wearable
computing are dominated by microcontrollers (e.g. Cortex-M). As the recent Intel
Quark demonstrates, the necessity of executing legacy stacks (e.g. Linux) is pushing
towards equipping these microcontrollers with an MMU. Quark and the upcoming
ARMv8-R both support an MMU and lack two stage page-tables. Generally, there
is no universal sweet spot that reconciles the demands for low cost, low power con-
sumption and rich hardware features. For instance, solutions based on FPGAs and
soft-cores such as LEON can benefit from software based virtualization by freeing
gates not used for virtualization extensions to be used for application specific logic
(e.g. digital signal processing, software-defined radio, cryptography).
A virtualization layer provides to the guest OS an interface similar to the un-
derlying hardware. An alternative approach is to execute the commodity OS as
a partition of a microkernel, by mapping the OS threads directly to the micro-
kernel threads, thus delegating completely the process management functionality
from the hosted OSes to the microkernel (e.g. L4Linux). This generally involves an
invasive and error-prone OS adaptation process, however. The formal verification
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of seL4 [133] demonstrated that a detailed analysis of the security properties of a
complete microkernel is possible even at the machine code level [190]. Similarly,
the Ironclad Apps framework [104] hosts security services in a remote operating
system. Its functional correctness and information flow properties are verified on
the assembly level.
In order to achieve trustworthy isolation between partitions, more light-weight
solutions can also be employed, namely formally verified separation kernels [174, 71,
33] and Software Fault Isolation (SFI) [218, 233] . The latter has the advantage over
the former in that it is a software-only approach, not relying on common hardware
components such as MMU and memory protection units (MPU). Nevertheless, both
mechanisms are generally not equipped with the functionality needed to host a
commodity OS. Conversely, formally verified processor architectures specifically
designed with a focus on logical partitioning [225] and information flow control [19]
can be used to achieve isolation.
A.2.1 Contributions
We present a platform to virtualize the memory subsystem of a real commodity CPU
architecture: The ARMv7-A. The virtualization platform is based on direct paging,
a virtualization approach inspired by the paravirtualization mechanism of Xen [26]
and Secure Virtual Architecture [69]. The design of the platform is sufficiently slim
to enable its formal verification without penalizing the system performance. The
verification is performed down to a detailed model of the architecture, including
a detailed model of the ARMv7 MMU. This enables our threat model to consist
of an arbitrary guest that can execute any ARMv7 instruction in user mode. We
prove complete mediation of the MMU configurations, memory isolation of the
hosted components, and information flow correctness. Additionally, we present
our methodology for the binary verification of hypervisor code and report on first
results. So far, one handler has been verified on the binary level. Completing
the binary verification for all handlers is work in progress. The viability of the
platform is demonstrated via a prototype hypervisor that is capable of hosting
a Linux system while provably isolating it from other services. The hypervisor
supports BeagleBoard-xM (a development board based on ARM Cortex-A8) and
is used to benchmark the platform on real hardware. As the main application it
is shown how the virtualization mechanism can be used to support a tamper-proof
run-time monitor that prevents code injection in an untrusted Linux guest.
A.3 Verification Approach
In Figure A.1 we give an overview of the entire verification flow presented in this
paper. In particular it depicts the different layers of modelling, how they are related,
and the tools used. This is discussed in more detail in Section A.3.6.
Our MMU virtualization API is designed for paravirtualization and targets a
commodity CPU (ARMv7-A). In such a scenario, the hosting CPU must provide
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two levels of execution: privileged and unprivileged. The hypervisor is the only soft-
ware component that is executed at the privileged level; at this level the software
has complete control of the underlying hardware. All other software components
(including operating system kernels, user processes, etc.) are executed in unpriv-
ileged mode; direct accesses to the sensitive resources must be prevented and all
transitions to privileged mode are controlled through the use of exceptions and
interrupts.
In addition to the MMU virtualization API itself, as part of the hypervisor, the
system is intended to support two types of clients:
• An untrusted commodity OS guest (Linux) running non-critical software (e.g.
GUI, browser, server, games).
• A set of trusted services such as controllers that drive physical actuators,
run-time monitors, sensor drivers, or cryptographic services.
An example computation of such system is shown in the row labelled “Real
model” of Figure A.1. White circles represent states in unprivileged execution
level where the untrusted guest (either its kernel or one of its user processes) are
running. Gray circles represent unprivileged states where one of the trusted services
are in control. Finally, black circles represent states in privileged level where the
hypervisor is active. Transitions between two unprivileged states (e.g. 1 → 2) do
not cause any exceptions. The transition between the states 2 and 3 is caused by
an exception, for example the execution of a software interrupt. Finally, transitions
from privileged to unprivileged levels (e.g. 6 → 7) are caused by instructions that
explicitly change the execution level.
A.3.1 Attack Model
Due to the size and complexity of a complete Linux system, a realistic adversary
model must consider the Linux partition compromised. For this reason, the at-
tacker is an untrusted paravirtualized Linux kernel and its user processes, that
maliciously or due to an error may attempt to gain access to resources outside the
guest partition. Thus, the attacker is free to execute any CPU instruction in un-
privileged mode; it is initially not able to directly access the coprocessor registers,
and all attacker memory accesses are initially mediated by the MMU. However, by
exploiting possible flaws in the hypervisor the attacker may during the course of a
computation gain such access to the MMU configuration, something our security
proof shows is in fact not possible. In this work, we assume absence of external
mechanisms that can directly modify the internal state of the machine (e.g. external
devices or physical tampering). The analysis of temporal partitioning properties
(e.g. timing channels as investigated in [55]) is also deliberately left out of this
work.
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Figure A.1: Executions of a real machine (middle), the implementation model
(above), and the Top Level Specification (top) and the relations between them.
In addition the dependencies of the binary verification methodology (bottom) are
depicted.
A.3.2 Security Goals
The verification must demonstrate that the low level platform does not allow un-
desired interference between guest and sensitive resources. That is:
1. The hypervisor must play the role of a security monitor of the MMU settings.
If complete mediation of the MMU settings is violated, then an attacker may
bypass the hypervisor policies and compromise the security of the entire sys-
tem. We show this by proving that neither the untrusted guest nor the trusted
services can directly change the MMU configuration.
2. Executions of an arbitrary guest cannot affect the “trusted world”, i.e. the
parts of the state the guest is not allowed to modify, such as memory of
trusted services, system level registers and status flags, and the hypervisor
state. This is an integrity property, similar to the no-exfiltration property
of [108].
3. Absence of information flow from the trusted world to the guest, i.e. confi-
dentiality, similar to no-infiltration of [108].
Note that these properties, as in [108], are qualitatively different: The integrity
property is a single-trace property, and concerns the inability of the guest to directly
write some other state variables. Since it is under guest control when and how to
invoke the virtualization API, there are plenty of indirect communication channels
connecting guests to the hypervisor. For instance, a guest decision to allocate or
deallocate a page table affects large parts of the hypervisor state, without ever
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directly writing to any internal hypervisor state variable. Enforcing this is in a
sense the very purpose of the hypervisor. On the other hand, the only desired
effects of hypervisor actions should be to allocate/deallocate, map, remap, and
unmap virtual memory resources, leaving any other observation a guest may make
unaffected, thus preventing the guest from extracting information from inaccessible
resources even indirectly. This is essentially a two-trace information flow property,
needed to break guest-to-guest (or guest-to-service) information channels in much
the same way as intransitive noninterference is used in [153] to break guest-to-guest
channels passing through the scheduler in seL4.
In this work we establish these properties via successive refinements that add
more details (that in turn can highlight different misbehaviour of the system) to the
virtualization API, starting from an abstract model refining down to the binary code
of the low level execution platform. We first demonstrate that the intended security
property holds for the most abstract model. At each refinement, the proof consist of
(i) identifying a relation that is strong enough to transfer the security property from
the higher abstract model to the more real one (we call this a candidate relation)
and (ii) demonstrating that the candidate relation actually satisfies the properties
required from a refinement relation. For the first task it turns out that one needs a
bisimulation relation in order to transfer higher-order information flow properties
like confidentiality. The latter task is reduced to subsidiary properties, which have
natural correspondences in previous kernel verification literature [108, 174]:
• A malicious guest cannot violate isolation while it is executing.
• Executions of the abstract vs the more real model preserve the candidate
bisimulation relation.
These two tasks are qualitatively different. The former task, due to our use of mem-
ory protection, is really a noninterference-like property of the hosting architecture
rather than a property of the hypervisor. This property must hold independently
of the hosted guest, which is unknown at verification time since the attacker can
take complete control of the untrusted Linux. By contrast, the latter task consists
in verifying at increasing levels of detail the functional correctness of the individual
handlers.
A.3.3 Top Level Specification
The first verification task focuses on establishing correctness of the design of the
virtualization API. With this goal, in Section A.6.1 we specify the desired behaviour
of the virtualization API as a transition system, called the Top Level Specification
(TLS). This specification models unprivileged execution of an arbitrary guest sys-
tem on top of a CPU with MMU support, alternating with abstract handler events.
These events model invocations of the hypervisor handlers as atomic transforma-
tions operating on an abstract machine state. Abstract states are real CPU states
extended by auxiliary (model) data that reflect the internal state of the hypervisor.
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We refer to this auxiliary data as the abstract hypervisor state. Handler events
represent the execution of several instructions at privileged level, in response to ex-
ceptions or interrupts. Modelling handler effects as atomic state transformations is
possible, since the hypervisor is non-preemptive, i.e. nested exceptions/interrupts
are ruled out by the implementation.
Since in direct paging the guest systems can directly manipulate inactive page
tables, the TLS needs to explicitly model page tables in memory. This contrasts
simpler models such as the one presented in [71] where the hypervisor state was
represented in the TLS using abstract model variables only. For this reason, estab-
lishing complete mediation, integrity, and confidentiality for the TLS is far from
trivial.
A.3.4 Implementation Model
Extending the security properties to an actual implementation, however, requires
additional work, for the following reasons:
• The TLS uses auxiliary data structures (the abstract hypervisor state) that
are not stored inside the system memory.
• The TLS accesses the memory directly using physical addresses.
As is common practice, the virtualization code executes under the same address
translation as the guest (but with different access permissions), in order to reduce
the number of context switches required. For this approach it is critical to verify
that all low-level operations performed by the hypervisor correctly implement the
TLS specification; these operations include reads and updates of the page tables,
and reads and updates of the hypervisor data structures. To show implementation
soundness we exhibit a refinement property relating TLS states with states of the
implementation. The refinement relation is proven to be preserved by all atomic
hypervisor operations; reads and updates of the page tables, reads and updates of
the hypervisor data structures. In particular it is established that these virtual
memory operations access the correct physical addresses and never produce any
data abort exceptions. Moreover, it is shown that the refinement relation directly
transfers both the integrity properties and the information flow properties of the
TLS to the implementation level.
A.3.5 Binary Verification
The last verification step consists in filling the gap between the implementation and
the binary code executed on the actual hardware. This requires to exhibit a refine-
ment relation between the implementation model and the real model of the system
(i.e. where each transition represents the execution of one binary instruction).
Intuitively, internal hypervisor steps cannot be observed by the guests, since
during the execution of the handler no guest is active. Moreover, as the hypervisor
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does not support preemption, then the execution of handlers cannot be interrupted.
These facts permit to disregard internal states of the handlers and limit the refine-
ment to relate only states where the guests are executing.
Thus, the binary verification can be accomplished in three steps: (i) verification
that the refinement relation directly transfers the isolation properties to the real
model, (ii) verification of a top level theorem that transforms the relational reason-
ing into a set of contracts for the handlers and guarantees that the refinement is
established if all contracts are satisfied, and (iii) verification of the machine code.
The last step establishes if the hypervisor code fragments respect the contracts,
expressed as Hoare triples {P}C{Q}, where P and Q are the pre/post conditions
of the assembly fragment C.
A.3.6 Proof Engineering
We use Figure A.1 and Table A.1 to summarise the models, theorems and tools that
are described in the following sections. We use three transition systems; the TLS
(Section A.6.1), the Implementation Model (Section A.6.2) and the ARMv7 model
(Section A.4). These transition systems have been defined in the HOL4 theorem
prover and differ in the level of abstraction they use to represent the hypervisor
behaviour. The three transition systems model guest behaviour identically (e.g.
transitions 0 → 1); these transitions obey the access privileges computed by the
MMU and satisfy properties 8 and 9 of Section A.4. These properties have been
verified for a simplified MMU model in [127].
We use HOL4 to verify that the security properties hold for the TLS (Theo-
rems A.6.1, A.6.2, A.6.3, A.6.4 and A.6.5 of Section A.6.1). The reasoning
used to implement the proofs in the interactive theorem prover is summarised in
Section A.7.
The refinement (R) between the TLS and the implementation model is verified
in HOL4 (Theorem A.6.6 of Section A.6.2). We also use HOL4 to prove that the
refinement transfers the security properties of the TLS to the implementation model
(Corollary 1).
The refinement (R′) between the implementation model and the real model is
formally defined in HOL4, allowing us to prove that the refinement transfers the
security properties to the ARMv7 model (Corollary 2).
The verification of the refinement (Theorem A.6.7 of Section A.6.3) is only
partial: we demonstrate the verification of the binary code of the hypervisor only
for a part of the code-base and we rely on some assumptions in order to fill the
semantic gap between HOL4 and the external tools. We prove Theorem A.6.7 for
non-privileged transitions in HOL4 (i.e. transitions not involving the hypervisor
code such as 1→ 2 and 12→ 13).
For the hypervisor code, we show that the task can be partially automated by
means of external tools. For this purpose we use the HOL4 model of ARMv7 to
transform the binary code of the hypervisor (e.g. the code executed between states
3 and 7 in the real model) to the input language of BAP (represented in the figure
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by the arrow labelled “Lifter”). The usage of HOL4 for this task allows us to reduce
the assumptions needed to fill the gap between the HOL4 ARMv7 model and BAP,
as described in Section A.9. The methodology to complete the verification is the
following: given a hypervisor handler whose code has been translated to the BAP
code C, we use a HOL4 certifying procedure that generates a contract {P}C{Q}
starting from the hypervisor implementation model and the refinement relation.
The certifying procedure yields a HOL4 theorem stating that the refinement relation
R′ is preserved if the hypervisor handler C establishes the postcondition Q starting
from the precondition P . We use BAP to compute the weakest precondition WP
of the postcondition Q and the code C and a finally an SMT solver checks that the
weakest precondition is entailed by the precondition.
A.4 The ARMv7 CPU
ARMv7 is the currently dominant processor architecture in embedded devices. Our
verification relies on the HOL4 model of ARM developed at Cambridge [82]. The
use of a theorem prover allows the verification goals to be stated in a manner which
is faithful to the intuition, without resorting to approximations and abstractions
that would be needed when using a fully automated tool such as a model checker.
Furthermore, basing the verification on the Cambridge ARM model lends high
trustworthiness to the exercise: The Cambridge model is well-tested and phrased
in a manner that retains a high resemblance to the pseudocode used by ARM in
the architecture reference manual [17]. The Cambridge model has been extended
by ourselves to include MMU functionality. The resulting model gives a highly
detailed account of the ISA level instruction semantics at the different privilege
levels, including relevant MMU coprocessor effects. It must be noted that the
Cambridge ARM model assumes linearizable memory, and so can be used out of the
box only for processor and hypervisor implementations that satisfy this property,
for instance through adequate cache flushing as discussed in Section A.5.5.
We outline the HOL4 ARMv7 model in sufficient detail to make the formal
results presented later understandable. An ARMv7 machine state is a record
σ = 〈uregs, bregs, coregs,mem〉 ∈ Σ ,
where uregs, bregs, coregs, and mem, respectively, represent the user registers,
banked registers (used for handling exceptions), coprocessors, and memory. The
function mode(σ) returns the current privilege execution mode in the state σ, which
can be either PL0 (unprivileged or user mode, used by the guest) or PL1 (privi-
leged mode, used by the hypervisor). The memory is the function mem ∈ 232 → 28.
The coprocessor registers coregs control the MMU.
System behaviour is modelled by the state transition relation →l∈{PL0 ,PL1}⊆
Σ × Σ, where a transition is performed by the execution of an ARM instruction.
Unprivileged transitions (σ →PL0 σ′) start from and end in states that are in
unprivileged execution mode (i.e. mode(σ) = mode(σ′) = PL0 ). All the other
A.4. THE ARMV7 CPU 67
Artefact Description HOL4 BAP In
TLS Model of the abstract design of
the hypervisor + attacker (guest)
◦ [157]
Implementation model Low level model of the hypervi-
sor + attacker
◦ [72]
ARM model Real model of the system ◦ [82, 157]
Properties 8 and 9 Properties of the ARM instruc-
tion set (here only assumed)
◦ [127]
Properties of the TLS
Theorem A.6.1 Verification of the functional in-
variant
◦ [157]
Theorem A.6.2 Verification of MMU integrity ◦ [157]
Theorem A.6.3 Verification of no context switch ◦ [157]
Theorems A.6.4
and A.6.5
Verification of No exfiltration +
No infiltration = isolation
◦ [157]
Properties of the Implementation model
Theorem A.6.6 Verification of Refinement ◦ [72]
Corollary 1 Verification of MMU integrity +
No exfiltration + No infiltration
◦ [72]
Properties of the real model
Theorem A.6.7 Refinement. For non-privileged
transitions proved in HOL4. One
of the API function proved using
BAP
◦ ◦ Here
Corollary 2 Verification of MMU integrity +
No exfiltration + No infiltration
◦ Here
Miscellaneous
Lifter Translation of ARMv7 binary to
BIL
◦ ◦ [72, 71]
Certifying procedure Generates a contract starting
from the model of one of the API
function and the refinement rela-
tion
◦ Here
Indirect jump solver Computes all possible target of
indirect jumps for a BIL loop free
program. Here extended and re-
implemented as BAP extension
◦ [72]
Table A.1: List and first appearance of models, theorems and tools.
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transitions (σ →PL1 σ′) involve at least one state in privileged level. The raising of
an exception is modelled by a transition that enables the level PL1 . An exception
can be raised because: (i) a software interrupt (SWI) is executed, (ii) the current
instruction is undefined, (iii) a memory access is attempted that is disallowed by
the MMU, or (iv) an hardware interrupt is received. Whenever an exception occurs,
the CPU disables the interrupts and jumps to a predefined address in the vector
table to transfer control to the corresponding exception handler.
The ARMv7 MMU uses a two level translation scheme. The first level (L1)
consists of a 4096 entry table that divides up to 4GB of memory into 1MB sections.
These sections can either point to an equally large region of physical memory or
to a level 2 (L2) page table with 256 entries that maps the 1MB section into 4 KB
physical pages. MMU behaviour is modelled by the function mmu(σ, pl, va, req),
which takes a state σ, a privilege level, a virtual address va and an access request
req ∈ {rd, wt, ex} (representing read, write and execute accesses) and yields pa ∈
232 ∪ {⊥}, where pa is the translated physical address or an access denied. The
ARMv7 documentation describes the possibility of unpredictable behaviour due to
erroneous setup of the MMU through coprocessor registers and page tables. In this
work the hypervisor completely mediates the MMU configuration and aims to rule
out this kind of behaviour.
In the ARM architecture domains provide a discretionary access control mecha-
nism. This mechanism is orthogonal to the one provided by CPU execution modes.
There are sixteen domains, each on activated independently in one of the copro-
cessor registers coregs. The page tables map each virtual page/section to one of
the domains and the MMU forbids accesses to a page/section if the corresponding
domain is not active.
The state transition relation queries the MMU whenever a virtual address is
accessed, and raises an exception if the requested access mode is not allowed. To
describe the security properties guaranteed by an ARMv7 CPU we introduce some
auxiliary definitions.
Physical memory access rights The predicate mmuph takes a state σ, the priv-
ilege level pl, a physical address pa and an access permission req ∈ {rd, wt, ex} and
holds if the access permission is granted for physical address pa.
mmuph(σ, pl, pa, req) ⇔ ∃va. mmu(σ, pl, va, req) = pa
The ARMv7 MMU mediates accesses to the virtual memory, enabling or forbidding
operations to virtual addresses. Intuitively, a physical address pa can be read
(written) if it exists at least a virtual addresses va that can be read (written) and
that is mapped to pa according with the current page tables.
Write-derivability We say that a state σ′ is write-derivable from a state σ in
privilege level pl if their memories differ only for physical addresses that are writable
in pl.
wd(σ, σ′, pl) ⇔ ∀pa. σ.mem(pa) 6= σ′.mem(pa)⇒ mmuph(σ, pl, pa, wt) .
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According with the MMU configuration in σ, only a subset of physical addresses
are writable (mmuph(σ, pl, pa, wt)). Write-derivability identifies the set of states
that can be produced by changing the memory content of an arbitrary number of
such physical addresses with arbitrary values.
MMU-equivalence We say that two states are MMU-equivalent if for any virtual
address va the MMU yields the same translation and the same access permissions.
σ ≡mmu σ′ ⇔ ∀va, pl, req. mmu(σ, pl, va, req) = mmu(σ′, pl, va, req)
Informally, two states are MMU-equivalent if their MMUs are configured exactly in
the same way.
MMU-safety Finally, a state is MMU-safe if it has the same MMU behaviour
as any state with the same coprocessor registers whose memory differs only for
addresses that are writable in PL0 .
mmus(σ) ⇔ ∀σ′. σ.coregs = σ′.coregs ∧ wd(σ, σ′,PL0 )⇒ (σ ≡mmu σ′)
A state is MMU-safe if there is no way to change the MMU configuration (i.e. the
page tables) by writing into addresses that are writable in non-privileged mode.
That is the MMU configuration prevents non-privileged SW to tamper the page
tables.
An ARMv7 processor that obeys the access privileges computed by the MMU
satisfies the following two properties:
Property 8 (ARM-integrity). Assume σ ∈ Σ with mode(σ) = PL0 . If σ →PL0 σ′
and mmus(σ) then wd(σ, σ′,PL0 ) and σ.coregs = σ′.coregs, i.e., unprivileged steps
from MMU-safe states can only lead into write-derivable states and do not affect
the coprocessor registers.
Note, that the MMU-safety prerequisite is not redundant here, because single
instructions in ARM may result in a series of write operations, e.g., for “store pair”
and unaligned store instructions. If the MMU configuration was not safe from
manipulation in unprivileged mode, then such a series of writes could lead to an
intermediate MMU configuration granting more write permissions than the initial
one and the resulting state would not be write-derivable from σ.
Property 9 (ARM-confidentiality). Let σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ with mode(σ1) = mode(σ2) =
PL0 , and let A contains all physical addresses accessible in σ1, i.e., A ⊇ {pa |
∃req. mmuph(σ1,PL0 , pa, req)}. Suppose that σ1.uregs = σ2.uregs, σ1.coregs =
σ2.coregs, σ1 ≡mmu σ2, and ∀pa ∈ A. σ1.mem(pa) = σ2.mem(pa). If σ1 →PL0 σ′1,
there exists σ′2 such that σ2 →PL0 σ′2, mmus(σ1), and mmus(σ2) then
σ′1.uregs = σ′2.uregs , σ′1.coregs = σ′2.coregs and ∀pa ∈ A. σ′1.mem(pa) = σ′2.mem(pa) .
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Intuitively, Property 9 establishes that in MMU-safe configurations unprivileged
transitions only can access information stored in the registers and in the part of
memory that is readable in PL0 according to access permissions. Within this
paper we take Properties 8 and 9 for granted. In [127] the authors validated the
HOL4 ARMv7 model against these properties assuming an identity-mapped address
translation. Extending the result for an arbitrary but MMU-safe page table setup
is currently nearing completion.
A.5 The Memory Virtualization API
The memory virtualization API is designed for the ARMv7-A architecture1 and
assumes neither hardware virtualization extensions nor TrustZone [4] support. To
properly isolate the trusted components from the untrusted guest, which hosts a
commodity OS, the memory virtualization subsystem needs to provide two main
functionalities:
• Isolation of memory resources used by the trusted components.
• Virtualization of the memory subsystem to enable the untrusted OS to dy-
namically manage its own memory hierarchy, and to enforce access restric-
tions.
The physical memory region allocated to each type of client is statically defined.
Inside its own region the guest OS is free to manage its own memory, and the
virtualization API does not provide any additional guarantees for the security of
the guest OS kernel against attacks from its user processes. However, using trusted
services such as a run-time monitor it is possible to provide provable security guar-
antees to the guest OS, for instance to enforce the W⊕X policy or to secure software
updates, as explained in Section A.12.
A.5.1 Memory Management
The virtual memory layout is defined by a set of page tables that reside in physical
memory. The configuration of these page tables is security-critical and must not be
directly manipulated by untrusted parties. At the same time, the untrusted Linux
kernel needs to manage its memory layout, which requires constant access to the
page tables. Hence the hypervisor must provide a secure access mechanism, which
we refer to as virtualizing the memory subsystem.
We use direct paging [26] to virtualize the memory subsystem. Direct paging
allows the guest to allocate the page tables inside its own memory and to directly
manipulate them while the tables are not in active use by the MMU. Once the
page tables are activated, the hypervisor must guarantee that further updates are
possible only via the virtualization API to modify, allocate and free the page tables.
1In practice, the presented design also supports the ARMv6 and ARMv5 architectures.
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Figure A.2: Direct paging: 1) guest writes to virtual memory are mediated by the
MMU as usual; 2) page tables are allocated in guest memory; 3) the hypervisor
prevents writable mappings to guest memory regions holding page tables, forbidding
the guest to directly modify them; 4) the hypervisor allows writable mappings to
data blocks in guest memory.
Physical memory is fragmented into blocks of 4 KB. Thus, a 32-bit architecture
has 220 physical blocks. Since L1 and L2 page tables have size 16 KB and 1 KB
respectively, an L1 page table is stored in four contiguous physical blocks and a
physical block can contain four L2 page tables. We assign a type to each physical
block, that can be:
• data: the block can be written by the guest.
• L1 : contains part of an L1 and is not writable in unprivileged mode.
• L2 : contains four L2 and is not writable in unprivileged mode.
The virtualization API shown in Figure A.3 is very similar to the MMU interface of
the Secure Virtual Architecture [69] and consists of 9 hypercalls that select, create,
free, map, or unmap memory blocks or page tables.
Figure A.2 indicates the address translation procedure and the connection be-
tween components of memory subsystem.
A.5.2 Enforcing The Page Type Constraints
Each API call needs to validate the page type, guaranteeing that page tables are
write-protected. This is illustrated in Figure A.4. The table in the centre represents
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switch Select the active L1
L1create Create page table of type L1
L2create Create page table of type L2
L1free Change the type of an L1 block to data
L2free Change the type of an L2 block to data
L1unmap Clear an entry of an L1 page table
L2unmap Clear an entry of an L2 page table
L1map Set an entry of an L1 page table
L2map Set an entry of an L2 page table
Figure A.3: The virtualization API of the hypervisor to support direct paging.
Figure A.4: Direct-paging mechanism. We use solid arrows to represent the L2
page table references and unprivileged write permissions, dotted arrows to represent
other allowed references, and dashed arrows for references violating the page table
policy.
the physical memory and stores the virtualization data structures for each physical
block; the page type (pt), a flag informing if the block is allocated to guest memory
(gm) and a reference counter (rc).
The four top most blocks contain an L1 page table, whose 4096 entries are
depicted by the table L1-A. The top entry of the page table is a section descriptor
(T = S) that grants write permission to the guest (AP = (0, w)). This entry’s
address component (Adr) points to the second physical section, which consists of
256 physical blocks. Two more section descriptors of L1-A are depicted in the table:
the first one grants read-only permission to the guest (0, r), the second descriptor
prevents any guest access and enables write permission for the privileged mode
(1, w). The last two entries of L1-A are PT-descriptors. Each entry points to an
L2 page table in the same physical block described by table L2-A and containing
four L2 page tables.
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The API calls manipulating an L1 enforce the following policy:
Any section descriptor that allows the guest to access the memory
must point to a section for which every physical block resides in the
guest memory space. Moreover, if a descriptor enables a guest to write
then each block must be typed data. Finally, all PT-descriptors must
point to physical blocks of type L2.
The Figure depicts two additional L1 page tables; L1-B and L1-C. The type of
a physical block containing L1-B can be transformed to L1 by invoking L1create.
On the other hand, a block containing L1-C is rejected by L1create since the block
contains three entries that violate the policy. In fact,
• the first descriptor grants guest write permission over a section which has at
least one non data block, in this case L2,
• the second section descriptor allows the guest to access a section of the phys-
ical memory in which there exists a block that is outside the guest memory,
and
• the third entry is a PT-descriptor, but points to a physical block that is not
typed L2.
The first setting clearly breaks MMU-safety, since the guest is now able to write
directly to a page table, circumventing the complete mediation of MMU configu-
rations by the hypervisor. The second situation compromises confidentiality and
possible integrity of the system if the guest has write access to the block outside its
own memory. The third issue may again break MMU-safety if the referenced block
is a writable data block. In case the referenced block contains (part of) another
L1 page table this setting can lead to unpredictable MMU behaviour, since the L1
page table entries have a different binary format than the expected L2 entries.
The table L2-A depicts the content of a physical block typed L2 that contains
four L2 page tables, each consisting of 256 entries. Each hypercall that manipulates
an L2 enforces the following policy:
If any entry of the four L2 page tables grants access permission to
the guest then the pointed block must be in the guest memory. If the
entry also enables guest write access then the pointed block must be
typed data.
For example a block containing L2-B is rejected by L2create, since the block con-
tains at least two entries that violate the policy and thus threaten MMU-safety and
integrity (in case of the first entry shown) as well as confidentiality (in case of the
second one).
A naive run-time check of the page-type policy is not efficient, since it requires
to re-validate the L1 page table whenever the switch hypercall is invoked. To
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Figure A.5: Spawning a new process using the virtualization API. The guest (1)
requests a writable mapping of four physical blocks to allocate a new L1 page table.
After (2) setting up the table in memory (not shown), it asks (3) to remove the
writable mapping, (4) to interpret the blocks as an L1 table, and (5) to make this
one the new active L1 page table (not shown).
efficiently enforce that only data blocks can be written by the guest, the hypervisor
maintains a reference counter, tracking for each block the sum of:
1. The number of descriptors providing writable access in user mode to the block.
2. The number of PT-descriptors that point to the block.
The intuition is that a hypercall can change the type of a physical block (e.g.
allocate or free a page table) only if the corresponding reference counter is zero.
Lemmas A.7.5 and A.7.6 in Section A.7 demonstrate that this approach is sound
and that the page table policy described above is sufficient to guarantee MMU-
safety.
In Figure A.5 we exemplify how an OS can use the API to spawn a new process.
The OS selects four blocks from its physical memory to allocate a new L1 page
table. We assume that initially the OS has no virtual mapping that enables it to
access this part of the memory (i.e. the reference counter rc of these blocks is zero
and the type pt is data).
1. Using L2map, the OS requests to change an existing L2 page table, estab-
lishing a writable mapping to the four blocks. The hypercall increases the
reference counter accordingly (i.e. rc1 = 1).
2. Without any mediation of the hypervisor, the OS uses the new mapping to
write the content of the new L1 page table.
3. Using L2unmap, the guest removes the mapping established in (1) and de-
creases the reference counters (i.e. rc3 = 0).
4. The guest invokes L1create, requesting the page table to be validated and
the block type changed to L1. The request is granted only if the reference
counter is zero, guaranteeing that there does not exist any mapping in the
system that allows the guest to directly write the content of the page table.
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5. Finally, the OS invokes switch to perform the context switch and to activate
the new L1.
The example demonstrates some of the principles used to design the minimal API:
(i) the address of the page tables are chosen by the guest, thus we do not need to
change the OS allocators, (ii) the preparation of the page table can be done by the
OS without mediation of the hypervisor, (iii) the content of the page table is not
copied into the hypervisor memory, thus reducing memory accesses and memory
overhead and not requiring dynamic allocation in the hypervisor, (iv) tracking the
reference counter is used to guarantee the absence of page tables granting the guest
write access to another page table, thus we can allow context switches among all
created L1s without needing to re-validate their content.
A.5.3 Integrity of the Hypervisor Memory Map
When an exception is raised, the CPU redirects execution flow to a fixed location
according to the exception vector. In ARMv7, subsequent instructions are executed
in privileged mode but under the same virtual memory mapping as the interrupted
guest. The hypervisor must enforce that the memory mapping of the exception
vector, handler code, and hypervisor data structures is accessible during an excep-
tion without being modifiable by the guests. To this end, the hypervisor maintains
its own static virtual memory mapping in a master page table and mirrors the
corresponding regions to all L1s of the guest (with restricted access permissions).
A.5.4 Hypervisor Accesses to Guest Page Tables
The hypervisor APIs must be able to read and write the page tables allocated by
the guest, in order to check the soundness of the requests and to apply the corre-
sponding changes. The naive solution requires the hypervisor to change the current
page table, enabling a hypervisor master page table whenever the guest memory
must be accessed and then re-enabling the original page table before the guest is
restored. This solution is expensive as it requires to flush TLB and caches. A
solution tailored for Unixes can rely on the injective mapping built by the guest,
which can be used by the hypervisor to access the guest kernel memory. In our
settings the hosted guest is not trusted, thus this solution cannot guarantee that
the injective mapping is obeyed by the guest. Some ARMv7 CPUs support special
coprocessor instructions for virtual-to-physical address translation. These instruc-
tions can be used to validate the guest injective mapping at run-time. However, this
approach is platform dependent and can result in nested exceptions that complicate
the architecture and verification of the hypervisor. Instead, our design reserves a
subset of the virtual address space for hypervisor use. The hypervisor master page
table is built so that this address space is always mapped according to an injective
translation (1-to-1) allowing the hypervisor to easily compute the virtual address
for each physical address in the guest memory, similar to the direct memory maps
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supported by FreeBSD [149] and Linux [73]. As with the hypervisor code and data
structures, these regions are mirrored in all guest L1 tables.
A.5.5 Memory Model and Cache Effects
Hypervisors are complex software interacting directly with many low level hard-
ware components, like processor, MMU, etc. Furthermore, there are hardware
pieces that, while being invisible to the software layer, still can affect the system
behaviour in many aspects. For example, the memory management unit relies on
a caching mechanism, which is used to speed up accesses to page table entries.
Basically, a data-cache is a shared resource between all partitions and it thus af-
fects and is affected by activities of each partition. Consequently, data-caches may
cause unintended interaction between software components running on the same
processor, which can lead to cross-partition information leakage.
Moreover, for the ARMv7 architecture cache usage may cause sequential con-
sistency to fail if the same physical address is accessed using different cacheability
attributes. This opens up for TOCTTOU2-like vulnerabilities since a trusted agent
may check and later evict a cached data item, which is subsequently substituted by
an unchecked item placed in the main memory using an uncacheable alias. Further-
more, an untrusted agent can similarly use uncacheable address aliasing to easily
measure which lines of the cache are evicted. This results in storage channels that
are not visible in information flow analyses performed at the ISA level.
As an example (Figure C.4), the guest can use an uncacheable virtual alias of
a page table entry in physical memory to bypass the page type constraints and
install a potentially harmful page table. If the cache contains a valid page table
entry PTE A for the physical address from a previous check by the hypervisor and
this cache entry is clean (i.e., it will not be written back to memory upon eviction),
the guest can (1) store an invalid (i.e. violating the page table policy) page table
entry PTE B in a data page and (2) request the data page to become a page table.
If the guest write is (3) directly applied to the memory, bypassing the cache using
a uncacheable virtual address, and (4) the hypervisor accesses the same physical
location through the cache, then the hypervisor potentially validates stale data (5).
At a later point in time, the validated data PTE A is evicted from the cache and
not written back to memory since it is clean. Then (6) the MMU will use the invalid
page table containing PTE B instead and its settings become untrusted.
This kind of behaviour undermines the properties assured by formal verifica-
tion that assumes a sequentially consistent model. In this paper, to counter this
threat we use a naive solution; we prevent memory incoherence by cleaning the
complete cache before accessing data stored by the guest. Clearly, this can intro-
duce a substantial performance overhead, as shown in Section A.10.2. In [100], we
demonstrate more efficient countermeasures to such threats and propose techniques
to fix the verification.
2TOCTTOU – Time Of Check To Time Of Use
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Figure A.6: Integrity threat due to incoherent memory caused by mismatched
cacheability attributes. PTE A is validated by the hypervisor (4) but PTE B will
be used as a page table entry for the guest (6).
A.6 Formalizing the Proof Goals
A.6.1 The Top Level Specification
A state of the Top Level Specification (TLS) is a tuple 〈σ, h〉, consisting of an
ARMv7 state σ and an abstract hypervisor state h. An abstract hypervisor state
has the form 〈pgtype, pgrefs〉 where pgtype indicates memory block types and pgrefs
maintains reference counters. Specifically, pgtype ∈ 220 → {D,L1, L2} tracks the
type of each 4 KB physical block; a block can either be (D) memory writable from
the guest or data page, (L1) contain a L1 page table or (L2) contain a L2 page
table. The map pgrefs ∈ 220 → 230 tracks the references to each physical block, as
described in Section A.5.
The TLS interleaves standard unprivileged transitions with abstract handler
invocations. Formally, the TLS transition relation 〈σ, h〉 →i∈{0,1} 〈σ′, h′〉 is defined
as follows:
• If σ →PL0 σ′ then 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h〉; instructions executed in unprivileged
mode that do not raise exceptions behave equivalently to the standard ARMv7
semantics and do not affect the abstract hypervisor state.
• If σ →PL1 σ′ and mode(σ) = PL0 then 〈σ, h〉 →1 Ha(〈σ′, h〉); whenever
an exception is raised, the hypervisor is executed, modelled by the abstract
handler Ha. The abstract handler always yields a state whose execution mode
is unprivileged.
In our setup the trusted services and the untrusted guest are both executed in
unprivileged mode. To distinguish between these two partitions, we use ARM
domains. We reserve the domains 2-15 for the secure services.
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Secure services Let σ ∈ Σ, the predicate S(σ) identifies if the active partition
is the one hosting the secure services: the predicate holds if at least one of the
reserved domains (2-15) is enabled in the coprocessor registers coregs of σ.
Intuitively, guaranteeing spatial isolation means confining the guest to manage
a part of the physical memory available for the guest uses. In our setting, this
part is determined statically and identified by the set of physical addresses Gm.
Clearly, no security property can be guaranteed if the system starts from a insecure
state; for example the guest must not be allowed to change the MMU behaviour by
directly writing the page tables. For this reason we introduce a system invariant
I(〈σ, h〉) that is used to constrain the set of secure initial states of the TLS. The
set of all possible TLS states that satisfy the invariant is denoted by QI . Then one
needs to show:
Theorem A.6.1 (Invariant preserved). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI and i ∈ {0, 1}. If 〈σ, h〉 →i
〈σ′, h′〉 then I(〈σ′, h′〉).
Section A.7 elaborates the definition of the invariant and summarises the proof
of the Theorem.
Complete mediation (MMU-integrity) is demonstrated by showing that neither
the guest nor the secure services are able to directly change the content of the page
tables and affect the address translation mechanism.
Theorem A.6.2 (MMU-integrity). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI . If 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉 then
σ ≡mmu σ′.
We use the approach of [108] to analyse the hypervisor data separation proper-
ties. The observations of the guest in a state 〈σ, h〉 is represented by the structure
Og(〈σ, h〉) = 〈σ.uregs,memg(σ), σ.coregs〉 of user registers, guest memory memg(σ)
(the restriction of σ.mem to Gm), and coprocessor registers. The latter are visible
to the guest since they directly affect guest behaviour by controlling the address
translation, and do not contain any information the guest should not be allowed to
see. Evidently, however, all writes to the coprocessor registers must be mediated
by the hypervisor.
The remaining part of the state (i.e. the content of the memory locations that
are not part of the guest memory, banked registers) and, again, the coprocessor
registers constitute the secure observations Os(〈σ, h〉) of the state, which guest
transitions are not supposed to affect.
The following theorem demonstrates that the context switch between the un-
trusted guest and the trusted services is not possible without the mediation of
the hypervisor. The proof is straightforward, since S only depends on coprocessor
registers that are not accessible in unprivileged mode.
Theorem A.6.3 (No context switch). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI . If 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉 then
S(σ) = S(σ′).
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The no-exfiltration property guarantees that a transition executed by the guest
does not modify the secure resources:
Theorem A.6.4 (No-Exfiltration). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI .
If 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉 and ¬S(σ) then Os(〈σ, h〉) = Os(〈σ′, h′〉).
The no-infiltration property is a non-interference property guaranteeing that
guest instructions and hypercalls executed on behalf of the guest do not depend on
any information stored in resources not accessible by the guest.
Theorem A.6.5 (No-Infiltration). Let 〈σ1, h1〉, 〈σ2, h2〉 ∈ QI , i ∈ {0, 1}, and
assume that Og(〈σ1, h1〉) = Og(〈σ2, h2〉), ¬S(σ1), and ¬S(σ2).
If 〈σ1, h1〉 →i 〈σ′1, h′1〉 and 〈σ2, h2〉 →i 〈σ′2, h′2〉 then Og(〈σ′1, h′1〉) = Og(〈σ′2, h′2〉).
A.6.2 The Implementation Model
A critical problem of verifying low level platforms is that intermediate states of a
handler that reconfigures the MMU can break the semantics of the high level lan-
guage (e.g. C). For example, a handler can change a page table and (erroneously)
unmap the region of virtual memory where the handler data structure (or the code)
are located. For this reason we introduce the implementation model, that is suffi-
ciently detailed to expose misbehaviour of the hypervisor accesses to the observable
part of the memory (i.e. page tables, guest memory and internal data structures).
The implementation interleaves standard unprivileged transitions and hypervisor
functionalities. In contrast to the TLS, these functionalities now store their internal
data in system memory, accessed by means of virtual addresses. In practice, in the
implementation model the hypervisor functionalities are expressed as executable
specifications, yet they are very close to the execution of the actual hardware at
instruction semantics level. We demonstrate these differences by comparing two
fragments of the TLS and the implementation specifications.
The TLS models the update of a guest page table entry as σ′.mem = write32
(σ.mem, pa, desc), where pa is the physical address of the entry, desc is a word
representing the new descriptor and write32 is a function that yields a new mem-
ory having four consecutive bytes updated. At the implementation level the same
operation is represented as
if ¬ mmu(σ, PL1, Gpa2va(pa), wt)
then ⊥
else write32(σ.mem,
mmu(σ,PL1,Gpa2va(pa), wt),desc)
where mmu is the formal model of the ARMv7 MMU (introduced in Section A.4)
and Gpa2va is the function used by the hypervisor to compute the virtual address of
a physical address that resides in guest memory. This function is statically defined
and is the inverse of the injective translation established by the hypervisor master
page table.
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The implementation can fail to match the TLS for two reasons: (i) the current
page table can prevent the hypervisor from accessing the computed virtual address,
and then the implementation terminates in a failing state (denoted by ⊥), (ii) the
current address translation does not respect the expected injective mapping, thus
mmu(σ,PL1 , Gpa2va(pa),wt) 6= pa and the implementation writes in an address
that differs from the one updated by the TLS.
The next example shows the difference between accesses to the reference counter
in the TLS and at implementation level. The TLS models this operation as
h.pgrefs(b), where b is the physical block. The implementation models the same
operation using memory offsets as follows:
if ¬ mmu(σ, PL1, tblva + 4*b, rd)
then ⊥
else read32(σ.mem,
mmu(σ, PL1, tblva + 4*b, rd))
& 0xCFFFFFFF
This representation is directly reflected in the hypervisor code. For each block,
the page type (two bits) and the reference counter (30 bits) are placed contiguously
in a word. These words form an array, whose initial virtual address is tblva.
The handlers are represented by a HOL4 function Hr from ARMv7 states to
ARMv7 states. The function is the executable specification of the various exception
handlers including the MMU mapping/remapping/unmapping functionalities and
is composed sequentially of the functional specifications for the corresponding code
segments.
Then, the state transition relation i∈{0,1}⊆ Σ × (Σ ∪ {⊥}) determines the
implementation behaviour as follows:
• If σ →PL0 σ′ then σ0 σ′; instructions executed in unprivileged mode that
do not raise exceptions behave according to the standard ARMv7 semantics.
• If σ →PL1 σ′ and mode(σ) = PL0 then σ1 Hr(σ′); whenever an exception
is raised, the hypervisor is executed and its behaviour is modelled by the
function Hr. The function yields either a state whose execution mode is
unprivileged or ⊥.
To show implementation soundness we exhibit a refinement property relating
abstract states 〈σ1, h〉 to real states σ2. The refinement relation R (that is left-total
and surjective with the exception of the faulty state ⊥) requires that: (i) the regis-
ters and coprocessors contain the same value in both states, (ii) the guest memory
contains the same values in both states, (iii) the hypervisor data structures of the
TLS state are projected into a part of hypervisor memory, and (iv) the reserved
virtual addresses are always mapped in the same way as they are mapped in the
master page table. Observations of the guest Org and secure observations Ors are
defined on real states using the hypervisor data structure mapping in analogy with
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the corresponding observations on abstract states defined above. We require the re-
finement relation R to be a bisimulation relation, that is preserved by computations
of the abstract and implementation model.
Theorem A.6.6 (Implementation refinement). Let 〈σ1, h〉 ∈ QI and σ2 ∈ Σ such
that 〈σ1, h〉 R σ2. Let i ∈ {0, 1}.
• If σ2i σ′2 then exists 〈σ′1, h′〉 such that 〈σ1, h〉 →i 〈σ′1, h′〉 and 〈σ′1, h′〉 R σ′2.
• If 〈σ1, h〉 →i 〈σ′1, h′〉 then exists σ′2 such that σ2i σ′2 and 〈σ′1, h′〉 R σ′2.
Finally we show that the security property of the TLS and the refinement rela-
tion directly transfer the mmu-integrity/no-exfiltration/no-infiltration to the imple-
mentation. We use ΣI to represent the space of consistent implementation states:
States σ2 such that if 〈σ1, h〉 R σ2 then I(〈σ1, h〉).
Corollary 1 (Implementation security transfer). Let σ1, σ2 ∈ ΣI , i ∈ {0, 1},
Org(σ1) = Org(σ2):
• if σ10 σ′1 then σ1 ≡mmu σ′1
• if σ10 σ′1 and ¬S(σ1) then Ors(σ1) = Ors(σ′1)
• if σ1i σ′1, σ2i σ′2, and ¬S(σ1) and ¬S(σ2) then Org(σ′1) = Org(σ′2)
A.6.3 Binary Code Correctness
In the ARMv7 model of Section A.4 the untrusted guest, the trusted services and
the hypervisor share the CPU, and the hypervisor behaviour is modelled by the
execution of its binary instructions.
Intuitively, internal hypervisor states cannot be observed by the guest, since (i)
during the execution of the handler the guest is not active, (ii) the hypervisor does
not support preemption and (iii) the handlers do not raise nested exceptions. For
this reason, we introduce a weak transition relation, which hides states that are
privileged. We write σ0  i σn if there is a finite execution σ0 →i · · · → σn such
that mode(σn) = PL0 and mode(σj) = PL1 for 0 < j < n.
Our goal is to exhibit a refinement property relating implementation states σ1
and real states σ2. The refinement relation R′ (that is left-total with the exception
of the faulty state ⊥ and surjective) requires that: (i) the registers and coprocessors
contain the same value in both states, (ii) the guest memory contains the same val-
ues in both states, (iii) the memory holding the hypervisor data structures contains
the same values in both states. For the observations of the guest Org on real states,
the same definition as for the implementation model are used, i.e. the guest can
observe the same addresses in both models. Again the refinement is required to
establish a bisimulation.
Theorem A.6.7 (Real Refinement). Let σ1, σ2 ∈ ΣI such that σ1 R′ σ2. Let
i ∈ {0, 1}.
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• If σ2  i σ′2 then exists σ′1 such that σ1 →i σ′1 and σ′1 R′ σ′2.
• If σ1i σ′1 then exists σ′2 such that σ2  i σ′2 and σ′1 R′ σ′2.
Finally one must show that the security properties are transferred to the real
model.
Corollary 2 (Real Security Transfer). Let σ1, σ2 ∈ ΣI , i ∈ {0, 1}, Org(σ1) =
Org(σ2):
• if σ1  0 σ′1 then σ1 ≡mmu σ′1
• if σ1  0 σ′1 and ¬S(σ1) then Ors(σ1) = Ors(σ′1)
• if σ1  i σ′1, σ2  i σ′2, and ¬S(σ1) and ¬S(σ2) then Org(σ′1) = Org(σ′2)
A.6.4 Execution Safety and End-to-End Information Flow
Security
Note that we do not prove explicitly execution safety. The reason is that the
transition relations of the ARM CPU and the TLS are left-total. Left-totality for
the ARM CPU depends on the fact that the physical CPU never halts (with the
exception of the privileged “wait” instruction that is never used by the hypervisor).
Left-totality for the TLS holds because the virtualization API is modelled by HOL4
total functions over TLS states; every function is equipped with a termination proof,
which is either automatically inferred by the theorem prover or has been manually
verified. The only transitions that can yield a dead state (⊥) are the hypervisor
transitions of the implementation model, due to incorrect memory accesses. Proving
that this model can never reach the state ⊥ is part of the proof of Theorem A.6.6.
It makes use of Lemma A.8.2, which shows that all hypervisor memory accesses are
correct.
We do not prove standard end-to-end information flow properties because their
definitions depend on the actual trusted services. This is often the case when two
components are providing services to each other. For example, if the trusted service
is the run-time monitor of Section A.12, then it should be able to directly read the
memory of the untrusted Linux (to compute the signatures). Additionally, the
trusted service can be allowed to affect the behaviour of the guest, for example by
rebooting it or by changing its process table if a malware is detected.
However, our verification results enable the enforcement of end-to-end security
by properly restricting the capability of the trusted services. In fact, these services
are executed non-privileged, thus their execution is constrained by properties 8 and
9. Moreover, their memory mapping is static, is configured in the master page
table of the hypervisor, and is independent of the guest configuration. If complete
isolation is needed, it is sufficient to configure these entries of the master page
table properly, use properties 8 and 9 together with Theorem A.6.2 to prove that
the trusted services cannot affect and are independent of the guest resources. This
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enables the trace properties to be established and consequently to obtain end-to-end
security.
A.7 TLS Consistency
We proceed to describe the strategy for proving the TLS consistency properties of
Section A.6.1. To this end we summarise the structure of the system invariant.
The system invariant consists of two predicates: one (RC) ensures soundness of the
reference counter, and the other (TC) guarantees that the state of the system is
well typed.
The reference counter is sound (i.e. RC〈σ, h〉) if for every physical block b,
the reference counter h.pgrefs(b) is equal to
∑
i∈{0...220−1} count(〈σ, h〉, i, b), where
count is a function that counts the number of references from the block i to the
block b, according to the reference-counter policy:
• if b is a data block and i is a page table, i.e. h.pgtype(b) = D and h.pgtype(i) 6=
D, then count is the number of page table descriptors in i that are writable
in non-privileged mode and that point to b,
• if b is a L2 page table and i is a L1 page table then count is the number of
page table descriptors in i that use the table b to fragment the section, and
• if i is not a page table, i.e. h.pgtype(i) = D, then count(〈σ, h〉, i, b) = 0.
A system state is well typed (TC〈σ, h〉), if the MMU is enabled, the current L1
page table is inside a physical block of type L1, and each physical block b that does
not have type data (h.pgtype(b) 6= D) contains a sound page table (sound(〈σ, h〉, b))
and resides in the guest memory (pa ∈ Gm for all pa such that pa[31 : 12] = b).
The predicate sound ensures that (i) no unpredictable setting is allowed, (ii) page
tables grant write access only to blocks with type data, (iii) page tables forbid any
access in PL0 to blocks outside the guest memory, and (iv) every L1 page table
descriptor points to a block typed L2. Section A.5.2 and Figure A.4 exemplify these
constraints.
The proofs of the theorems of Section A.6.1 have been obtained using the HOL4
theorem prover and the lemmas are described in the following.
Lemma A.7.1 (Invariant implies MMU-safety). If 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI then mmus(σ).
Lemma A.7.1 demonstrates an important property of the system invariant; a
state that satisfies the invariant has the same MMU behaviour as any state whose
memory differs only for addresses that are writable in unprivileged mode. The
proof of the lemma depends on the formal model of the ARMv7 MMU (but not
on its instruction set); there the MMU behaviour is determined by coprocessor
registers and the contents of the active L1 and referenced L2 page tables. The
invariant guarantees that the active L1 page table of σ resides in four consecutive
blocks that have type L1 and every page table descriptor in this table points to
84 PAPER A. PROVABLY SECURE MEMORY ISOLATION
a block typed L2. Moreover, only data blocks may be writable in unprivileged
mode and write attempts to other blocks will be rejected. We examine a state σ′
that is write-derivable in unprivileged mode from σ, but has the same coprocessor
registers, selecting the same active L1 page table. Since the content of the page
tables is unchanged, the MMU in σ′ behaves exactly like in σ.
Proof sketch of Theorem A.6.2 To demonstrate MMU-integrity the ARM-
integrity property is used. By definition of the TLS transition relation, if 〈σ, h〉 →0
〈σ′, h′〉 then (in the ARM model) σ →PL0 σ′. Moreover, Lemma A.7.1 guarantees
mmus(σ). Thus, Property 8 can be used to conclude that wd(σ, σ′,PL0 ) and
σ.coregs = σ′.coregs, i.e. σ′ is a state write-derivable from σ and coprocessor
registers have not changed. Finally, it suffices to apply Definition A.4 (MMU-
safety) to show that σ ≡mmu σ′.
Lemma A.7.2 (Guest isolation). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI . For every physical address pa
and access request req if ¬S(σ) and mmuph(σ,PL0 , pa, req) then Gm(pa).
The proof of Lemma A.7.2 uses the formal ARMv7 MMU model and directly
follows from the invariant. In particular, part (iii) of predicate sound demands that
entries of a page table grant access permissions to the guest only if the entry points
to a physical address that is inside the guest memory.
Proof sketch of Theorem A.6.4 Similar to the proof of Theorem A.6.2, the
definition of the transition relation and Lemma A.7.1 yield that 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉
implies h = h′, σ →PL0 σ′ and mmus(σ). Then Property 8 gives σ.coregs =
σ′.coregs and wd(σ, σ′,PL0 ), meaning that (according to the contraposition of Def-
inition A.4) the memories of σ and σ′ contain the same value for every physical
address that is not writable in mode PL0 in σ. By Lemma A.7.2 the guest can
only obtain write permissions to the physical addresses belonging to its own mem-
ory, thus the memories of σ and σ′ have the same value for every physical address
not in Gm. Moreover banked registers cannot be changed in unprivileged mode.
Consequently, Os(〈σ, h〉) = Os(〈σ′, h′〉) holds as claimed.
Proof sketch of Theorem A.6.5 We proceed separately for unprivileged and
privileged transitions. For unprivileged transition the ARM-confidentiality prop-
erty is used. As proven above, from the definition of the transition relation,
Lemma A.7.1, 〈σ1, h1〉 →0 〈σ′1, h′1〉, and 〈σ2, h2〉 →0 〈σ′2, h′2〉 we obtain h1 = h′1,
h2 = h′2, σ1 →PL0 σ′1, σ2 →PL0 σ′2, mmus(σ1) and mmus(σ2). Since Og(〈σ1, h1〉) =
Og(〈σ2, h2〉), the user registers, guest memories (i.e. the content for addresses
in Gm), and coprocessor registers are the same in σ1 and σ2. The definition of
mmus(σ1) yields σ1 ≡mmu σ2. Moreover, Lemma A.7.2 shows that the guest
can obtain an access permission only to the physical addresses in Gm, thus the
memories of σ1 and σ2 contain the same value for every address in Gm ⊇ {pa |
∃req. mmuph(σ1,PL0 , pa, req)}. This enables Property 9, which in turn justifies
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that σ′1.uregs = σ′2.uregs and ∀pa ∈ Gm. σ′1.mem(pa) = σ′2.mem(pa), i.e. the
guest observations in σ′1 and σ′2 are the same.
The proof of the Theorem A.6.5 for hypervisor transitions has been obtained
by performing relational analysis. The function Ha accesses only three state com-
ponents: the hypervisor data structures (i.e. h), the user registers and the memory
(in order to validate page tables). The function Ha is symbolically evaluated on the
states 〈σ1, h1〉 and 〈σ2, h2〉; whenever Ha updates an intermediate variable, it must
be demonstrated that the value of the variable is the same in both executions,
whenever Ha modifies a state component (e.g. memory or register), it must be
demonstrated that the equivalence of guest observation is preserved. These tasks
are completely automatic for assignments that only depend on intermediate vari-
ables and user registers. For every assignment that depends on memory accesses,
a new verification condition is generated to require that the accessed addresses are
the same in both executions and to guarantee that such address is in the guest
memory. Finally, these verification conditions are verified, showing that Ha never
accesses memory outside Gm.
Finally, we prove Theorem A.6.1 by showing that the invariant is preserved first
by guest transitions (Lemma A.7.3) and then by the abstract handlers (Lemma
A.7.4).
Lemma A.7.3 (Invariant vs guest). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI . If 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉 then
I(〈σ′, h′〉).
This lemma demonstrates that the invariant is preserved by guest transitions.
Its proof depends on the ARM-integrity property. It is straightforward to show that
the invariant only depends on the content of the physical blocks that are not typed
D and the hypervisor data (i.e. h and h′). Similar to the proof of Theorem A.6.4,
the definition of the transition relation, Lemma A.7.1 and Property 8 guarantee
that if 〈σ, h〉 →0 〈σ′, h′〉 then h = h′, σ →PL0 σ′, mmus(σ) and wd(σ, σ′,PL0 ). As
in the proof of Lemma A.7.1 it is shown that in σ every block that is not typed D
is not writable, concluding that the invariant is preserved.
Lemma A.7.4 (Invariant vs hypervisor). Let 〈σ, h〉 ∈ QI . If 〈σ, h〉 →1 〈σ′, h′〉
then I(〈σ′, h′〉).
The lemma demonstrates that the invariant is preserved by the handler func-
tionalities and shows the functional correctness of the TLS design. By definition,
if 〈σ, h〉 →1 〈σ′, h′〉 then there exists σ′′ such that σ → σ′′, mode(σ′′) = PL1 and
〈σ′, h′〉 = Ha(〈σ′′, h〉). Similar to the proof of Lemma A.7.3, Property 8 is used to
guarantee that the invariant is preserved by this transition: I(〈σ′′, h〉). Then we
show that the invariant is preserved by the abstract handler Ha.
This verification task requires the introduction of several supporting lemmas.
The idea is that according to the input request, the abstract handler only changes
a small part of the system state. For instance, when Ha maps a section, only the
current L1 page table is modified, the contents of other blocks are unchanged. In
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order to demonstrate that the invariant is indeed preserved for the parts of the
state that are not affected by Ha, we introduce a number of additional lemmas.
These lemmas are sufficiently general to be used to verify different virtualization
mechanisms that involve direct paging and they prove the intuition that the type
of a block can be safely changed when its reference counter is zero.
Definition Let h and h′ be two abstract hypervisor states. The predicate types(h, h′)
holds if and only if h.pgtype(b) 6= h′.pgtype(b) implies h.refs(b) = 0 for all blocks b.
Changing the type of a block can affect the soundness of page tables that refer-
ence that block. The following lemma expresses the key property that soundness of
page tables is preserved for all type changes of other blocks, as long as the reference
counters of that blocks are zero:
Lemma A.7.5. Assume I〈σ, h〉 and types(h, h′). For every block b such that
h.pgtype(b) = h′.pgtype(b), if sound(〈σ, h〉, b) then sound(〈σ, h′〉, b).
The proof of Lemma A.7.5 hinges on the fact that type changes can only break
parts (ii) and (iv) of the page table soundness condition. However, if the type is
only changed for blocks that are not referenced by any page table, soundness is
preserved trivially.
We exemplify the usage of Lemma A.7.5 when proving Lemma A.7.4. Assume
that Ha is allocating a new L2 page table in the block b′ (i.e. changing the type
of b′ from D to L2). This operation can break soundness of any other block b. In
fact, b can be a page table containing a writable mapping to b′, thus b is sound in
〈σ, h〉 but is unsound in 〈σ, h′〉. The side condition types(h, h′) ensures that this
case cannot occur: to safely allocate a new page table, the reference counter of b′
must be zero, thus b cannot contain a writable mapping to b′.
Similarly, the following lemma shows that, if the page type is changed only for
blocks with zero references, then for all other page tables, the number of references
is unchanged.
Lemma A.7.6. Assume I〈σ, h〉 and types(h, h′). For all blocks b, b′ if h.pgtype(b) =
h′.pgtype(b) then count(〈σ, h〉, b, b′) = count(〈σ, h′〉, b, b′).
Finally we use the following lemma to show that the well-typedness of a block
and its counted outgoing references are independent from the content of the other
physical blocks.
Lemma A.7.7. Let σ, σ′ ∈ Σ such that I〈σ, h〉. If σ and σ′ have the same memory
content for the block b then sound(〈σ′, h〉, b) and for every block b′ count(〈σ′, h〉, b, b′) =
count(〈σ′, h〉, b, b′).
For every functionality of the virtualization API (see Figure A.3), Lemmas A.7.5,
A.7.6 and A.7.7 help to limit the proof of Lemma A.7.4 to only checking the well-
typedness and soundness of the reference counter for the blocks that are affected
by Ha.
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Proof of Theorem A.6.1 The theorem directly follows from Lemmas A.7.3
and A.7.4.
A.8 Refinement
To verify the implementation refinement relation (i.e. prove Theorem A.6.6) we
proved two auxiliary lemmas:
Lemma A.8.1 (Real MMU). Let 〈σ1, h〉 ∈ QI and σ2 ∈ Σ. If 〈σ1, h〉 R σ2 then
σ1 ≡mmu σ2.
The Lemma shows that TLS and implementation states have the same MMU
configuration. Its proof uses that the system invariant requires page tables to be
allocated inside the guest memory, whose content is the same in the TLS and
implementation states. Moreover, coprocessor registers contain the same data.
Lemma A.8.2 (Hypervisor page tables). Let 〈σ1, h〉 ∈ QI and σ2 ∈ Σ. If
〈σ1, h〉 R σ2 then:
1. For all pa and req, if pa ∈ Gm then mmu(σ2,Gpa2va(pa),PL1 , req) = pa.
2. For every block b and access request req, mmu(σ2, tblva + 4 ∗ b,PL1 , req) =
tblpa + 4 ∗ b, where tblpa is the physical address where the hypervisor data
structure is allocated.
The Lemma shows that the implementation is always able to access the guest
memory and the hypervisor data structures, and that the computed physical ad-
dresses match the expected values.
Proof sketch of Theorem A.6.6 To prove that the refinement is preserved by
all possible transitions we verify independently the guest and hypervisor transitions.
For guest transitions, Theorem A.6.4 (No-Exfiltration) and Lemma A.7.1 (MMU-
safety) guarantee that the guest can change neither the memory outside Gm nor
the page tables. Thus it is sufficient to show that the physical addresses of the
hypervisor data structures are outside the guest memory. Moreover, Theorem A.6.5
(No-Infiltration) guarantees that the guest transition is not affected by a part of
the state that is not equivalent in 〈σ1, h〉 and σ2. For the hypervisor transition
we used a compositional approach. First, we verified that all low-level operations
(i.e. reads and updates of the page tables, reads and updates of the hypervisor
data structures) preserve the refinement relation. Then we compose these results
to show that the TLS and implementation transitions behave equivalently.
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Proof sketch of Corollary 1 The proof depends on the fact the the relation
R is left-total and surjective. Proving that the security properties of the TLS
are transferred to the implementation model is simplified by the definition of the
refinement relation. For example, Lemma A.8.1 and Theorem A.6.2 are used to
show that the MMU configuration cannot be changed by the untrusted guest. As-
sume σ2 0 σ′2 and let 〈σ1, h〉 be a TLS state such that 〈σ1, h〉 →0 〈σ′1, h′〉 and
〈σ1, h〉R σ2. Since the refinement is preserved by all transitions (Theorem A.6.6),
exists 〈σ′1, h′〉 such that 〈σ′1, h′〉R σ′2. Lemma A.8.1 yields σ1 ≡mmu σ2 and Theo-
rem A.6.2 (MMU-integrity) guarantees that σ1 ≡mmu σ′1, thus σ2 ≡mmu σ′1. Finally,
Lemma A.8.1 yields σ′1 ≡mmu σ′2, thus σ2 ≡mmu σ′2. Similar reasoning is used to
prove that properties no-exfiltration and no-infiltration are transferred to the im-
plementation model, by showing that, if two TLS states have the same observations
(i.e. Og(〈σ1, h〉) = Og(〈σ′1, h′〉) or Os(〈σ1, h〉) = Os(〈σ′1, h′〉)) and the states are re-
fined by two implementation states (i.e. 〈σ1, h〉R σ2 and 〈σ′1, h′〉R σ′2), then the
two implementation states have the same observations (i.e. Org(σ2) = Org(σ′2) or
Ors(σ2) = Ors(σ′2)).
A.9 Binary Verification
Binary analysis is key requirement to ensure security of low-level software platform,
like hypervisors. Machine code verification obviates the necessity of trusting the
compilers. Moreover, low level programs mix structured code (e.g. implemented
in C) with assembly and use instructions (e.g. mode switches and coprocessor
interactions) that are not part of the high level language, thus making difficult to
use verification tools that target user level code.
For our hypervisor the main goal of the verification of the binary code is to
prove Theorem A.6.7. This verification relies on Hoare logic and requires several
steps. The first step (Section A.9.2) is transforming the relational reasoning into a
set of contracts for the hypervisor handlers and guaranteeing that the refinement
is established if all contracts are satisfied. Let C be the binary code of one of
the handlers, the contract {P}C{Q} states that if the precondition P holds in the
starting state of C, then the postcondition Q is guaranteed by C.
Then, we adopt a standard semi-automatic strategy to verify the contracts.
First, the weakest liberal precondition WLP(C,Q) is computed on the starting
state, then it is verified that the precondition P implies the weakest precondition.
The second verification step (computation of weakest preconditions) can be
performed directly in HOL4 using the ARMv7 model. However, this task re-
quires a significant engineering effort. We adopted a more practical approach,
by using the Binary Analysis Platform (BAP) [47]. The BAP tool-set provides
platform-independent utilities to extract control flow graphs and program depen-
dence graphs, to perform symbolic execution and to perform weakest-precondition
calculations. These utilities reason on the BAP Intermediate Language (BIL), a
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small and formally specified language that models instruction evaluation as com-
positions of variable reads and writes in a functional style.
The existing BAP front-end to translate ARM programs to BIL lacks several
features required to handle our binary code: Support of ARMv7, management of
processor status registers, banked registers for privileged modes and coprocessor
registers. For this reason we developed a new front-end, which is presented in
Section A.9.3, that converts an ARMv7 assembly fragment to a BIL program.
The final verification step consists of checking that the precondition P implies
the weakest precondition. This task can be fully automated if the predicate P ⇒
WLP(C,Q) is equivalent to a predicate of the form ∀~x.A where A is quantifier free.
The validity of A can then be checked using a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)
solver that supports bitvectors to handle operations on words. In this work, we
used STP [84].
An alternative approach for binary verification is to use the “decompilation”
procedure developed by Myreen [155]. This procedure takes an ARMv7 binary and
produces a HOL4 function that behaves equivalently (i.e. implements the same
state transformation). This result allows to lift the verification of properties of
assembly programs to reasoning on HOL4 functions. However, the latter task can
be expensive due to the lack of automation in HOL4.
A.9.1 Soundness of the Verification Approach
The procedure described here to establish the functional correctness of the hyper-
visor code relies on four main arguments.
1. The HOL4 procedures that evaluate the effects of a given instruction in the
ARMv7 model specify the updates to the processor state correctly. We use
the ARMv7 step theorems to guarantee the correctness of this task.
2. The lifter transforms this state update information into an equivalent list of
single-variable assignments in BIL. The correctness of this part of the lifter
is an assumption for now.
3. The expressions in each update of a processor component are correctly trans-
lated to BIL expressions in the list of assignments, preserving their semantics.
This has been proven for our lifter.
4. The binary code fragment that is lifted is actually executed on the ARMv7
hardware.
The last argument relies on the fact that the boot loader places the unmodified
hypervisor image to the right place in memory. This is another assumption since
we do not verify our boot loader. Furthermore there must not be self-modifying
code. The easiest way to enforce this is to partition the hypervisor memory via
its page table into data and code region and prove an invariant that the first is
non-executable but the latter is non-writeable. There is no such protection against
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self-modifying code in the hypervisor at the moment. Finally, one needs to show
that the binary code is not interrupted, thus proving that the hypervisor is in
deed non-preemptive. We do not have a full proof of the statement, but there are
provisions in the lifter to show the absence of ARMv7 interrupts and exceptions.
For system call and unknown instructions, the lifter generates BIL statements
that always fail, i.e., one can only verify programs in BAP that do not use such
instructions. We follow the same approach for fetches, jumps, and memory instruc-
tions accessing constant addresses which are not mapped in the hypervisor’s static
page table. Thus such operations cannot produce pre-fetch or data aborts. Addi-
tional care has to be taken to distinguish data and code regions to avoid permission
faults due to writes to the code region or fetches from the data region, however
there are no such checks at the moment. Indirect jumps are solved dynamically
based on the lifted BIL program (see Sect. A.9.4) and for any jump to a location
that is not defined in the program, i.e., not in the region accessible by the hypervi-
sor, analysis with BAP will give an error. For dynamic memory accesses the lifter
is able to insert assertions that the corresponding address is mapped, however the
feature is currently not activated automatically. At last, the reception of external
interrupts should not be re-enabled during hypervisor execution. Currently this
invariant is not checked in the code verification but it could be easily added as an
assertion between every instruction.
A.9.2 The Contracts Generation
Let C be the binary code of one of the handlers, we define the precondition P and
the postcondition Q such that the contract subsumes the refinement:
• P (σ2) = exists σ1 such that σ1R′σ2
• Q(σ′2, σ2) = for all σ1, σ′1 if σ1R′σ2 and σ11 σ′1 then σ′1R′σ′2
These contracts are not directly suitable for the verification of the binary code
because the contracts quantify on states (σ1 and σ′1) that are in relation with the
pre-state (σ2) and post-state (σ′2) of the binary code. We developed an HOL4
inference procedure specific for the structure of our hypervisor. The output of the
procedure is a proof guaranteeing that the original contract {P}C{Q} is satisfied
if a “simplified” contract {P ′}C{Q′} is met. That is, for every σ2, σ′2 the predicate
P ′(σ2)⇒ Q′(σ′2, σ2) implies P (σ2)⇒ Q(σ′2, σ2).
This procedure makes heavy use of the simplification rules and decision proce-
dures of HOL4. We informally summarise how this procedure works for the memory
resource. The precondition P ′ is generated by transferring the hypervisor invariant
I from the abstract model down to the real model. This is possible because (i) R′
constrains the memory holding the hypervisor data structures to be the same in σ2
and σ1, (ii) R (the refinement between the abstract model and the implementation
model) guarantees that this memory area contains a projection of the hypervisor
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data structures in the TLS state, (iii) on the TLS state the hypervisor invariant
holds.
For the postcondition Q′ we proceed as follows. If σ1 →1 σ′1 then σ′1 = Hr(σ1).
Let A be the set of memory addresses that are constrained by the refinement relation
R′ and let B be the set of addresses that are modified by Hr. The set B is
usually easy to identify in HOL4, thanks to its symbolic execution capability and
the lemmas that have been already proven for the tasks of Section A.8. For each
handler we demonstrate that B ⊆ A.
For every address a ∈ (B¯) ∩ A (namely addresses constrained by the refine-
ment relation that are not updated) we add to Q′ the constraint σ′2.mem(a) =
σ2.mem(a). This uses σ1.mem(a) = σ2.mem(a) and the refinement for the address
a (σ′1.mem(a) = σ′2.mem(a)).
For every address a ∈ B we make use of the HOL4 rewriting engine to obtain a
naive symbolic execution of the handler specification. We use HOL4 to symbolically
computeHr(σ1) then we use the precondition σ1R′σ2 to rewrite the result and make
sure that this is expressed only in terms of σ2. Let exp be the resulting expression,
we add to Q′ the constraint σ′2.mem(a) = exp.mem(a).
When the symbolic execution is too complex (e.g. too many outcomes are pos-
sible according to the initial state), we split the verification by generating multiple
contracts {P1}C{Q1}, . . . , {Pn}C{Qn}, where Pi = P (σ2) ∧ Ai(σ2) and
∨
iAi is a
valid formula (i.e. all possible cases are taken into account).
A.9.3 Translation of ARMv7 to BIL
The target language of the ARMv7 BAP front-end is BIL, a simple single-variable
assignment language tailored to model the behaviour of assembly programs and
developed to be platform independent. A BIL program is a sequence of state-
ments. Each statement can affect the system state by assigning the evaluation of
an expression to a variable, (conditionally or unconditionally) modifying the con-
trol flow, terminating the system in a failure state if an assertion does not hold
and unconditionally halting the system in a successful state. The BIL data types
for expressions and variables include boolean, words of several sizes and memories.
The main constituent of BIL statements are expressions, that include constants,
standard bit-vector binary and unary operators, and type casting function. Addi-
tionally, an expression can read several words from a memory or generate a new
memory by changing a word in a given one.
We developed the new front-end on top of the HOL4 ARM model (see Sec-
tion A.4), so that the soundness of the transformation from an ARM assembly
instruction to its corresponding BIL program relies on the correctness of the ARM
model used in HOL4 and not on a possibly different formalization of ARMv7. Our
approach is illustrated in Figure A.7.
The HOL4 model provides a mechanism to statically compute the effects of an
instruction via the arm_steps function. Let inst be the encoding of an instruction,
then arm_steps(inst) returns the possible execution steps {st1, . . . , stn}. Each step
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Figure A.7: Lifting machine code to BIL using the HOL4 ARMv7 model. The
arm_steps function translates machine instructions into steps sti consisting of
guards ci and transition functions ti. Their effect is equivalent to the hypervi-
sor computation in the real model (states 3-7, cf. Fig. A.1). Each step sti is in turn
translated into equivalent BIL code.
sti = (ci, ti) consists of the condition ci that enables the transition and the function
ti that transforms the starting state into the next state. The function arm_steps
is a certifying HOL4 procedure, since its output is a theorem demonstrating that
for every σ ∈ Σ if fetch(σ) = inst and ci(σ) holds then σ →PL1 ti(σ). For standard
ARM decoding the function fetch reads four bytes from memory starting from the
address pointed to by the program counter.
The translation procedure involves the following steps, (i) mapping HOL4 ARM
states to BIL states and (ii) for each instruction of the given assembly fragment
producing the BIL fragment that emulates the arm_steps outputs. To map an
ARM state to the corresponding BIL state we use a straightforward approach. A
BIL variable is used to represent a single component of the machine state: for
example, the variable R0 represents the register number zero and the variable
MEM represents the system memory.
To transform an ARM instruction to the corresponding BIL fragment we need
to capture all the possible effects of its execution in terms of affected registers,
flags and memory locations. The generated BIL fragment should simulate the be-
haviour of the instruction executed on an ARM machine. Therefore, to obtain a
BIL fragment for an instruction we need to translate the predicates ci and their cor-
responding transformation functions ti. This task is accomplished using symbolic
evaluation of the predicates and the transformation functions. The input of the
evaluation is a symbolic state in which independent variables are used to represent
each state register, flag, coprocessor register and memory. This approach allows us
to obtain a one-to-one mapping between the symbolic state variables and the BIL
state variables. To transform a predicate ci, we apply the predicate to a symbolic
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ARMv7 state, thus obtaining a symbolic boolean expression in which free-variables
are a subset of the symbolic state variables. Similarly, to map a transformation
function ti, we apply ti to a symbolic state, thus obtaining a new state in which
each register, flag and affected memory location is assigned a symbolic expression.
Intuitively, for each instruction we produce the following BIL fragment:
label GUARD_1
cjmp |b1|, EFFECT_1 , GUARD_2
...
label GUARD_N
cjmp |bn|, EFFECT_n , ERROR
label ERROR
assert false
Where “cjmp” is the BIL instruction for conditional jump and |bi| is a BIL boolean
expression obtained by translating the symbolic evaluation of ci. Then, for each
step i we symbolically evaluate the transformation ti and for each field (i.e. mem-
ory locations, registers, flags and coprocessor registers) that has been updated we
transform the resulting symbolic expression and assign it to the corresponding BIL
variable, generating a fragment
label EFFECT_i
var_1 = |exp1|
...
var_n = |expn|
The described lifting procedure is straightforward. However, its soundness de-
pends on the correct transformation of HOL4 terms (e.g. |bn| and |expn|) to BIL
expressions. Since the number of HOL4 operators that occur in the generated ex-
pressions is huge, we cannot rely on a simple syntactical transformation to obtain
a robust conversion of them to BIL. Moreover, the transformation of HOL4 terms
to BIL expressions is used to convert the pre/post conditions of our contracts from
HOL4 to BAP. For this reason, we formally modelled in HOL4 the BIL expression
language (by providing a deep embedding of BIL expression in HOL4) and the
translation procedure liftExp certifies its output:
liftExp(exp) = (exp′,` exp = exp′)
In particular, the translation procedure procedure yields a theorem demonstrating
that the HOL4 input term exp is equivalent to the BIL expression exp′.
In order to dynamically generate the certifying theorem, the translation proce-
dure is implemented in ML, which is the HOL4 meta language. The translation
syntactically analyses and deconstructs the input expressions to select the theorems
to use in the HOL4 conversion and rewrite rules. For terms composed by nested
expressions the procedure acts recursively.
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A.9.4 Supporting Tools
To compute the weakest precondition of a program is necessarily to statically know
the control flow graph (CFG) of the program. This means that the algorithm
depends on the absence of indirect jumps. Even if the hypervisor C-code avoids
their explicit usage (e.g. by not using function pointers), the compiler introduces an
indirect jump for each function exit point (e.g. the instruction at the address 0x20C
in Figure A.8, is an indirect jump). Solving an indirect jump (i.e. enumerating all
possible locations that can be target of the jump) is depending on checking the
correctness of other properties of the application (e.g. the link register, which is
usually used to track the return address of functions, can be pushed and popped
from the stack, thus making the correctness of the control flow dependent on the
integrity of the stack itself). Since we are interested in solving indirect jumps of code
fragments that must respect contracts (Hoare triples {P}C{Q}), we implemented
a simple iterative procedure that uses STP to discover all possible indirect jump
targets under the contract precondition P .
1. The CFG of the of C fragment is computed using BAP. From the CFG, the
list L of reachable addresses containing an indirect jump is extracted
2. For each address a ∈ L, the code fragment C is modified as follows:
a) let expa be the expression used in the indirect jump
b) the indirect jump is substituted with an assertion, which requires expa
to be different from a fresh variable fva; if such assertion fails, i.e. expa =
fva, the modified fragment C terminates with a fault, otherwise it cor-
rectly terminates
3. the new fragment has no indirect jump; the weakest precondition WP of the
postcondition true (i.e. correct termination) is computed
4. the SMT solver searches for an assignment of the free variables (including all
fvi) that invalidates P ⇒WP
5. if the SMT solver discovers a counterexample which involves the indirect
jump at the address a, then it also discovers a possible target for this jump
via selected assignment of the variable fv. Let exp be the expression used
in the indirect jump. The fragment C is transformed by substituting the
indirect jump with a conditional statement; if exp is equal to fv then jump to
the fixed address fv, otherwise jump to the expression exp: jmp exp will be
transfed into
cjmp exp == fv; value; new_label
label new_label: jmp exp
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0x100 bl #0x200
0x104 ...
0x108 bl #0x200
0x10C ...
// function
0x200 push LR
0x204 str R1, R2
0x208 pop LR
0x20C b LR
...
(a) Assembly
label pc_0x100 PC = 0x100;
LR = PC+4; jmp pc_0x100
label pc_0x104 ...
label pc_0x108 PC = 0x108;
LR = PC+4; jmp pc_0x100
label pc_0x10C ...
label pc_0x200 PC = 0x200;
mem=store32(mem , SP , LR);
SP=SP -4
label pc_0x204 PC = 0x204;
mem=store32(mem , R1 , R2);
label pc_0x208 PC = 0x208;
LR=load32(mem , SP+4);
SP=SP+4
label pc_0x20C PC = 0x20C;
jmp LR
(b) BIL
Figure A.8: Indirect jump example
6. if the SMT solver does not find a counterexample, then every indirect jump is
either unreachable or all its possible targets have been discovered. The frag-
ment C is transformed by substituting every indirect jump with an assertion
that always fails (assert false).
7. The procedure is restarted. Note that the inserted conditional statements
prevent that the discovered assignments of fva can be used to invalidate the
formula by the SMT solver in the next iteration.
In order to handle the greater complexity of the hypervisor code respect to the
separation kernel verified in [71], we re-engineered this tool as a BAP plug-in. A
particular problem that we face is that the CFG can contain loops if the same inter-
nal function of the hypervisor is called twice from different points in the program.
Integrating the procedure with BAP allowed us to reuse the existing loop-unfolding
algorithms to break these artificial loops.
We use figures A.8 and A.9 to demonstrate the algorithm. The assembly pro-
gram (Figure A.8a) contains a function at 0x200 , which is invoked twice (from
0x100 and 0x108). This function push the link register in the stack (0x200), writes
the content of the register R2 into the memory pointed by R1 (0x204), pop the link
register in the stack (0x208) and returns (0x20C). We assume that the precondition
used is strong enough to ensure correct manipulation of the stack (e.g. the value of
the stack pointer SP and the value of register R1 used as pointer in the instruction
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure A.9: Execution of the indirect jump solver
at 0x204 are distant at least one word). Figure A.8b and A.9a depict the BIL
translation of the program and its initial CFG respectively. The CFG has only
one reachable indirect jump (in 0x20C), whose expression is LR. The SMT solver
discovers a possible target for this jump (in this case 0x104) and the program is
transformed by substituting the indirect jump with a conditional statement, ob-
taining CFG is depicted in Figure A.9b. This CFG has an artificial loop due to
the two invocations of the same function. Figure A.9c depicts the CFG obtained
by unrolling the loop once. The program has now two reachable indirect jumps,
the procedure is repeated and the SMT solver discovers that 0x10C is a possible
target of the jump in 0x20C-1. The CFG is transformed as Figure A.9d. This
CFG has still two indirect jumps. However, the SMT solver discovers that there is
no assignment to the initial variables of the program that enables the activation of
these jumps. Thus all indirect jumps have been resolved, the remaining ones are
unreachable and are suppressed, obtaining the CFG in Figure A.9e.
In addition to solving indirect jumps, effective application of the verification
strategy required the implementation of several tools and optimisation of the weak-
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Figure A.10: Binary verification work-flow: Contract Generation, generating pre
and post conditions based on the specification of the low-level abstraction and the
refinement relation; Contract Simplification, massaging contracts to make them
suitable for verification; Lifter, lifting handlers machine code and the generated
contracts in HOL4 to BIL, Ind Jump Solver, procedure to resolve indirect jumps in
the BIL code; BIL constant jumps, BIL fragments without indirect jumps; Contract
Verification using SMT solver to verify contracts. Here, grey boxes are depicting
the tools that have been developed to automate the verification as much as possible.
est precondition algorithm of BAP. Weakest preconditions can grow exponentially
with regard to the number of instructions. Even though this problem cannot be
solved in general, we can handle the most common case for ARM binaries, namely
the sequential composition of several conditionally executed arithmetical instruc-
tions. This pattern matches the optimisation performed by the compiler to avoid
small branches. We improved the BAP weakest precondition algorithm by adding
a simplification function that identifies these cases. For some fragments of the code
this straightforward strategy strongly reduced the size of the precondition; e.g. for
one fragment consisting of 27 C lines compiled to 35 machine instructions the size
of the precondition has been reduced from 8 GB to 15 MB.
Furthermore, machine code (and BIL) lacks information on data types (except
for the native types like word and bytes) and represents the whole memory as a
single array of bytes. Writing predicates and invariants is complex because their
definition depends on location, alignment and size of data-structure fields. More-
over, the behaviour of compiled code often depends on the content of static memory
used to represent constant values of the high level language. We developed a set of
tools that integrate HOL4 and GDB to extract information from the C source code
and the compiled assembly. With the support of these tools we are able to write
the invariants and contracts of the hypervisor independently of the actual symbol
locations and data structure offsets produced by the compiler.
Figure A.10 summarises the work-flow of our binary verification approach.
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A.9.5 Limitations
The binary verification of the hypervisor has not been completed yet due to some
time consuming tasks that require better automation. First, the inference proce-
dure of Section A.9.2 uses the HOL4 simplification rules and decision procedures,
however it is not completely automatic and must be adapted for every handler.
Without taking into account the specificity of each handler, a naive procedure
can easily generates contracts that cannot be handled by SMT solvers. For every
handler, we manually specialize the procedure to generate contracts that have no
quantifier in the precondition and only universal quantifiers in the postcondition.
Further complexity arises due to presence of loops. In theory, loops can be
automatically handled by unfolding, since all loops in the hypervisor code iterate
over fixed and limited ranges (e.g. the number of descriptors in a page table).
Practically, this increases the size of the code (1024 times for handlers working on
L2, and up to 4096*256 for handlers on L1) beyond the limit of programs that can
be analyzed with BAP; thus the majority of loops must be manually handled.
By design, every loop in the hypervisor is also present in the specification. Let
C = C1;while(B){C2};C3 be the handler fragment and let Hr(σ) = let σ1 :=
H1(σ) in let σ2 := FOR(b,H2, σ1) in H3(σ2) be the specification. The problem
of verifying that the refinement is preserved (i.e. if σR′σ′, and C(σ) is the state
produced by the program C, and Hr(σ′) is the state produced by the specification
Hr then C(σ)R′Hr(σ′)) is reduced in verifying three refinements:
• σR′σ′ implies C1(σ)R′1H1(σ′)
• σR′1σ′ implies C2(σ)R′1H2(σ′)
• σR′1σ′ implies C3(σ)R′H3(σ′)
that is, a new refinement relation/invariant R′1 must be identified for the loop.
This usually means identifying register allocation, allocations of variables on the
stack etc. Due to lack of tools and integration with the compiler, this task is
manually performed and requires to additionally specialize the inference procedure
of Section A.9.2.
A.10 Implementation
The implementation of the hypervisor demonstrates the feasibility of our approach.
The actual implementation targets BeagleBoard-xM (which is equipped with an
ARM Cortex-A8) and supports the execution of Linux as the untrusted guest. The
hypervisor executes both the untrusted guest and the trusted services in unprivi-
leged mode, and their execution is cooperatively scheduled. Theorems A.6.1, A.6.2
and A.6.3 guarantee that the main security properties of the system (i.e. the cor-
rect setup of the page tables) cannot be violated by either the guest or the trusted
services. Moreover, the untrusted guest cannot directly affect the trusted services
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or directly extract information from their states (Theorems A.6.4 and A.6.5). This
isolation is achieved by the complete mediation of the MMU settings and the allo-
cation of the ARM domains 2-15 to the secure services. This approach limits the
number of secure services to fourteen. However, this mechanism has the benefit of
using the same page tables for both the guest and the trusted services (by reserving
an area of the hypervisor virtual memory for the latter). This reduces the cost of
context switch, since TLB and caches do not need to be cleaned. If more trusted
services are needed, a separate page tables can be used.
The core of the hypervisor is the virtualization of the memory subsystem. This
is provided by the handlers that are the subject of the verification and that are
modelled by the transformations Ha and Hr (Section A.6). This core have been ex-
tended with additional handlers to provide further functionalities, which are needed
to host a complete OS and to implement useful secure services. Since these addi-
tional handlers are not involved in the virtualization of the memory subsystem,
establishing that they preserve the invariant (Theorem A.6.1) usually requires only
to demonstrate that they do not directly change the physical blocks that contain
the page tables and their memory safety.
A.10.1 Linux Support
The Linux kernel 2.6.34 has been modified to run on top of the hypervisor. This
task required modification of architecture-dependent parts of the Linux kernel like
execution modes, low-level exception routines and page table management. High-
level OS functions such as process, resource and memory manager, file system, and
networking did not require any modifications. This also introduce the additional
handlers of the hypervisor that are not part of the formal verification.
CPU Privilege Modes In the absence of hardware supports, like virtualization
extension, the target CPU includes only two execution modes: privileged and un-
privileged (user). As for other approaches based on paravirtualization, since the
hypervisor executes as privileged, the Linux kernel has been modified to execute as
unprivileged. To separate kernel and user applications, the hypervisor manages two
separate unprivileged execution contexts: virtual user and virtual kernel modes. In
x86 these virtual modes can be implemented by segmentation. This approach is
not possible for CPUs that do not provide this feature (e.g. x86 64-bit and ARM).
Instead, we reserve the ARM domain 0 for the kernel virtual mode. Whenever
the guest kernel requests a switch to virtual user mode (invoking the dedicated
hypercall) we disable the domain 0, thus any access to the kernel virtual addresses
generates a fault.
Note that the main security goal here is not to guarantee this OS-internal isola-
tion, but to maintain the separation between the virtualized components (such as
the Linux guest vs. secure data or services residing in non-guest memory).
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CPU Exceptions CPU exceptions such as aborts and interrupts change the
processor mode to privileged. These exceptions must therefore be handled in the
hypervisor, which after validation can forward them to the unprivileged exception
handlers of the Linux kernel. The hypervisor supplies the kernel exception handlers
with some privileged data needed to correctly service an on-going exception (e.g. for
pre-fetch abort, the privileged fault address and fault status registers are forwarded
to the guest). The exception handlers in the Linux kernel have thus been slightly
modified to support this. Among the exceptions that are forwarded to the Linux
kernel there are the hardware interrupts delivered by the timer. This allows Linux
to implement an internal time based scheduler.
Memory Management To paravirtualize the kernel, we modified the architec-
ture dependent layer of its memory management. In the modified Linux all accesses
to the coprocessor registers or to the active page tables are done by issuing the
proper hypercalls. The architecture independent layer of the memory management
has been left unmodified. In order to speed up the execution of Linux, a minimal
emulation layer has been moved from the Linux kernel into the hypervisor itself.
This layer reduces the overhead by translating a guest request into a sequence of
invocations of the APIs that virtualize the MMU . Since the emulation layer ac-
cesses page tables only through the virtualization API, showing memory safety of
this component is sufficient to extend the coverage of the verification.
A.10.2 Run-time Overhead
The port of the Linux kernel 2.6.34 on the hypervisor allows us to present a rough
comparison of our approach with existing paravirtualized hypervisors for the ARM
architecture [121]. The purpose of the evaluation is more to demonstrate that
our approach actually runs with reasonable efficiency. A serious evaluation is out
of scope of this work. It requires a more optimised implementation, and a more
comprehensive evaluation.
The run-time evaluation is done using LMBench [151] running on Linux 2.6.34
with and without virtualization. The outcome, measured on an ARMv7-A Cortex-
A8 system (BeagleBoard-xM [205]), is presented in Table A.2. The significant
virtualization overhead for the fork benchmarks is due to a large number of sim-
ple operations (in this case, write access to a page-table) being replaced with a
large number of expensive hypercalls. It may be possible to reduce this overhead
with minimal optimisation (e.g. batching). In Table A.2 we also report mea-
sures from [121], where the authors compare several existing hypervisors for ARM.
We point out that these performance numbers have been obtained from different
sources, testing different ARM cores, boards and hosted Linux kernels. Hence we
do not claim to be able to draw any hard conclusions from these figures about
the relative performance of the hypervisors or their underlying architectures. With
the purpose of demonstrating that the hypervisor can run efficiently real applica-
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Benchmark Hypervisor
Aggressive
cache flushes L4Linux Xen OKL4
null syscall 329% 332% 3043% 150% 60%
read 160% 181% 844% 90% 15%
write 193% 201% 877% 85% 24%
stat 83% 84% 553% 7%
fstat 118% 122% 945% 42%
open/close 121% 119% 433%
select(10) 78% 84% 4461% 14%
sig handler install 237% 245% 1241% 16%
sig handler overhead 226% 237% 1281% 82% -14%
protection fault 40% 39% 975% 67%
pipe 168% 3073% 450% 74% 31%
fork+exit 195% 1861% 950% 247% 8%
fork+execve 187% 1787% 591% 239% 5%
pagefaults 435% 8740% 567%
Table A.2: Latency benchmarks. LMBench micro benchmarks for the Linux ker-
nel v2.6.34 running naively on BeagleBoard-xM, paravirtualized on the hypervi-
sor without cache flushing (Hypervisor), with aggressive flushing (Aggressive cache
flushes), and the other hypervisors (L4Linux, Xen, OKL4 ). Figures in the three
last columns have been obtained from different ARM cores, boards and hosted
Linux kernels
tions, we also measured the overhead introduced when executing tar, dd and several
compression tools.
The second column reports the latency for the version of the hypervisor that
aggressively flushes the caches (i.e. the caches are completely clean and inval-
idated whenever an exception or an interrupt is raised, while the hypervisor in
the first column limits cache flushes to the cases of context switch). This naive
approach guarantees that the actual CPU respects the fully sequential memory
model, but introduces severe performance penalties especially in the application
benchmarks. Less conservative approaches (e.g. evicting only the necessary physi-
cal addresses or forcing the page tables to be allocated in memory regions that are
always cacheable) can be adopted for some processor implementations, but they
require a more fine-grained modelling including caches and and an adaptation of
the verification approach for their justification, as discussed in [100].
A.10.3 Memory Footprint
The main difference between our proposal and the existing verified hypervisors
is the MMU virtualization mechanism. The direct paging approach requires a
table which contains at most memsize/blocksize entries, where memsize is the total
available physical memory and blocksize is the minimum page size (here, 4 KB).
Each entry in this table uses 2 + log2 maxref bits, with the first two bits used to
record entry type and maxref being the maximum number of references pointing
to the same page. Assuming this number is bound by the number of processes,
Table A.4 indicates the memory overhead introduced by direct paging.
It should be noted that on ARMv7, most operating systems including Linux
dedicate one L1 page to each process and at least three L2 pages to map the stack,
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Applications Hypervisor
Aggressive
cache flushes
tar (500 KB) 0% 171%
tar (1 MB) 0% 108%
dd (10 MB) 100% 1000%
dd (20 MB) 79% 932%
dd (40 MB) 76% 1061%
jpg2gif(5 KB) 0% 117%
jpg2bmp(5 KB) 0% 175%
jpg2bmp(250 KB) 0% 27%
jpg2bmp(750 KB) -1% 24%
Jpegtrans(270’, 5 KB) 0% 700%
Jpegtrans(270’, 250 KB) 14% 300%
Jpegtrans(270’, 750 KB) 11% 176%
Bmp2tiff(90 KB) 0% 500%
Bmp2tiff(800 KB) 0% 300%
Ppm2tiff(100 KB) 0% 600%
Ppm2tiff(250 KB) 0% 700%
Ppm2tiff(1.3 MB) 50% 350%
Tif2rgb(200 KB) 200% 1100%
Tif2rgb(800 KB) 25% 575%
Tif2rgb(1.200 MB) 31% 462%
sox(aif2wav -r 8000 –bits 16 100 KB) 50% 600%
sox(aif2wav -r 8000 –bits 16 500 KB) 75% 350%
sox(aif2wav -r 8000 –bits 16 800 KB) 83% 267%
Table A.3: Latency benchmarks. Application benchmarks for the Linux kernel
v2.6.34 running natively on BeagleBoard-xM, paravirtualized on the hypervisor
without cache flushing (Hypervisor), with aggressive flushing (Aggressive cache
flushes).
Processes
Direct Paging
256 MB
Direct Paging
1 GB Shadow page table
32 56 KB 224 KB 608 KB
64 64 KB 256 KB 1216 KB
128 72 KB 288 KB 2432 KB
Table A.4: Memory footprint. Comparison of memory usage of Shadow page table
and direct paging.
the executable code and the heap. Then the OS itself has a minimum footprint of
16 KB+3∗1 KB per process. This footprint is doubled if the underlying hypervisor
uses shadow page tables.
A.11 Evaluation
The hypervisor is implemented in C (and some assembly) and consists of 4529
lines of code (LOC). Excluding platform dependent parts, the hypervisor core is no
larger than 2066 LOC. The virtualization of the memory subsystem consists of 1200
LOC. To paravirtualize Linux we changed 1025 LOC of its kernel, 950 in the ARM
specific architecture folder and 75 in init/main.c. The paravirtualization is binary
compatible with existing userland applications, thus we do not need to recompile
either hosted applications or the libc. For comparison, the only other hypervisor
that implements direct paging is the Xen hypervisor, which consists of 100 KLOC
and its design is not suitable for verification. Instead, the small code base of our
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hypervisor makes it easier to experiment with different virtualization paradigms
and enables formal verification of its correctness. The formal specification consists
of 1500 LOC of HOL4 and intentionally avoids any high level construct, in order
to make the HOL4 model as similar as possible to the C implementation, at the
price of increasing the verification cost. The complete proof consists of 18700 LOC
of HOL4.
The verification highlighted a number of bugs in the initial design of the APIs:
(i) arithmetic overflow when updating the reference counter, caused by not pre-
venting the guest to create an unbounded number of references to a physical block,
(ii) bit field and offset mismatch, (iii) missing check that a newly allocated page
table prevents the guest to overwrite the page table itself, (iv) usage of the signed
shift operator where the unsigned one was necessary and (v) approval of guest re-
quests that cause unpredictable MMU behaviour. Moreover, the verification of the
implementation model identified three additional bugs exploitable by the guest by
requesting the validation of page tables outside the guest memory. Finally, the
methodology described in Section A.9 has been experimented in the verification
of the binary code of one of the hypercalls. This experiment identified a buffer
overflow in the binary code that was missing in implementation model. The HOL4
model uses a 10-bit variable to store an untrusted parameter which is later used to
index the entries of a page table. The binary code uses a 32-bit registers to store
the same parameter, thus causing an overflow when accessing the L2 page table if
the received parameter is bigger than 1023. The bug has been fixed by sanitising
the input using the mask parameter = parameter & 0x3ff.
The project was conducted in three steps. The design, modelling and verification
of the APIs for MMU virtualization required nine person months. Here, the most
expensive tasks have been the verification of Theorems A.6.1 and A.6.6. The C
implementation of the APIs and the Linux port has been accomplished in three
person months. While the implementation team was completing the Linux port
the verification team started the verification of the refinement, which has taken
three months so far. This work is continuing, in order to complete the verification
from the HOL4 implementation level down to assembly.
A.12 Applications
Applications of the hypervisors include the deployment of trusted cryptographic
services and trusted controllers. In the first scenario, the hypervisor core is extended
with the handlers required to implement message passing. These handlers allow (i)
Linux to send a message to the trusted service, (ii) the trusted service to reply
with an encrypted message and (iii) the two partitions to cooperatively schedule
themselves. The isolation properties guarantee that the untrusted guest cannot
access the cryptographic keys stored in the memory of the trusted services. The
second scenario includes a device (e.g. a physical sensor) whose IO is memory
mapped. The guest is forbidden to access the memory where the IO registers are
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(a) Usage of SW-based virtualization in
a cloud platform
(b) Deployment of a run-time monitor
preventing code injection
Figure A.11: Applications of the secure virtualization platform.
mapped, thus guaranteeing that the trusted controller is the only subject capable
of directly affecting the device. The complete Linux system can be used to provide
a rich and complex user interface (either graphical or web based) for the controller
logic without affecting its security.
The MMU virtualization solution demonstrated here can be used by other ARM-
based software platforms than the hypervisor reported above. A fully fledged hy-
pervisor (e.g. XEN) can use our approach to support hardware that lacks virtual-
ization extensions (e.g. Cortex-A8, Cortex-A5, ARM11). The mechanism can also
be used by compiler-based virtual machines and unikernels, which need to monitor
the memory configuration and protect it from the rest of the system (e.g. SVA uses
a non-verified implementation of direct paging). Customers of cloud infrastructures
can also benefit from our approach (see Figure A.11a). In this setting, if the virtu-
alization extensions are available, the most privileged execution mode is controlled
by the software platform managed by the cloud provider (e.g. a hypervisor). Thus,
these extensions cannot be used by the customer to isolate its untrusted Linux from
its own trusted services. In this setup, our mechanism can be used to fulfil this
requirement.
An interesting application of isolating platforms is the external protection of an
untrusted commodity OS from internal threats, as demonstrated in [66]. Trustwor-
thy components are deployed together and properly isolated from the application
OS (see Figure A.11b). These components are used as an aid for the application
OS to restrict its own attack surface, by guaranteeing the impossibility of certain
malicious behaviours. In [51], we show that this approach can be used to imple-
ment an embedded device that hosts a Linux system provably free of binary code
injection. Our goal is to formally prove that the target system prevents all forms
of binary code injection even if the adversary has full control of the hosted Linux
and no analysis of Linux is performed.
The system is implemented as a run-time monitor. The monitor forces an
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untrusted Linux system to obey the executable space protection policy (usually
represented as W ⊕X); a memory area can be either executable or writable, but
cannot be both. The protection of executable space allows the monitor to intercept
all changes to the executable code performed by a user application or by the Linux
kernel itself. On top of this infrastructure, we use standard signature checking
to prevent code injection. Here, integrity of an executable physical block stands
for the block having a valid signature. Similarly, the integrity of the system code
depends on the integrity of all executable physical blocks. The valid signatures are
assumed to be known by the run-time monitor. We refer to this information as the
“golden image” (GI) and it is held by the monitor.
We configured the hypervisor to support the following interaction protocol:
1. For each hypercall invoked by a guest, the hypervisor forwards the request to
the monitor.
2. The monitor validates the request based on its validation mechanism.
3. The monitor reports to the hypervisor the result of the hypercall validation.
Since the hypervisor supervises the changes of the page tables, the monitor is able
to intercept all the memory layout modifications. This makes the monitor able
to know whether a physical block is writable: if there exists at least one virtual
mapping pointing to such block and having writable access permission. Similarly
it is possible to know which physical block is executable.
Then the signature checking is implemented in the obvious way: whenever Linux
requests to change a page table (i.e. causing to change the domain of the executable
code) the monitor (i) identifies the physical blocks that can be made executable by
the request, (ii) computes the block signature and (iii) compares the result with the
content of the golden image. This policy is sufficient to prevent code injection that
is caused by changes of the memory layout setting, due to the hypervisor forwarding
to the monitor all requests to change the page tables.
Figure A.11b depicts the architecture of the system; both the run-time monitor
and the untrusted Linux are deployed as two guests of the hypervisor. Using a
dedicated guest on top of the hypervisor permits to decouple the enforcement of
the security policies from the other hypervisor functionalities, thus keeping the
trusted computing base minimal. Moreover, having the security policy wrapped
inside a guest supports both the tamper-resistance and the trustworthiness of the
monitor. In fact, the monitor can take advantage from the isolation properties
provided by the hypervisor. This avoids malicious interferences coming from the
other guests (for example from a process of an OS running on a different partition of
the same machine). Finally, decoupling the run-time security policy from the other
functionalities of the hypervisor makes the formal specification and verification of
the monitor more affordable.
The formal model of the system (i.e. consisting of the hypervisor, the monitor
and the untrusted Linux) is built on top of the models presented in Section A.6.1.
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Here we leave unspecified the algorithm used to sign and check signatures, so that
our results can be used for different intrusion detection mechanisms. The golden
image GI is a finite set of signatures {s1, . . . , sn}, where the signatures are selected
from a domain S. We assume the existence of a function sig : 24096∗8 → S that
computes the signature of the content of a block. The system behaviour is modelled
by the following rules:
1. 〈σ,h〉→0〈σ
′,h′〉
〈σ,h,GI〉→0〈σ′,h′,GI〉
2. 〈σ,h〉→1〈σ
′,h′〉 validate(req(〈σ,h〉),〈σ,h,GI〉)
〈σ,h,GI〉→1〈σ′,h′,GI〉
3. 〈σ,h〉→1〈σ
′,h′〉 ¬validate(req(〈σ,h〉),〈σ,h,GI〉)
〈σ,h,GI〉→1(〈σ,h,GI〉)
User mode transitions (e.g. Linux activities) require neither the hypervisor nor
the monitor intermediation. Theorem A.6.4 justifies the fact that, by construction,
the transitions executed by the untrusted component cannot affect the monitor
state; (i) the golden image is constant and (ii) the monitor code can be statically
identified and abstractly modelled. The executions in privileged mode require the
intermediation of the monitor. If the monitor validates the request, then the stan-
dard behaviour of the hypervisor is executed. Otherwise the hypervisor performs
a special operation to reject the request, by reaching the state that is returned by
a function . Hereafter, the function  is assumed to be the identity. Alternatively,
 can transform the state so that the requestor is informed about the rejected op-
eration, by updating the user registers according to the desired calling convention.
The function validate(req(〈σ, h〉), 〈σ, h,GI 〉) represents the validation mechanism of
the monitor, which checks at run-time possible violations of the security policies.
To formalize the top level goal of our verification we introduce some auxiliary
notations. The “working set” identifies the physical blocks that host executable
binaries and their corresponding content. Let σ be a machine state. The working
set of σ is defined as
WS(σ) = {〈bl, content(bl, σ)〉 | ∃pa.mmuph(σ,PL0 , pa, ex) ∧ pa ∈ bl}
By using a code signing approach, we say that the integrity of a physical block
is satisfied if the signature of the block’s content belongs to the golden image. Let
cnt ∈ 24096∗8 be the 4 KB content of a physical block bl and GI be the golden
image
int(GI , bl, cnt) = sig(bl, cnt) ∈ GI
Notice that our security property can be refined to fit different anti-intrusion mech-
anisms. For example, int(GI , bl, cnt) can be instantiated with the execution of an
anti-virus scanner.
The system state is free of malicious code injection if the signature check is
satisfied for the whole executable code. That is: Let σ be a machine state, bl be a
A.13. CONCLUDING REMARKS 107
physical block and GI be the golden image
int(GI , σ) ⇔ ∀〈bl, cnt〉 ∈WS(σ) . int(GI , bl, cnt)
Finally, in [51] we demonstrate our top level goal: No code injection can succeed.
Theorem A.12.1. If 〈σ, h,GI 〉 is a state reachable from the initial state of the
system 〈σ0, h0,GI 〉 then int(GI , σ)
We implemented a prototype of the system. The monitor code consists of 720
lines of C and 100 lines have been added to the hypervisor to support the needed
interactions among the hosted components.
A.13 Concluding Remarks
We have presented a memory virtualization platform for ARM based on direct
paging, an approach inspired by the paravirtualization mechanism of Xen [26],
and the Secure Virtual Architecture [69]. The platform has been verified down to a
detailed model of a commodity CPU architecture (ARMv7-A), and we have shown a
hypervisor based on the platform capable of hosting a Linux system while provably
isolating it from other services. The hypervisor has been implemented on real
hardware and shown to provide promising performance, although the benchmarks
presented here are admittedly preliminary. The verification is done with respect
to a top-level model that augments a real machine state with additional model
components. The verification shows complete mediation, memory isolation, and
information flow correctness with respect to the top-level model. As the main
application we demonstrated how the virtualization mechanism can be used to
support a provably secure run-time monitor for Linux that provides secure updates
along with the W⊕X policy.
The main precursor work on formally verified MMU virtualization uses the
simulation-based approach of Paul et al [11, 164, 9]. In [11, 164] shadow page
tables are used to provide full virtualization, including virtual memory, for “baby
VAMP”, a simplified MIPS, using VCC. Full virtualization is generally more com-
plex than the paravirtualization approach studied in the present paper, but the
machine model is simplified, information flow security is not supported by the sim-
ulation framework, and neither applications nor implementation on real hardware
are reported. In [9] the same simulation-based approach is used to study TLB vir-
tualization on an abstract version of the x64 virtual memory architecture. Other
related work on verification of microkernels and hypervisors such as seL4 [133] or
the Nova project [199] does not address MMU virtualization in detail. It may be
argued that the emergence of hardware based virtualization support makes soft-
ware MMU virtualization obsolete. We argue that this is not the case. First, many
platforms remain or are currently in development that do not yet support virtual-
ization extensions, second, many application hardening frameworks such as Criswell
et al. [68], KCoFi [66], Overshadow [49], Inktag [112] and Virtual Ghost [67] rely
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on some form of MMU virtualization for their internal security, and third, some
use cases, e.g. in cloud scenarios, could make good use of software based MMU
virtualization to harden VMs without relying on cloud provider hardware.
Our results are not yet complete. The MMU virtualization approach does not
support DMA. To securely enable DMA the behaviour of the specific DMA con-
troller must be formally modelled (in [186] the authors describe a framework for
such extensions and establish Properties 8 and 9 for the resulting model) and the
hypervisor must (i) mediate all accesses to the memory area where the controller’s
registers are mapped, (ii) enable a DMA channel only if the pointed physical blocks
is data and (iii) update the reference counters accordingly. Several embedded plat-
forms are equipped with IOMMUs, that provide HW support to isolate/confine
external peripherals that use DMA. However SW based isolation of DMA is still
interesting since it can be used in the scenarios where these HW extensions are not
available (e.g. CortexM microcontrollers), they are not accessible (e.g. when they
are managed by a cloud provider), or in time critical applications since the page
walks introduced by the IOMMU can slow down the peripheral and make worst
case execution time analysis more difficult.
A tricky problem concern the treatment of unpredictable behaviour in the
ARMv7 architecture. The Cambridge ISA model [82] maps transitions resulting
in unpredictable behaviour to ⊥. We ignore this for the following reason. Our ver-
ification shows that unpredictable behaviour never arises during hypervisor code
execution. This is so since the ARMv7 step theorems used by the lifter are de-
fined only for predictable instructions, and since our invariant guarantees that the
MMU configuration is always well defined. As a result unpredictable behaviour can
arise only during non-privileged execution, the analysis of which we have in effect
deferred to other work [186].
Finally more work is needed to properly reflect caches, TLBs, and, further down
the line, multi-core. The soundness of the current implementation depends on the
type of data cache, and on flushing the cache when needed, in order to support
a linearizable memory model. To enable more aggressive optimisation, and to
fully formally secure our virtualization framework on processors with weaker cache
guarantees, the model must be extended to reflect cache behaviour.
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Abstract
We present MProsper, a trustworthy system to prevent code injection in
Linux on embedded devices. MProsper is a formally verified run-time moni-
tor, which forces an untrusted Linux to obey the executable space protection
policy; a memory area can be either executable or writable, but cannot be
both. The executable space protection allows the MProsper’s monitor to in-
tercept every change to the executable code performed by a user application
or by the Linux kernel. On top of this infrastructure, we use standard code
signing to prevent code injection. MProsper is deployed on top of the Prosper
hypervisor and is implemented as an isolated guest. Thus MProsper inherits
the security property verified for the hypervisor: (i) Its code and data can-
not be tampered by the untrusted Linux guest and (ii) all changes to the
memory layout is intercepted, thus enabling MProsper to completely mediate
every operation that can violate the desired security property. The verifi-
cation of the monitor has been performed using the HOL4 theorem prover
and by extending the existing formal model of the hypervisor with the formal
specification of the high level model of the monitor.
B.1 Introduction
Even if security is a critical issue of IT systems, commodity OSs are not designed
with security in mind. Short time to market, support of legacy features, and adop-
tion of binary blobs are only few of the reasons that inhibit the development of
secure commodity OSs. Moreover, given the size and complexity of modern OSs,
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the vision of comprehensive and formal verification of them is as distant as ever.
At the same time the necessity of adopting commodity OSs can not be avoided;
modern IT systems require complex network stacks, application frameworks etc.
The development of verified low-level execution platforms for system partition-
ing (hypervisors [138, 157], separation kernels [174, 71], or microkernels [133]) has
enabled an efficient strategy to develop systems with provable security properties
without having to verifying the entire software. The idea is to partition the system
into small and trustworthy components with limited functionality running along-
side large commodity software components that provide little or no assurance. For
such large commodity software it is not realistic to restrict the adversary model.
For this reason, the goal is to show, preferably using formal verification, that the
architecture satisfies the desired security properties, even if the commodity software
is completely compromised.
An interesting usage of this methodology is when the trustworthy components
are used as an aid for the application OS to restrict its own attack surface, by
proving the impossibility of certain malicious behaviors. In this paper, we show that
this approach can be used to implement an embedded device that hosts a Linux
system provably free of binary code injection. Our goal is to formally prove that
the target system prevents all forms of binary code injection even if the adversary
has full control of the hosted Linux and no analysis of Linux itself is performed.
This is necessary to make the verification feasible, since Linux consists of million of
lines of code and even a high level model of its architecture is subject to frequent
changes.
Technically, we use Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI). VMI is a virtualized
architecture, where an untrusted guest is monitored by an external observer. VMI
has been proposed as a solution to the shortcomings of network-based and host-
based intrusion detection systems. Differently from network-based threat detection,
VMI monitors the internal state of the guest. Thus, the VMI does not depend on
information obtained from monitoring network packets which may not be accurate
or sufficient. Moreover, differently from host-based threat detection, VMIs place
the monitoring component outside of the guest, thus making the monitoring itself
tamper proof. A further benefit of VMI monitors is that they can rely on trusted
information received directly from the underlying hardware, which is, as we show,
out of the attackers reach.
Our system, MProsper, is implemented as a run-time monitor. The monitor
forces an untrusted Linux system to obey the executable space protection policy
(usually represented asW⊕X); a memory area can be either executable or writable,
but cannot be both. The protection of executable space allows MProsper to inter-
cept all changes to the executable code performed by a user application or by the
Linux kernel itself. On top of this infrastructure, we use standard code signing to
prevent code injection.
Two distinguishing features of MProsper are its execution on top of a formally
verified hypervisor (thus guaranteeing integrity) and the verification of its high level
model (thus demonstrating that the security objective is attained). To the best of
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our knowledge this is the first time the absence of binary code injection has been
verified for a commodity OS. The verification of the monitor has been performed
using the HOL4 theorem prover and by extending the existing formal model of the
hypervisor [157] with the formal specification of the monitor’s run-time checks.
The paper is organized as follows: Section C.2 introduces the target CPU archi-
tecture (ARMv7A), the architecture of the existing hypervisor and its interactions
with the hosted Linux kernel, the threat model and the existing formal models; Sec-
tion B.3 describes the MProsper architecture and design, it also elaborates on the
additional software required to host Linux; Section B.4 describes the formal model
of the monitor and formally states the top level goal: absence of code injection;
Section C.6 presents the verification strategy, by summarizing the proofs that have
been implemented in HOL4; Section B.6 demonstrates the overhead of MProsper
through standard microbenchmarks, it also presents measures of the code and proof
bases; finally, Sections D.2 and B.8 present the related work and the concluding
remarks.
B.2 Background
B.2.1 The Prosper Hypervisor
The Prosper hypervisor supports the execution of an untrusted Linux guest [157]
along with several trusted components. The hosted Linux is paravirtualized; both
applications and kernel are executed unprivileged (in user mode) while privileged
operations are delegated to the hypervisor, which is invoked via hypercalls. The
physical memory region allocated to each component is statically defined. The
hypervisor guarantees spatial isolation of the hosted components; a component can
not directly affect (or be affected by) the content of the memory regions allocated
to other components. Thus, the interactions among the hosted components are
possible only via controlled communication channels, which are supervised by the
hypervisor.
The Prosper hypervisor and the MProsper monitor target the ARMv7-A archi-
tecture, which is the most widely adopted instruction set architecture in mobile
computing. In ARMv7-A, the virtual memory is configured via page tables that
reside in physical memory. The architecture provides two levels of page tables, in
the following called L1s and L2s. These tables represent the configuration of the
Memory Management Unit (MMU) and define the access permissions to the virtual
memory. As is common among modern architectures, the entries of ARMv7 page
tables support the NX (No eXecute) attribute: an instruction can be executed only
if it is fetched from a virtual memory area whose NX bit is not set. Therefore, the
system executable code is a subset of the content of the physical blocks that have
at least an executable virtual mapping.
To isolate the components, the hypervisor takes control of the MMU and con-
figures the pagetables so that no illicit access is possible. This MMU configuration
can not be static; the hosted Linux must be able to reconfigure the layout of its own
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request r DMMU behavior
switch(bl) makes block bl the active page table
freeL1(bl) and freeL2(bl) frees block bl, by setting its type to data
unmapL1(bl, idx), unmapL2(bl, idx) unmaps entry idx of the page table
stored in block bl
linkL1(bl, idx, bl′) maps entry idx of block bl to point the
L2 stored in bl′
mapL2(bl, idx, bl′, ex, wt, rd) and map entry idx of block bl to point to
mapL1(bl, idx, bl′, ex, wt, rd) block bl′ and granting rights ex,wt, rd
to user mode
createL2(bl) and createL1(bl) makes block bl a potential L2/L1, by
setting its type to L2/L1
Table B.1: DMMU API
memory (and the memory of the user programs). For this reason the hypervisor
virtualizes the memory subsystem. This virtualization consists of a set of APIs that
enable Linux to request the creation/deletion/modification of a page table and to
switch the one currently used by the MMU.
Similarly to Xen [26], the virtualization of the memory subsystem is accom-
plished by direct paging. Direct paging allows the guest to allocate the page tables
inside its own memory and to directly manipulate them while the tables are not in
active use by the MMU. Once the page tables are activated, the hypervisor must
guarantee that further updates are possible only via the virtualization API.
The physical memory is fragmented into blocks of 4 KB. Thus, a 32-bit archi-
tecture has 220 physical blocks. We assign a type to each physical block, that can
be: data: the block can be written by the guest, L1: contains part of an L1 page
table and should not be writable by the guest, L2: contains four L2 page tables
and should not be writable by the guest. We call the L1 and L2 blocks “potential”
page tables, since the hypervisor allows to select only these memory areas to be
used as page tables by the MMU.
Table B.1 summarizes the APIs that manipulate the page tables. The set of
these functions is called DMMU. Each function validates the page type, guarantee-
ing that page tables are write-protected. A naive run-time check of the page-type
policy is not efficient, since it requires to re-validate the L1 page table whenever
the switch hypercall is invoked. To efficiently enforce that only blocks typed data
can be written by the guest the hypervisor maintains a reference counter, which
tracks for each block the sum of descriptors providing access in user mode to the
block. The intuition is that a hypercall can change the type of a physical block
(e.g. allocate or free a page table) only if the corresponding reference counter is
zero.
A high level view of the hypervisor architecture is depicted in Fig. B.1. The
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Figure B.1: Hypervisor Architecture
hypervisor is the only component that is executed in privileged mode. It logically
consists of three layers: (i) an interface layer (e.g. the exception handlers) that is
independent from the hosted software, (ii) a Linux specific layer and (iii) a critical
core (i.e. the DMMU), which is the only component that manipulates the sensible
resources (i.e. the page tables). Fig. B.1 demonstrates the behavior of the system
when a user process in the Linux guest spawns a new process.
This design has two main benefits: (i) the critical part of the hypervisor is small
and does not depend on the hosted software and (ii) the Linux-specific layer enriches
the expressiveness of the hypercalls, thus reducing the number of context switches
between the hypervisor and the Linux kernel. From a verification point of view, to
guarantee security of the complete system it is not necessary to verify functional
correctness of the Linux layer; it suffices to verify that this layer never changes
directly the sensitive resources and that its execution does not depend on the sen-
sitive data. These tasks can be accomplished using sand-boxing techniques [188] or
tools for information flow analysis [24].
B.2.2 The Attack Model
The Linux guest is not trusted, thus we take into account an attacker that has
complete control of the partition that hosts Linux. The attacker can force user pro-
grams and the Linux kernel to follow arbitrary flows and to use arbitrary data. The
attacker can invoke the hypervisor, including the DMMU API, through software
interrupts and exceptions. Other transitions into privileged memory are prevented
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by the hypervisor. The goal of the attacker is “code injection”, for example using
a buffer overflow to inject malicious executable code. This attack is normally per-
formed by a malicious software that is able to write code into a data storage area
of another process, and then cause this code to be executed.
In this paper we exemplify our monitor infrastructure using code signing. Sign-
ing the system code is a widely used approach to confirm the software author and
guarantee (computationally speaking) that the code has not been altered or cor-
rupted, by use of a cryptographic hash. Many existing code signing systems rely on
a public key infrastructure (PKI) to provide both code authenticity and integrity.
Here we use code signing to define integrity of the system code: integrity of an
executable physical block stands for the block having a valid signature. Similarly,
the integrity of the system code depends on the integrity of all executable physical
blocks. The valid signatures are assumed to be known by the runtime monitor. We
refer to this information as the “golden image” (GI) and it is held by the monitor.
In order to make injected code detectable, we also assume that the attacker is
computationally bound; it can not modify the injected code to make its signature
compliant with the golden image. We stress that our goal is not to demonstrate
the security properties of a specific signature scheme. In fact the monitor can
be equipped with an arbitrary signature mechanism and the signature mechanism
itself is just one of the possible approaches that can be used to check integrity of
the system code. For this reason we do not elaborate further on the computational
power of the attacker.
B.2.3 Formal Model of the Hypervisor
Our formal model is built on top of the existing HOL4 model for ARMv7 [82]. This
has been extended with a detailed formalization of the ARMv7 MMU, so that every
memory access uses virtual addresses and respects the constraints imposed by the
page tables.
An ARMv7 state is a record σ = 〈regs, coregs,mem〉 ∈ Σ, where regs, coregs and
mem, respectively, represent the registers, coprocessors and memory. In the state
σ, the function mode(σ) determines the current privilege execution mode, which
can be either PL0 (user mode, used by Linux and the monitor) or PL1 (privileged
mode, used by the hypervisor).
The system behavior is modeled by a state transition relation l∈{PL0 ,PL1}−−−−−−−−−→⊆
Σ × Σ, representing the complete execution of a single ARM instruction. Non-
privileged transitions (σ PL0−−−→ σ′) start and end in PL0 states. All the other
transitions (σ PL1−−−→ σ′) involve at least one state in privileged level. A transition
from PL0 to PL1 is done by raising an exception, that can be caused by software
interrupts, illegitimate memory accesses, and hardware interrupts.
The transition relation queries the MMU to translate the virtual addresses
and to check the access permissions. The MMU is represented by the function
mmu(σ, PL, va, accreq) → pa ∪ {⊥}: it takes the state σ, a privilege level PL, a
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virtual address va ∈ 232 and the requested access right accreq ∈ {rd, wt, ex}, for
readable, writable, and executable in non-privileged respectively, and returns either
the corresponding physical address pa ∈ 232 (if the access is granted) or a fault (⊥).
In [157] we show that a system hosting the hypervisor resembles the following
abstract model. A system state is modeled by a tuple 〈σ, h〉, consisting of an
ARMv7 state σ and an abstract hypervisor state h, of the form 〈τ, ρex, ρwt〉. Let
bl ∈ 220 be the index of a physical block and t ∈ {D,L1, L2}, τ ` bl : t tracks
the type of the block and ρex(bl), ρwt(bl) ∈ 230 track the reference counters: the
number of page tables entries (i.e. entries of physical blocks typed either L1 or L2)
that map to the physical block bl and are executable or writable respectively.
The transition relation for this model is 〈σ, h〉 α−→ 〈σ′, h′〉, where α ∈ {0, 1}, and
is defined by the following inference rules:
• if σ PL0−−−→ σ′ then 〈σ, h〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h〉 ; instructions executed in non-privileged
mode that do not raise exceptions behave equivalently to the standard ARMv7
semantics and do not affect the abstract hypervisor state.
• if σ PL1−−−→ σ′ then 〈σ, h〉 1−→ Hr(〈σ′, h〉), where r = req(σ′); whenever an
exception is raised, the hypervisor is invoked through a hypercall, and the
reached state is resulting from the execution of the handler Hr
Here, req is a function that models the hypercall calling conventions; the target
hypercall is identified by the first register of σ, and the other registers provide
the hypercall’s arguments. The handlers Hr formally model the behavior of the
memory virtualization APIs of the hypervisor (see Table B.1).
Intuitively, guaranteeing spatial isolation means confining the guest to manage
a part of the physical memory available for the guest uses. In our setting, this part
is determined statically and identified by the predicate Gm(bl), which holds if the
physical block bl is part of the physical memory assigned to the guest partition.
Clearly, no security property can be guaranteed if the system starts from a non-
consistent state; for example the guest can not be allowed to change the MMU
behavior by directly writing the page tables. For this reason we introduce a system
invariant IH(〈σ, h〉) that is used to constrain the set of consistent initial states.
Then the hypervisor guarantees that the invariant is preserved by every transition:
Proposition 1. Let IH(〈σ, h〉). If 〈σ, h〉 i−→ 〈σ′, h′〉 then IH(〈σ′, h′〉).
We use the function content : Σ × 220 → 24096∗8 that returns the content of a
physical block in a system state as a value of 4 KB. Proposition 2 summarizes some
of the security properties verified in [157]: the untrusted guest can not directly
change (1) the memory allocated to the other components, (2) physical blocks that
contain potential page tables, (3) physical blocks whose writable reference counter
is zero and (4) the behavior of the MMU.
Proposition 2. Let IH(〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex)〉). If 〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex)〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h′〉 then:
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1. For each DMMU hypercall invoked by a guest, the hypervisor forwards the
hypercall’s request to the monitor.
2. The monitor validates the request based on its validation mechanism.
3. The monitor reports to the hypervisor the result of the hypercall validation.
Figure B.2: The interaction protocol between the Prosper hypervisor and the mon-
itor
– For every bl such that ¬Gm(bl) then content(bl, σ) = content(bl, σ′)
– For every bl such that τ(bl) 6= data then content(bl, σ) = content(bl, σ′)
– For every bl if content(bl, σ) 6= content(bl, σ′) then ρwt(bl) > 0
– For every va, PL, acc we have mmu(σ, va, PL, acc) = mmu(σ′, va, PL, acc)
B.3 Design
We configured the hypervisor to support the interaction protocol of Figure B.2; the
monitor mediates accesses to the DMMU layer. Since the hypervisor supervises
the changes of the page tables the monitor is able to intercept all modifications to
the memory layout. This makes the monitor able to know if a physical block is
writable: This is the case if there exists at least one virtual mapping pointing to
the block with a guest writable access permission. Similarly it is possible to know
if a physical block is executable. Note that the identification of the executable
code (also called “working set”) does not rely on any information provided by the
untrusted guest. Instead, the monitor only depends on HW information, which can
not be tampered by an attacker.
The first policy enforced by the monitor is code signature: Whenever Linux
requests to change a page table (i.e. causing to change the domain of the working
set) the monitor (i) identifies the physical blocks that can be made executable by
the request, (ii) computes the block signature and (iii) compares the result with
the content of the golden image. This policy is sufficient to prevent code injection
that are caused by changes of the memory layout setting, due to the hypervisor
forwarding to the monitor all requests to change the page tables.
However, this policy is not sufficient to guarantee integrity of the working set. In
fact, operations that modify the content of a physical block that is executable can
violate the integrity of the executable code. These operations cannot be intercepted
by the monitor, since they are not supposed to raise any hypercall. In fact, a simple
write operation in a block typed data does not require the hypervisor intermediation
since no modification of the memory layout is introduced. To prevent code injections
performed by writing malicious code in an executable area of the memory, the
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monitor enforces the executable space protection policyW⊕X, preventing physical
blocks from being simultaneously writable and executable. As for the hypervisor,
a naive run-time check of the executable space protection is not efficient. Instead,
we reuse the hypervisor reference counters: we accept a hypercall that makes a
block executable (writable) only if the writable (executable) reference counter of
the block is zero.
An additional complication comes from the Linux architecture. An unmodified
Linux kernel will not survive the policies enforced by the monitor, thus its execution
will inevitably fail. For example, when a user process is running there are at least
two virtual memory regions that are mapped to the same physical memory where
the process executable resides: (i) the user “text segment” and (ii) the “kernel
space” (which is an injective map to the whole physical memory). When the process
is created, Linux requests to set the text segment as executable and non writable.
However, Linux does not revoke its right to write inside this memory area using its
kernel space. This setting is not accepted by the monitor, since it violates X ⊕W ,
thus making it impossible to execute a user process.
Instead of adapting a specific Linux kernel we decided to implement a small
emulation layer that has two functionalities:
• It proxies all requests from the Linux layer to the monitor. If the emulator
receives a request that can be rejected by the monitor (e.g. a request setting as
writable a memory region that is currently executable) then the emulator (i)
downgrades the access rights of the request (e.g. setting them as non writable)
and (ii) stores the information about the suspended right in a private table.
• It proxies all data and prefetch aborts. The monitor looks up in the private
table to identify if the abort is due to an access right that has been previously
downgraded by the emulator. In this case the monitor attempts (i) to down-
grade the existing mapping that conflicts with the suspended access right and
(ii) to re-enable the suspended access right.
Note that a malfunction of the emulation layer does not affect the security of the
monitor. Namely, we do not care if the emulation layer is functionally correct, but
only that it does not access sensible resources directly.
Fig. B.3 depicts the architecture of MProsper. Both the runtime monitor and
the emulator are deployed as two guests of the Prosper hypervisor. The Linux
layer prepares a list of requests in a buffer shared with the emulation guest. Af-
ter the Linux layer returns, the hypervisor activates the emulation guest, which
manipulates the requests (or adds new ones) as discussed before. Then the hyper-
visor iteratively asks the monitor to validate one of the pending requests and upon
success it commits the request by invoking the corresponding DMMU function.
Using a dedicated guest on top of the hypervisor permits to decouple the en-
forcement of the security policies from the other hypervisor functionalities, thus
keeping the trusted computing base minimal. Moreover, having the security policy
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Figure B.3: MProsper’s Architecture
wrapped inside a guest supports both the tamper-resistance and the trustworthi-
ness of the monitor. In fact, the monitor can take advantage from the isolation
properties provided by the hypervisor. This avoids malicious interferences coming
from the other guests (for example from a process of an OS running on a different
partition of the same machine). Finally, decoupling the run-time security policy
from the other functionalities of the hypervisor makes the formal specification and
verification of the monitor more affordable.
B.4 Formal Model of MProsper
The formal model of the system (i.e. consisting of the hypervisor, the monitor and
the untrusted Linux) is built on top of the models presented in Section B.2.3. Here
we leave unspecified the algorithm used to sign and check signatures, so that our
results can be used for different intrusion detection mechanisms. The golden image
GI is a finite set of signatures {s1, . . . , sn}, where the signatures are selected from a
domain S. We assume the existence of a function sig : 24096∗8 → S that computes
the signature of the content of a block. The system behavior is modeled by the
following rules:
1. 〈σ,h〉
0−→〈σ′,h′〉
〈σ,h,GI〉 0−→〈σ′,h′,GI〉
2. 〈σ,h〉
1−→〈σ′,h′〉 validate(req(〈σ,h〉),〈σ,h,GI〉)
〈σ,h,GI〉 1−→〈σ′,h′,GI〉
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3. 〈σ,h〉
1−→〈σ′,h′〉 ¬validate(req(〈σ,h〉),〈σ,h,GI〉)
〈σ,h,GI〉 1−→(〈σ,h,GI〉)
User mode transitions (e.g. Linux activities) require neither hypervisor nor
monitor intermediation. Proposition 2 justifies the fact that, by construction, the
transitions executed by the untrusted component can not affect the monitor state;
(i) the golden image is constant and (ii) the monitor code can be statically identified
and abstractly modeled. Executions in privileged mode require monitor interme-
diation. If the monitor validates the request, then the standard behavior of the
hypervisor is executed. Otherwise the hypervisor performs a special operation to
reject the request, by reaching the state that is returned by a function . Hereafter,
the function  is assumed to be the identity. Alternatively,  can transform the
state so that the requestor is informed about the rejected operation, by updating
the user registers according to the desired calling convention.
The function validate(req(〈σ, h〉), 〈σ, h,GI〉) represents the validation mecha-
nism of the monitor, which checks at run-time possible violations of the security
policies. In Table B.2 we briefly summarize the policies for the different access
requests. Here, PT is a function that yields the list of mappings granted by a page
table, where each mapping is a tuple (vb, pb, wt, ex) containing the virtual block
mapped (vb), the pointed physical block (pb) and the unpriviledged rights to ex-
ecute (ex) and write (wt). The rules in Table B.2 are deliberately more abstract
than the ones modeled in HOL4 and are used to intuitively present the behavior
of the monitor. For example, the function PT is part of the hardware model and
is not explicitly used by the monitor code, it is instead more similar to an iter-
ative program. This makes our verification more difficult, but it also makes the
monitor model as near as possible to the actual implementation, enabling further
verification efforts that can establish correctness of the implementation.
Note that the monitor always checks that a mapping is not writable and exe-
cutable simultaneously. Furthermore, if a mapping grants a writable access then
the executable reference counter of the pointed physical block must be zero, guar-
anteeing that this mapping does not conflict (according with the executable space
protection policy) with any other allocated page table. Similarly, if a mapping
grants an executable access, then the writable reference counter of the pointed
block must be zero.
To formalize the top goal of our verification we introduce some auxiliary nota-
tions. The working set identifies the physical blocks that host executable binaries
and their corresponding content.
Definition Let σ be a machine state. The working set of σ is defined as
WS(σ) = {〈bl, content(bl, σ)〉 | ∃pa, va.mmu(σ,PL0 , va, ex) = pa ∧ pa ∈ bl}
By using a code signing approach, we say that the integrity of a physical block
is satisfied if the signature of the block’s content belongs to the golden image.
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request r validate(r, 〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex), GI〉) holds iff
switch(bl) always
freeL1(bl) and freeL2(bl) always
unmapL1(bl, idx), unmapL2(bl, idx), ρex(bl) = 0
and linkL1(bl, idx, bl′)
mapL2(bl, idx, bl′, ex, wt, rd) and soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρwt, ρex, bl′) and
mapL1(bl, idx, bl′, ex, wt, rd) soundS(ex, bl′, σ,GI) ∧ ρex(bl) = 0
createL2(bl) and createL1(bl) ∀(vb, pb, wt, ex) ∈ PT (content(bl, σ)).
soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρwt, ρex, pb) and
soundS(ex, pb, σ,GI)
∀(vb′, pb′, wt′, ex′) ∈ PT (content(bl, σ)).
no-conflict(vb, pb, wt, ex)(vb′, pb′, wt′, ex′)
where
soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρwt, ρex, bl) =
(
(ex⇒ ¬wt ∧ ρwt(bl) = 0) ∧
(wt⇒ ¬ex ∧ ρex(bl) = 0)
)
soundS(ex, bl, σ,GI) = (ex⇒ integrity(GI, bl, content(bl, σ)))
no-conflict(vb, pb, wt, ex)(vb′, pb′, wt′, ex′) =
(
(vb 6= vb′ ∧ pb = pb′)⇒
(ex⇒ ¬wt′ ∧ wt⇒ ¬ex′)
)
Table B.2: Security policies for the available access requests
Definition Let cnt ∈ 24096∗8 be the 4KB content of a physical block bl and GI be
the golden image. Then integrity(GI, bl, cnt) if, and only if, sig(bl, cnt) ∈ GI
Notice that our security property can be refined to fit different anti-intrusion mech-
anisms. For example, integrity(GI, bl, cnt) can be instantiated with the execution
of an anti-virus scanner.
The system state is free of malicious code injection if the signature check is
satisfied for the whole executable code. That is:
Definition Let σ be a machine state, bl be a physical block and GI be the
golden image. Then integrity(GI, σ) if, only only if, for all 〈bl, cnt〉 ∈ WS(σ),
integrity(GI, bl, cnt)
Finally, we present our top level proof goal: No code injection can succeed.
Proposition 3. If 〈σ, h,GI〉 is a state reachable from the initial state of the system
〈σ0, h0, GI〉 then integrity(GI, σ)
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B.5 Verification Strategy
Our verification strategy consists of introducing a state invariant I(s) that is pre-
served by any possible transition and demonstrating that the invariant guarantees
the desired security properties.
Definition I(σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex), GI) holds if
IH(σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex)) ∧
∀ bl . (¬(τ(bl) = data))⇒ ∀ (vb, pb, wt, ex) ∈ PT (content(bl, σ)).
soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρwt, ρex, pb) ∧ soundS(ex, pb, σ,GI)
Clearly, the soundness of the monitor depends on the soundness of the hyper-
visor, thus I requires that the hypervisor’s invariant IH holds. Notice that the
invariant constrains not only the page tables currently in use, but it constrains all
potential page tables, which are all the blocks that have type different from data.
This allows to speed up the context switch, since the guest simply re-activates a
page table that has been previously validated. Technically, the invariant guarantees
protection of the memory that can be potentially executable and the correctness of
the corresponding signatures.
We verified independently that the invariant is preserved by unprivileged tran-
sitions (Theorem B.5.1) and by privileged transitions (Theorem B.5.2). Moreover,
Lemma B.5.1 demonstrates that the monitor invariant guarantees there is no ma-
licious content in the executable memory.
Lemma B.5.1. If I(〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex), GI〉) then integrity(GI, σ).
Proof. The proof is straightforward, following from soundS of every block that can
be executable according with an arbitrary potential page table.
Theorem B.5.1 demonstrates that the invariant is preserved by instructions
executed by the untrusted Linux. This depends on Lemma B.5.2, which shows that
the invariant forbids user transitions to change the content of the memory that is
executable.
Lemma B.5.2. Let 〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex), GI〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h′, GI ′〉 and I(〈σ, h,GI〉) then
∀bl . (¬(τ(bl) = data))⇒
 PT (content(bl, σ′)) = PT (content(bl, σ))∧∀(vb, pb, wt, ex) ∈ PT (content(bl, σ′)) .
(ex⇒ content(pb, σ) = content(pb, σ′))

Proof. Proof is straightforward and we split it in two parts. First we show that page
tables remain constant after user transitions and then we prove that executable
block cannot be changed by the user. From Proposition 2 we know since the
hypervisor invariant holds in the state 〈σ, h,GI〉, user transitions are not allowed
to change the page tables. Thus the user transitions preserve mappings of all page
tables in the memory.
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By the monitor’s invariant we know that in 〈σ, h,GI〉 all the mappings in page
tables comply with the policy soundW⊕X . That is, if a mapping in a page table
grants executable permissions on block to the user, the block must be write pro-
tected against unprivileged accesses. Moreover, we know that page tables remain
the same after an unprivileged transition and the user cannot change his access
permission. This proves that the content of executable block is not modifiable by
unprivileged transitions.
Theorem B.5.1. If 〈σ, h,GI〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h′, GI ′〉 and I(〈σ, h,GI〉) then I(〈σ′, h′, GI ′〉).
Proof. From the inference rules we know that h′ = h, GI ′ = GI and that the
system without the monitor behaves as 〈σ, h〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h〉. Thus, Proposition 1 can
be used to guarantee that the hypervisor invariant is preserved (IH(σ′, h′)).
If the second part of the invariant is violated then there must exist a mapping in
one (hereafter bl) of the allocated page tables that is compliant with the executable
space protection policy in σ and violates the policy in σ′. Namely, content(bl, σ′)
must be different from content(bl, σ). This contradicts Proposition 2, since the type
of the changed block is not data (τ(bl) 6= data).
Finally we must demonstrate that every potentially executable block contains
a sound binary. Lemma B.5.2 guarantees that the blocks that are potentially exe-
cutable are the same in σ and σ′ and that the content of these blocks is unchanged.
Thus is sufficient to use the invariant I(σ, h,GI), to demonstrate that the signatures
of all executable blocks are correct.
To demonstrate the functional correctness of the monitor (Theorem B.5.2 i.e.
that the invariant is preserved by privileged transitions) we introduce two auxiliary
lemmas: Lemma B.5.3 shows that the monitor correctly checks the signature of
pages that are made executable. Lemma B.5.4 expresses that executable space
protection is preserved for all hypervisor data changes, as long as a block whose
reference counter (e.g. writable; ρ′wt) becomes non zero has the other reference
counter (e.g. executable; ρex) zero.
Lemma B.5.3. If 〈σ, h,GI〉 1−→ 〈σ′, (τ ′, ρ′wt, ρ′ex), GI ′〉 and I(〈σ, h,GI〉) then for all
bl, τ ′(bl) 6= data⇒ ∀(vb′, pb′, wt, ex) ∈ PT (content(bl, σ′)). soundS(ex, pb′, σ′, GI).
Proof. Proof is done by case analysis on the type of the performed operation and
its the validity. If the requested operation is not valid then the proof is trivial, since
 is the identity function and it yields the same state. Therefore, soundS holds.
However, if the request is validated by th monitor and it is committed by the hy-
pervisor we prove Lemma B.5.3 by doing case analysis on the type of the performed
operation. Let assume that the requested operation is mapL2.
(i) If the requested mapping does not set the executable flag ex, the working set
would not be changed by committing the request WS(σ) = WS(σ′) and the
predicate soundS holds trivially.
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(ii) If the requested mapping sets the executable flag ex (i.e. the mapping grants
an executable access to a physical block pb), from validity of the request we
know that soundS(ex, pb, σ,GI). Thus adding this mapping preserves the
soundness of state and the lemma holds in this case as well.
Proof for the other operations can be done similarly.
Lemma B.5.4. If 〈σ, h,GI〉 1−→ 〈σ′, (τ ′, ρ′wt, ρ′ex), GI ′〉 and assuming that:
(i) I(〈σ, (τ, ρwt, ρex), GI〉),
(ii) ∀ bl. (ρex(bl) = 0 ∧ ρ′ex(bl) > 0)⇒ (ρwt(bl) = 0), and
(iii) ∀ bl. (ρwt(bl) = 0 ∧ ρ′wt(bl) > 0)⇒ (ρex(bl) = 0).
For all blocks bl, if soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρwt, ρex, bl) then soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρ′wt, ρ′ex, bl)
Proof. Since in the initial state the invariant holds, we know that the state 〈σ, h,GI〉
complies with the policy W ⊕X . Thus for each block bl only one of its counters
ρex(bl) and ρwt(bl) can be greater than zero. This implies that only one of the
assumptions (ii), (iii) is true. Let assume that in 〈σ, h,GI〉 the block bl is exe-
cutable, therefore ρwt(bl) = 0. If in 〈σ, h′, GI〉, the block bl is still executable, its
writable permission has not been changed and soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρ′wt, ρ′ex, bl) holds.
However, its permissions has been changed in 〈σ, h′, GI〉 it has to be happened ac-
cording to the assumption (iii), this means that soundW⊕X(wt, ex, ρ′wt, ρ′ex, bl) will
be hold true.
Theorem B.5.2. If 〈σ, h,GI〉 1−→ 〈σ′, h′, GI ′〉 and I(〈σ, h,GI〉) then I(〈σ′, h′, GI ′〉).
Proof. When the request is not validated (¬validate) then the proof is trivial, since
 is the identity function.
If the request is validated by the monitor and committed by the hypervisor,
then the inference rules guarantee that GI ′ = GI and that the system without the
monitor behaves as 〈σ, h〉 0−→ 〈σ′, h〉. Thus, Proposition 1 can be used to guarantee
that the hypervisor invariant is preserved (IH(σ′, h′)). Moreover, Lemma B.5.3
demonstrates that the soundS part of the invariant holds.
The proof of the second part (the executable space protection) of the invariant
is the most challenging task of this formal verification. This basically establishes
the functional correctness of the monitor and that its run-time policies are strong
enough to preserve the invariant (i.e. they enforce protection of the potentially
executable space). Practically speaking, the proof consists of several cases: one
for each possible request. The structure of the proof for each case is similar. For
example, for r = mapL2(bl, idx, bl′, ex, wt, rd), we (i) prove that the hypervisor
(modeled by the function Hr) only changes entry idx of the page table stored in
block bl (that is, all other blocks that are not typed data are unchanged), (ii)
we show that only the counters of physical block bl′ are changed, and (iii) we
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establish the hypothesis of Lemma B.5.4. This enables us to infer soundW⊕X for
the unchanged blocks and to reduce the proof to only check the correctness of the
entry idx of the page table in the block bl.
Finally, Theorem B.5.3 composes our results, demonstrating that no code injec-
tion can succeed.
Theorem B.5.3. Let 〈σ, h,GI〉 be a state reachable from the initial state of the
system 〈σ0, h0, GI0〉 and I(〈σ0, h0, GI0〉), then integrity(GI, σ) holds
Proof. Theorems B.5.1 and B.5.2 directly show that the invariant is preserved for
an arbitrary trace. Then, Lemma B.5.1 demonstrates that every reachable state is
free of malicious code injection.
B.6 Evaluation
The verification has been performed using the HOL4 interactive theorem prover.
The specification of the high level model of the monitor adds 710 lines of HOL4 to
the existing model of the hypervisor. This specification is intentionally low level
and does not depend on any high level theory of HOL4. This increased the difficulty
of the proof (e.g., it musts handle finite arithmetic overflows), that consists of 4400
lines of HOL4. However, the low level of abstraction allowed us to directly transfer
the model to a practical implementation and to identify several bugs of the original
design. For example, the original policy for linkL1(bl, idx, bl′) did not contain the
condition ρex(bl) = 0, allowing to violate the integrity of the working set if a block
is used to store an L1 page table and is itself executable.
The monitor code consists of 720 lines of C and the emulator consists of addi-
tional 950 lines of code. Finally, 100 lines have been added to the hypervisor to
support the needed interactions among the hosted components.
We used LMBench to measure the overhead introduced on user processes hosted
by Linux. We focused on the benchmarks “fork”, “exec” and “shell”, since they
require the creation of new processes and thus represent the monitors worst case
scenario. As macro-benchmark, we measured in-memory compression of two data
streams. The benchmarks have been executed using Qemu to emulate a Beagleboard-
Mx. Since we are not interested in evaluating a specific signature scheme, we
computed the signature of each physical block as the xor of the contained words,
allowing us to focus on the overhead introduced by the monitor’s infrastructure.
Table B.3 reports the benchmarks for different prototypes of the monitor, thus en-
abling to compare the overhead introduced by different design choices. “No moni-
tor” is the base configuration, where neither the monitor or the emulation layer are
enabled. In “P Emu” the emulation layer is enabled and deployed as component
of the hypervisor. This benchmark is used to measure the overhead introduced by
this layer, which can be potentially removed at the cost of modifying the Linux
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Benchmark fork exec shell tar -czvf 1.2 KB/12.8 MB
No monitor 0.010 0.010 0.042 0.05 20.95
P Emu 0.011 0.011 0.048 0.09 21.05
P Emu + P Mon 0.013 0.013 0.054 0.10 21.02
P Emu + U Mon 0.017 0.017 0.067 0.11 20.98
Table B.3: Qemu benchmarks [in second]
kernel. In “P Emu + P Mon” both the monitor and the emulation layer are de-
ployed as privileged software inside the hypervisor. Finally, in “P Emu + U Mon”
the monitor is executed as unprivileged guest.
B.7 Related Work
Since a comprehensive verification of commodity SW is not possible, it is necessary
to architect systems so that the trusted computing base for the desired properties
is small enough to be verified, and that the untrusted code cannot affect the secu-
rity properties. Specialized HW (e.g. TrustZone and TPM) has been proposed to
support this approach and has been used to implement secure storage and attesta-
tion. The availability of platforms like hypervisors and microkernels extended the
adoption of this approach to use cases that go beyond the ones that can be handled
using static HW based solutions.
For example, in [131] the authors use the seL4 microkernel to implement a secure
access controller (SAC) with the purpose of connecting one front-end terminal to
either of two back-end networks one at a time. The authors delegate the complex
(and non security-critical) functionalities (e.g. IP/TCP routing, WEB front-end) to
untrusted Linuxes, which are isolated by the microkernel from a small and trusted
router manager. The authors describe how the system’s information flow properties
can be verified disregarding the behavior of the untrusted Linuxes.
Here, we used the trustworthy components to help the insecure Linux to restrict
its own attack surface; i.e. to prevent binary code injection. Practically, our pro-
posal uses Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI), which has been first introduced
by Garfinkel et al. [20] and Chen et al. [48]. Similarly to MProsper, other pro-
posals (including Livewire [20], VMWatcher [123] and Patagonix [143]) use VMI,
code signing and executable space protection to prevent binary code injection in
commodity OSs. However, all existing proposals rely on untrusted hypervisors and
their designs have not been subject of formal verification.
Among others non trustworthy VMIs, hytux [136], SecVisor [189] and NICKLE
[175] focus on protecting integrity of the sole guest kernel. SecVisor establishes
a trusted channel with the user, which must manually confirm all changes to the
kernel. NICKLE uses a shadow memory to keep copy of authenticated modules
and guarantees that any instruction fetch by the kernel is routed to this memory.
OpenBSD 3.3 has been one of the first OS enforcing executable space protection
(W ⊕ X). Similarly, Linux (with the PaX and Exec Shield patches), NetBSD
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and Microsoft’s OSs (using Data Execution Prevention (DEP)) enforce the same
policy. However, we argue that due to the size of the modern kernels, trustworthy
executable space protection can not be achieved without the external support of a
trusted computing base. In fact, an attacker targeting the kernel can circumvent
the protection mechanism, for example using return-oriented programming [191].
The importance of enforcing executable space protection from a privileged point
of view (i.e. by VMI) is also exemplified by [141]. Here, the authors used model
checking techniques to identify several misbehaviors of the Linux kernel that violate
the desired property.
B.8 Concluding Remarks
We presented a trustworthy code injection prevention system for Linux on embed-
ded devices. The monitor’s trustworthiness is based on two main principles (i)
the trustworthy hypervisor guarantees the monitor’s tamper resistance and that
all memory operations that modify the memory layout are mediated, (ii) the for-
mal verification of design demonstrates that the top security goal is guaranteed by
the run-time checks executed by the monitor. These are distinguishing features of
MProsper, since it is the first time that absence of binary code injection has been
verified for a commodity OS.
Even if the MProsper’s formal model is not yet at the level of the actual binary
code executed on the machine, this verification effort is important to validate the
monitor design; in fact we were able to spot security issues that were not dependent
on the specific implementation of the monitor. The high level model of the monitor
is actually a state transition model of the implemented code, operating on the
actual ARMv7 machine state. Thus the verified properties can be transferred to
the actual implementation by using standard refinement techniques (e.g. [190]).
Our ongoing work include the development of a end-to-end secure infrastruc-
ture, where an administrator can remotely update the software of an embedded
device. Moreover, we are experimenting with other run-time binary analysis tech-
niques that go beyond code signature checking: for example an anti-virus scanner
can be integrated with the monitor, enabling to intercept and stop self-decrypting
malwares.

ARM Data-Cache Terminology
In the following we give a short summary of some of the terms used in the next
two papers and a figure illustrating the structure of a data-cache in the ARM
architecture:
Data-cache structure for the ARM architecture.
Tag: The tag is the part of an address (mostly physical address) stored in the
cache which identifies the corresponding memory address associated to a line in the
cache.
Line: A line in the cache contains a block of contiguous words for the memory.
Each line include also a valid flag (which indicates if the line contains a valid data)
and a dirty flag (which indicates if the line has been changed since it was read from
memory).
Set: Memory addresses are logically partitioned into sets of lines that are
congruent w.r.t. a set index; usually set index depends on either virtual addresses
(then the cache is called virtually indexed) or physical addresses (then the cache is
called physically indexed).
Way: The cache contains a number of ways which can hold one corresponding
line for every set index.
Cache Flushing: Flushing means writing back into the memory a cache line
and cleaning the dirty flag.
Eviction: Eviction means writing back into the memory a cache line and
invalidating it in the cache.
Memory Coherence: Is the problem of ensuring that a value read from a
memory location (using either a cacheable or an uncacheable address) is always the
most recently written value to that location.
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Cache Storage Channels:
Alias-Driven Attacks and Verified
Countermeasures
Roberto Guanciale, Hamed Nemati, Mads Dam, Christoph Baumann
Abstract
Caches pose a significant challenge to formal proofs of security for code
executing on application processors, as the cache access pattern of security-
critical services may leak secret information. This paper reveals a novel attack
vector, exposing a low-noise cache storage channel that can be exploited by
adapting well-known timing channel analysis techniques. The vector can also
be used to attack various types of security-critical software such as hypervi-
sors and application security monitors. The attack vector uses virtual aliases
with mismatched memory attributes and self-modifying code to misconfig-
ure the memory system, allowing an attacker to place incoherent copies of
the same physical address into the caches and observe which addresses are
stored in different levels of cache. We design and implement three different
attacks using the new vector on trusted services and report on the discovery
of an 128-bit key from an AES encryption service running in TrustZone on
Raspberry Pi 2. Moreover, we subvert the integrity properties of an ARMv7
hypervisor that was formally verified against a cache-less model. We evalu-
ate well-known countermeasures against the new attack vector and propose
a verification methodology that allows to formally prove the effectiveness of
defence mechanisms on the binary code of the trusted software.
C.1 Introduction
Over the past decade huge strides have been made to realise the long-standing
vision of formally verified execution platforms, including hypervisors [138, 157],
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separation kernels [71, 174], and microkernels [133]. Many of these platforms have
been comprehensively verified, down to machine code [133] and Instruction Set
Architecture (ISA) [71] levels, and provide unprecedented security and isolation
guarantees.
Caches are mostly excluded from these analyses. The verification of both
seL4 [132] and the Prosper kernels [71, 157] assume that caches are invisible and
ignore timing channels. The CVM framework from the Verisoft project [10] treats
caches only in the context of device management [110]. For the verification of
user processes and the remaining part of the kernel, caches are invisible. Similarly,
the Nova [199, 203] and CertiKOS [97] microvisors do not consider caches in their
formal analysis.
How much of a problem is this? It is already well understood that caches are one
of the key features of modern commodity processors that make a precise analysis
of, e.g., timing and/or power consumption exceedingly difficult, and that this can
be exploited to mount timing-based side channels, even for kernels that have been
fully verified [56]. These channels, thus, must be counteracted by model-external
means, e.g., by adapting scheduling intervals [198] or cache partitioning [172, 129].
The models, however, should preferably be sound with respect to the features
that are reflected, such as basic memory reads and writes. Unfortunately, as we
delve deeper into the Instruction Set Architecture we find that this expectation is
not met: Certain configurations of the system enable an attacker to exploit caches
to build storage channels. Some of these channels are especially dangerous since
they can be used to compromise both confidentiality and integrity of the victim,
thus breaking the formally verified properties of isolation.
The principle idea to achieve this, is to break coherency of the memory system
by deliberately not following the programming guidelines of an ISA. In this report
we focus on two programming faults in particular:
1. Accessing the same physical address through virtual aliases with mismatched
cacheability attributes.
2. Executing self-modifying code without flushing the instruction cache.
Reference manuals for popular architectures (ARM, Power, x64) commonly warn
that not following such guidelines may result in unpredictable behaviour. However,
since the underlying hardware is deterministic, the actual behaviour of the system
in these cases is quite predictable and can be reverse-engineered by an attacker.
The first fault results in an incoherent memory configuration where cacheable
and uncacheable reads may see different values for the same physical address after
a preceding write using either of the virtual aliases. Thus the attacker can discover
whether the physical address is allocated in a corresponding cache line. For the
second fault, jumping to an address that was previously written without flushing
the instruction cache may result in the execution of the old instruction, since data
and instruction caches are not synchronised automatically. By carefully selecting
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old and new instructions, as well as their addresses, the attacker can then deduce
the status of a given instruction cache line.
Obtaining this knowledge, i.e., whether certain cache lines contain attacker data
and instructions, is the basic principle behind the Prime+Probe flavor of access-
driven timing channel attacks [208]. This type of attack can be adapted using the
new attack vector. The main advantage of this approach is that the cache storage
channels presented here are both more stealthy, less noisy, and easier to measure
than timing channels. Moreover, an incoherent data cache state can be used to
subvert the integrity of trusted services that depend on untrusted inputs. Breaking
the memory coherency for the inputs exposes vulnerabilities that enable a malicious
agent to bypass security monitors and possibly to compromise the integrity of the
trusted software.
The attacks sketched above have been experimentally validated in three realistic
scenarios. We report on the implementation of a prototype that extracts a 128-
bit key from an AES encryption service running in TrustZone on Raspberry Pi 2.
We use the same platform to implement a process that extracts the exponent of a
modular exponentiation procedure executed by another process. Moreover, imple-
menting a cache-based attack we subverted the integrity properties of an ARMv7
hypervisor that was formally verified against a cache-less model. The scenarios are
also used to evaluate several existing countermeasures against cache-based attacks
as well as new ones that are targeted to the alias-driven attack vector.
Finally, we propose a methodology to repair the formal analysis of the trusted
software, reusing existing means as much as possible. Specifically, we show (1)
how a countermeasure helps restoring integrity of a previously formally verified
software and (2) how to prove the absence of cache storage side channels. This last
contribution includes the adaptation of an existing tool [24] to analyse the binary
code of the trusted software.
C.2 Background
Natural preys of side-channel attacks are implementations of cryptographic algo-
rithms, as demonstrated by early works of Kocher [134] and Page [163]. In cache-
driven attacks, the adversary exploits the caches to acquire knowledge about the
execution of a victim and uses this knowledge to infer the victim’s internal variables.
These attacks are usually classified in three groups, that differ by the means used by
the attacker to gain knowledge. In “time-driven attacks” (e.g. [209]), the attacker,
who is assumed to be able to trigger an encryption, measures (indirectly or directly)
the execution time of the victim and uses this knowledge to estimate the number
of cache misses and hits of the victim. In “trace-driven attacks” (e.g. [6, 163, 232]),
the adversary has more capabilities: he can profile the cache activities during the
execution of the victim and thus observe the cache effects of a particular operation
performed by the victim. This highly frequent measurement can be possible due to
the adversary being interleaved with the victim by the scheduler of the operating
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system or because the adversary executes on a separate core and monitors a shared
cache. Finally, in “access-driven attacks” (e.g. [158, 208]), the attacker determines
the cache indices modified by the victim. This knowledge is obtained indirectly,
by observing cache side effects of victim’s computation on the behaviour of the
attacker.
In the literature, the majority of trace and access driven attacks use timing
channels as the key attack vector. These vectors rely on time variations to load/s-
tore data and to fetch instructions in order to estimate the cache activities of the
victim: the cache lines that are evicted, the cache misses, the cache hits, etc.
Storage channels, on the other hand, use system variables to carry information.
The possible presence of these channels raises concerns, since they invalidate the
results of formal verification. The attacker can use the storage channels without
the support of an external measurement (e.g. current system time), so there is no
external variable such as time or power consumption that can be manipulated by the
victim to close the channel and whose accesses can alert the victim about malicious
intents. Moreover, a storage channel can be less noisy than timing channels that are
affected by scheduling, TLB misses, speculative execution, and power saving, for
instance. Finally, storage channels can pose risk to the integrity of a system, since
they can be used to bypass reference monitors and inject malicious data into trusted
agents. Nevertheless, maybe due to the practical complexities in implementing these
channels, few works in literature address cache-based storage channels.
One of the new attack vectors of this paper is based on mismatched cacheability
attributes and has pitfalls other than enabling access-driven attacks. The vector
opens up for Time Of Check To Time Of Use (TOCTTOU) like vulnerabilities. A
trusted agent may check data stored in the cache that is not consistent with the
data that is stored in the memory by a malicious software. If this data is later
evicted from the cache, it can be subsequently substituted by the unchecked item
placed in the main memory. This enables an attacker to bypass a reference monitor,
possibly subverting the security property of formally verified software.
Watson [223] demonstrated this type of vulnerability for Linux system call wrap-
pers. He uses concurrent memory accesses, using preemption to change the argu-
ments to a system call in user memory after they were validated. Using non-
cacheable aliases one could in the same way attack the Linux system calls that
read from the caller’s memory. A further victim of such attacks is represented by
run time monitors. Software that dynamically loads untrusted modules often uses
Software-based Fault Isolation (SFI) [218, 195] to isolate untrusted components
from the trusted ones. If an on-line SFI verifier is used (e.g. because the loaded
module is the output of a just-in-time compiler), then caches can be used to mislead
the verifier to accept stale data. This enables malicious components to break the
SFI assumptions and thus the desired isolation.
In this paper we focus on scenarios where the victim and the attacker are hosted
on the same system. An instance of such scenarios consists of a malicious user pro-
cess that attempts to compromise either another user process, a run-time monitor
or the operating system itself. In a cloud environment, the attacker can be a
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(possibly compromised) complete operating system and the victim is either a colo-
cated guest, a virtual machine introspector or the underlying hypervisor. Further
instances of such scenario are systems that use specialised hardware to isolate se-
curity critical components from untrusted operating systems. For example, some
ARM processors implement TrustZone [1]. This mechanism can be used to isolate
and protect the system components that implement remote attestation, trusted
anchoring or virtual private networks (VPN). In this case, the attacker is either a
compromised operating system kernel or an untrusted user process threatening a
TrustZone application.
C.3 The New Attack Vectors: Cache Storage Channels
Even if it is highly desirable that the presence of caches is transparent to program
behaviour, this is usually not the case unless the system configuration satisfies
some architecture-specific constraints. Memory mapped devices provide a trivial
example: If the address representing the output register of a memory mapped
UART is cacheable, the output of a program is never visible on the serial cable,
since the output characters are overwritten in the cache instead of being sent to
the physical device. These behaviours, which occur due to misconfigurations of the
system, can raise to security threats.
To better understand the mechanisms that constitute our attack vectors, we
summarise common properties of modern architectures. The vast majority of gen-
eral purpose systems use set-associative caches:
(i) Data is transferred between memory and cache in blocks of fixed size, called
cache lines.
(ii) The memory addresses are logically partitioned into sets of lines that are con-
gruent wrt. a set index; usually set index depends on either virtual addresses
(then the cache is called virtually indexed) or physical addresses (then the
cache is called physically indexed);
(iii) The cache contains a number of ways which can hold one corresponding line
for every set index.
(iv) A cache line stores both the data, the corresponding physical memory location
(the tag) and a dirty flag (which indicates if the line has been changed since
it was read from memory).
Caches are used by processors to store frequently accessed information and thus
to reduce the number of accesses to main memory. A processor can use separate
instruction and data caches in a Harvard arrangement (e.g. the L1 cache in ARM
Cortex A7) or unified caches (e.g. the L2 cache in ARM Cortex A7). Not all
memory areas should be cached; for instance, accesses to addresses representing
registers of memory mapped devices should always be directly sent to the main
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A1) write(VA_c, 1)
A2) write(VA_nc, 0)
A3) call victim
A4) D = read(VA_nc)
V1) if secret
access(VA3)
else
access(VA4)
V2) access(VA3+secret)
(a) For write-back caches with inertia
and lazy write
A1) invalidate(VA_c)
A2) write(VA_nc, 0)
A3) D = read(VA_c)
A4) write(VA_nc, 1)
A5) call victim
A6) D = read(VA_c)
(b) For write-through caches or caches
that do not guarantee inertia or lazy
write
Figure C.1: Confidentiality threat due to data-cache
memory subsystem. For this reason, modern Memory Management Units (MMUs)
allow to configure, via the page tables, the caching policy on a per-page basis,
allowing a fine-grained control over if and how areas of memory are cached.
In Sections C.3.1, C.3.2 and C.3.3 we present three new attack vectors that
depends on misconfigurations of systems and caches. These attacks exploit the
following behaviours:
• Mismatched cacheability attributes; if the data cache reports a hit on a mem-
ory location that is marked as non-cacheable, the cache might access the
memory disregarding such hit. ARM calls this event “unexpected cache hit”.
• Self-modifying code; even if the executable code is updated, the processor
might execute the old version of it if this has been stored in the instruction
cache.
The attacks can be used to threaten both confidentiality and integrity of a target
system. Moreover, two of them use new storage channels suitable to mount access
driven attacks. This is particularly concerning, since so far only a noisy timing
channel could be used to launch attacks of this kind, which makes real implemen-
tations difficult and slow. The security threats are particularly severe whenever
the attacker is able to (directly or indirectly) produce the misconfigurations that
enable the new attack vectors, as described in Section C.3.4.
C.3.1 Attacking Confidentiality Using Data-Caches
Here we show how an attacker can use mismatched cacheability attributes to mount
access-driven cache attacks; i.e. measuring which data-cache lines are evicted by the
execution of the victim.
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We use the program in Figure C.1a to demonstrate the attacker programming
model. For simplicity, we assume that the cache is physically indexed, it has only
one way and that it uses the write allocate/write back policy. We also assume that
the attacker can access the virtual addresses vac and vanc, both pointing to the
physical address pa; vac is cacheable while vanc is not. The attacker writes 1 and
0 into the virtual addresses vac and vanc respectively, then it invokes the victim.
After the victim returns, the attacker reads back from the address vanc.
Let idx be the line index corresponding to the address pa. Since vac is cacheable,
the instruction in A1 stores the value 1 in the cache line indexed by idx, the line
is flagged as dirty and its tag is set to pa. When the instruction in A2 is executed,
since vanc is non-cacheable, the system ignores the “unexpected cache hit” and the
value 0 is directly written into the memory, bypassing the cache. Now, the value
stored in main memory after the execution of the victim depends on the behaviour
of the victim itself; if the victim accesses at least one address whose line index is
idx, then the dirty line is evicted and the value 1 is written back to the memory;
otherwise the line is not evicted and the physical memory still contains the value
0 in pa. Since the address is non-cacheable, the value that is read from vanc in A4
depends on the victim’s behaviour.
This mechanism enables the attacker to probe if the line index idx is evicted
by the the victim. If the attacker has available a pair of aliases (cacheable and
non-cacheable) for every cache line index, the attacker is able to measure the list
of cache lines that are accessed by the victim, thus it can mount an access-driven
cache attack. The programs V1 and V2 in Figure C.1a exemplify two victims of
such attack; in both cases the lines evicted by the programs depend on a confidential
variable secret and the access-driven cache attack can extract some bits of the secret
variable.
Note that we assumed that the data cache (i) is “write-back”, (ii) has “inertia”
and (iii) uses “lazy write”. That is, (i) writing is done in the cache and the write
access to the memory is postponed, (ii) the cache evicts a line only when the
corresponding space is needed to store new content, and (iii) a dirty cache line is
written back only when it is evicted. This is not necessarily true; the cache can be
write-through or it can (speculatively) write back and clean dirty lines when the
memory bus is unused. Figure C.1b presents an alternative attack whose success
does not depend on this assumption. The attacker (A1-A3) stores the value 0 in
the cache, by invalidating the corresponding line, writing 0 into the memory and
reading back the value using the cacheable virtual address. Notice that after step
A3 the cache line is clean, since the attacker used the non-cacheable virtual alias
to write the value 0. Then, the attacker writes 1 into the memory, bypassing the
cache. The value read in A6 using the cacheable address depends on the behaviour
of the victim; if the victim accesses at least one address whose line index is idx,
then the cache line for pa is evicted and the instruction in A6 fetches the value from
the memory, yielding the value 1; otherwise the line is not evicted and the cache
still contains the value 0 for pa.
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V1) D = access(VA_c)
A1) write(VA_nc, 1)
V2) D = access(VA_c)
V3) if not policy(D)
reject
[evict VA_c]
V4) use(VA_c)
Figure C.2: Integrity threat due to data-cache
C.3.2 Attacking Integrity Using Data-Caches
Mismatched cacheability attributes may also produce integrity threats, by en-
abling an attacker to modify critical data in an unauthorized or undetected manner.
Figure D.1a demonstrates an integrity attack. Again, we assume that the data-
cache is direct-mapped, that it is physically indexed and that its write policy is
write allocate/write back. For simplicity, we limit the discussion to the L1 caches.
In our example, vac and vanc are virtual addresses pointing to the same memory
location pa; vac is the cacheable alias while vanc is non-cacheable. Initially, the
memory location pa contains the value 0 and the corresponding cache line is ei-
ther invalid or the line has valid data but it is clean. In a sequential model where
reads and writes are guaranteed to take place in program order and their effects
are instantly visible to all system components, the program of Figure D.1a has the
following effects: V1) a victim accesses address vac, reading 0; A1) the attacker
writes 1 into pa using the virtual alias vanc; V2) the victim accesses again vac, this
time reading 1; V3) if 1 does not respect a security policy, then the victim rejects
it; otherwise V4) the victim uses 1 as the input for a security-relevant functionality.
On a real processor with a relaxed memory model the same system can behave
differently, in particular: V1) using vac, the victim reads initial value 0 from the
memory at the location pa and fills the corresponding line in the cache; A1) the
attacker use vanc to write 1 directly into the memory, bypassing the cache; V2)
the victim accesses again vac, reading 0 from the cache; V3) the policy is evaluated
based on 0; possibly, the cache line is evicted and, since it is not dirty, the memory
is not affected; V4) the next time that the victim accesses pa it will read 1 and will
use this value as input of the functionality, but 1 has not been checked against the
policy. This enables an attacker to bypass a reference monitor, here represented
by the check of the security policy, and to inject unchecked input as parameter of
security-critical functions.
C.3.3 Attacking Confidentiality Using Instruction Caches
Similar to data caches, instruction caches can be used to mount access-driven
cache attacks; in this case the attacker probes the instruction cache to extract
information about the victim execution path.
Our attack vector uses self-modifying code. The program in Figure C.3 demon-
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A1) jmp A8
A2) write(&A8, {R0=1})
A3) call victim
A4) jmp A8
A5) D = R0
...
A8) R0=0
A9) return
V1) if secret
jmp f1
else
jmp f2
Figure C.3: Confidentiality threat due to instruction-cache
strates the principles of the attack. We assume that the instruction cache is phys-
ically indexed and that it has only one way. We also assume that the attacker’s
executable address space is cacheable and that the processor uses separate instruc-
tion and data caches.
Initially, the attacker’s program contains a function at the address A8 that
writes 0 into the register R0 and immediately returns. The attacker starts in
A1, by invoking the function at A8. Let idx be the line index corresponding to
the address of A8: Since the executable address space is cacheable, the execution
of the function has the side effect of temporarily storing the instructions of the
function into the instruction cache. Then (A2), the attacker modifies its own code,
overwriting the instruction at A8 with an instruction that updates register R0 with
the value 1. Since the processor uses separate instruction and data caches the
new instruction is not written into the instruction cache. After that the victim
completes the execution of its own code, the attacker (A4) re-executes the function
at A8. The instruction executed by the second invocation of the function depends
on the behaviour of the victim: if the execution path of the victim contains at least
one address whose line index is idx then the attacker code is evicted, the second
execution of the function fetches the new instruction from the memory and the
register is updated with the value 1; otherwise, the attacker code is not evicted and
the second execution of the function uses the old code updating the register with
0.
In practice, the attacker can probe if the line index idx is evicted by the victim.
By repeating the probing phase for every cache line, the attacker can mount access-
driven instruction cache attacks. The program V1 in Figure C.3 exemplifies a victim
of such attack, where the control flow of the victim (and thus the lines evicted by
the program) depends on a confidential variable secret.
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C.3.4 Scenarios
In this section we investigate practical applications and limits of the attack vec-
tors. To simplify the presentation, we assumed one-way physically indexed caches.
However, all attacks above can be straightforwardly applied to virtually indexed
caches. Also, the examples can be extended to support multi-way caches if the
way-allocation strategy of the cache does not depend on the addresses that are
accessed: the attacker repeats the cache filling phase using several addresses that
are all mapped to the same line index. The attack presented in Section C.3.3 also
assumes that the processor uses separate instruction and data caches. This is the
case in most modern processors, since they usually use the “modified Harvard ar-
chitecture”. Modern x64 processors, however, implement a snooping mechanism
that invalidates corresponding instruction cache lines automatically in case of self-
modifying code ([119], Vol. 3, Sect. 11.6); in such a scenario the attack cannot
succeed.
The critical assumptions of the attacks are the ability of building virtual aliases
with mismatched cacheability attributes (for the attacks in Sections C.3.1 and C.3.2)
and the ability of self-modifying code (for the attack in Section C.3.3). These as-
sumptions can be easily met if the attacker is a (possibly compromised) operating
system and the victim is a colocated guest in a virtualized environment. In this
case, the attacker is usually free to create several virtual aliases and to self-modify
its own code. A similar scenario consists of systems that use specialised hardware
to isolate security-critical components (like SGX and TrustZone), where a malicious
operating system shares the caches with trusted components. Notice also that in
case of TrustZone and hardware assisted virtualization, the security software (e.g.
the hypervisor) is not informed about the creation of setups that enable the attack
vectors, since it usually does not interfere with the manipulation of the guest page
tables.
In some cases it is possible to enable the attack vectors even if the attacker
is executed in non-privileged mode. Some operating systems can allow user pro-
cesses to reconfigure cacheability of their own virtual memory. The main reason of
this functionality is to speed up some specialised computations that need to avoid
polluting the cache with data that is accesses infrequently [171]. In this case two
malicious programs can collude to build the aliases having mismatched attributes.
Since buffer overflows can be used to inject malicious code, modern operating
systems enforce the executable space protection policy: a memory page can be
either writable or executable, but it can not be both at the same time. However, to
support just in time compilers, the operating systems allow user processes to change
at run-time the permission of virtual memory pages, allowing to switch a writable
page into an executable and vice versa (e.g. Linux provides the syscall “mprotect”,
which changes protection for a memory page of the calling process). Thus, the
attack of Section C.3.3 can still succeed if: (i) initially the page containing the
function A8 is executable, (ii) the malicious process requests the operating system
to switch the page as writable (i.e. between step A1 and A2) and (iii) the process
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requests the operating system to change back the page as executable before re-
executing the function (i.e. between step A2 and A4). If the operating system does
not invalidate the instruction cache whenever the permissions of memory pages are
changed, the confidentiality threat can easily be exploited by a malicious process.
In Sections C.2 and D.2 we provide a summary of existing literature on side
channel attacks that use caches. In general, every attack (e.g. [6, 232, 158]) that
is access-driven and that has been implemented by probing access times can be
reimplemented using the new vectors. However, we stress that the new vectors
have two distinguishing characteristics with respect to the time based ones: (i)
the probing phase does not need the support of an external measurement, (ii) the
vectors build a cache-based storage channel that has relatively low noise compared
channels based on execution time which depend on many other factors than cache
misses, e.g., TLB misses and branch mispredictions.
In fact, probing the cache state by measuring execution time requires the at-
tacker to access the system time. If this resource is not directly accessible in the
execution level of the attacker, the attacker needs to invoke a privileged function
that can introduce delays and noise in the cache state (e.g. by causing the eviction
from the data cache when accessing internal data-structures). For this reason, the
authors of [232] disabled the timing virtualization of XEN (thus giving the attacker
direct access to the system timer) to demonstrate a side channel attack. Finally,
one of the storage channels presented here poses integrity threats clearly outside
the scope of timing based attacks.
C.4 Case Studies
To substantiate the importance of the new attack vectors, and the need to augment
the verification methodology to properly take caches and cache attributes into ac-
count, we examine the attack vectors in practice. Three cases are presented: A
malicious OS that extracts a secret AES key from a cryptoservice hosted in Trust-
Zone, a malicious paravirtualized OS that subverts the memory protection of a
hypervisor, and a user process that extracts the exponent of a modular exponenti-
ation procedure executed by another process.
C.4.1 Extraction of AES Keys
AES [70] is a widely used symmetric encryption scheme that uses a succession of
rounds, where four operations (SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumn and AddRound-
Key) are iteratively applied to temporary results. For every round i, the algorithm
derives the sub key Ki from an initial key k. For AES-128 it is possible to derive
k from any sub key Ki.
Traditionally, efficient AES software takes advantage of precomputed SBox ta-
bles to reach a high performance and compensate the lack of native support to low-
level finite field operations. The fact that disclosing access patterns to the SBoxes
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can make AES software insecure is well known in literature (e.g. [224, 208, 6]). The
existing implementations of these attacks probe the data cache using time channels,
here we demonstrate that such attacks can be replicated using the storage chan-
nel described in Section C.3.1. With this aim, we implement the attack described
in [158].
The attack exploits a common implementation pattern. The last round of AES
is slightly different from the others since the MixColumn operation is skipped. For
this reason, implementations often use four SBox tables T0, T1, T2, T3 of 1KB for
all the rounds except the last one, whereas a dedicated T4 is used. Let c be the
resulting cipher-text, n be the total number of rounds and xi be the intermediate
output of the round i. The last AES round computes the cipher-text as follows:
c = Kn ⊕ ShiftRows(SubBytes(xn−1))
Instead of computing ShiftRows(SubBytes(xn−1)), the implementation accesses the
precomputed table T4 according to an index that depends on xn−1. Let b[j] denote
the j-th byte of b and [T4 output] be one of the actual accesses to T4, then
c[j] = Kn[j]⊕ [T4 output] .
Therefore, it is straightforward to compute Kn knowing the cipher-text and the
entry yielded by the access to T4:
Kn[j] = c[j]⊕ [T4 output]
Thus the challenge is to identify the exact [T4 output] for a given byte j. We use
the “non-elimination” method described in [158]. Let L be a log of encryptions,
consisting of a set of pairs (cl, el). Here, cl is the resulting cipher-text and el is the
set of cache lines accessed by the AES implementation. We define Lj,v to be the
subset of L such that the byte j of the cipher-text is v:
Lj,v = {(cl, el) ∈ L such that cl[j] = v}
Since c[j] = Kn[j]⊕[T4 output] and the key is constant, if the j-th byte of two cipher-
texts have the same value then the accesses to T4 for such cipher-text must contain
at least one common entry. Namely, the cache line accessed by the implementation
while computing c[j] = Kn[j] ⊕ [T4 output] is (together with some false positives)
in the non-empty set
Ej,v =
⋂
(cl,el)∈Lj,v
el
Let T j,v4 be the set of distinct bytes of T4 that can be allocated in the cache lines
Ej,v. Let v, v′ be two different values recorded in the log for the byte j. We know
that exist ti,v4 ∈ T j,v4 and ti,v
′
4 ∈ T j,v
′
4 such that v = Kn[j]⊕ti,v4 and v′ = Kn[j]⊕ti,v
′
4 .
Thus
v ⊕ v′ = tj,v4 ⊕ tj,v
′
4
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This is used to iteratively shrink the sets T j,v4 and T
j,v′
4 by removing the pairs that
do not satisfy the equation. The attacker repeats this process until for a byte value
v the set T j,v4 contains a single value; then the byte j of key is recovered using
Kn[j] = v ⊕ tj,v4 . Notice that the complete process can be repeated for every byte
without gathering further logs and that the attacker does not need to know the
plain-texts used to produce the cipher-texts.
We implemented the attack on a Raspberry Pi 2 [179], because this platform is
equipped with a widely used CPU (ARM Cortex A7) and allows to use the Trust-
Zone extensions. The system starts in TrustZone and executes the bootloader of
our minimal TrustZone operating system. This installs a secure service that allows
an untrusted kernel to encrypt blocks (e.g. to deliver packets over a VPN) using
a secret key. This key is intended to be confidential and should not be leaked to
the untrusted software. The trusted service is implemented using an existing AES
library for embedded devices [227], that is relatively easy to deploy in the resource
constrained environment of TrustZone. However, several other implementations
(including OpenSSL [161]) expose the same weakness due to the use of precom-
puted SBoxes. The boot code terminates by exiting TrustZone and activating the
untrusted kernel. This operating system is not able to directly access the Trust-
Zone memory but can invoke the secure service by executing Secure Monitor Calls
(SMC).
In this setting, the attacker (the untrusted kernel), which is executed as privi-
leged software outside TrustZone, is free to manipulate its own page tables (which
are different from the ones used by the TrustZone service). Moreover, the attacker
can invalidate and clean cache lines, but may not use debugging instructions to
directly inspect the state of the caches.
The attacker uses the algorithm presented in Figure C.1b, however several con-
siderations must be taken into account to make the attack practical. The attacker
repeats the filling and probing phases for each possible line index (128) and way (4)
of the data-cache. In practice, since the cache eviction strategy is pseudo random,
the filling phase is also repeated several times, until the L1 cache is completely
filled with the probing data (i.e. for every pair of virtual addresses used, accessing
to the two addresses yield different values).
On Raspberry Pi 2, the presence of a unified L2 cache can obstruct the probing
phase: even if a cache line is evicted from the L1 cache by the victim, the system
can temporarily store the line into the L2 cache, thus making the probing phase
yield false negatives. It is in general possible to extend the attack to deal with L2
caches (by repeating the filling and probing phases for every line index and way
of the L2 cache subsystem), however, in Raspberry Pi 2 the L2 cache is shared
between the CPU and the GPU, introducing a considerable amount of noise in the
measurements. For this reason we always flushes the L2 cache between the step A5
and A6 of the attack. We stress that this operation can be done by the privileged
software outside TrustZone without requiring any support by TrustZone itself.
To make the demonstrator realistic, we allow the TrustZone service to cache its
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own stack, heap, and static data. This pollutes the data extracted by the probing
phase of the attack: it can now yield false positives due to access of the victim to
such memory areas. The key extraction algorithm can handle such false positives,
but we decide to filter them out to speed up the analysis phase. For this reason, the
attacker first identifies the cache lines that are frequently evicted independently of
the resulting cipher-text (e.g. lines where the victim stack is probably allocated)
and removes them from the sets Ej,v. As common, the AES implementation defines
the SBox tables as consecutive arrays. Since they all consists of 1 KB of data, the
cache lines where different SBoxes are allocated are non-overlapping, helping the
attacker in the task of reducing the sets Ej,v to contain a single line belonging to
the table T4 and of filtering out all evictions that are due the previous rounds of
AES.
For practical reasons we implemented the filling and probing phase online, while
we implemented the key extraction algorithm as a offline Python program that
analyses the logs saved by the online phase. The complete online phase (including
the set-up of the page tables) consists of 552 lines of C, while the Python programs
consists of 152 lines of code. The online attacker generates a stream of random
128 bits plain-texts and requests to the TrustZone service their encryption. Thus,
the frequency of the attacker’s measurements isolates one AES encryption of one
block per measurement. Moreover, even if the attacker knows the input plain-texts,
they are not used in the offline phase. We repeated the attack for several randomly
generated keys and in the worst case, the offline phase recovered the complete
128-bit key after 850 encryption in less than one second.
C.4.2 Violating Spatial Isolation in a Hypervisor
A hypervisor is a low-level execution platform controlling accesses to system re-
sources and is used to provide isolated partitions on a shared hardware. The par-
titions are used to execute software with unknown degree of trustworthiness. Each
partition has access to its own resources and cannot encroach on protected parts of
the system, like the memory used by the hypervisor or the other partitions. Here
we demonstrate that a malicious operating system (guest) running on a hypervi-
sor can gain illicit access to protected resources using the mechanism described in
Section C.3.2.
As basis for our study we use a hypervisor [157] that has been formally ver-
ified previously with respect to a cache-less model. The hypervisor runs on an
ARMv7 Cortex-A8 processor [63], where both L1 and L2 caches are enabled. On
ARMv7 the address translation depends on the page tables stored in the memory.
Entries of the page tables encode a virtual-to-physical mapping for a memory page
as well as access permissions and cacheability setting. On Cortex-A8 the MMU
consults the data cache before accessing the main memory whenever a page table
descriptor must be fetched.
The architecture is paravirtualized by the hypervisor for several guests. Only the
hypervisor is executing in privileged mode, while the guests are executed in non-
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privileged mode and need to invoke hypervisor functionality to alter the critical
resources of the system, like page tables.
A peculiarity of the hypervisor (and others [26]) that makes it particularly
relevant for our purpose is the use of so-called direct paging [157]. Direct paging
enables a guest to manage its own memory space with assistance of the hypervisor.
Direct paging allows the guest to allocate the page tables inside its own memory
and to directly manipulate them while the tables are not in active use by the
MMU. Then, the guest uses dedicated hypervisor calls to effectuate and monitor
the transition of page tables between passive and active state. The hypervisor
provides a number of system calls that support the allocation, deallocation, linking,
and activation of guest page tables. These calls need to read the content of page
tables that are located in guest memory and ensure that the proposed MMU setup
does not introduce any illicit access grant. Thus the hypervisor acts as a reference
monitor of the page tables.
As described in Section C.3.2, on a Cortex-A8 processor sequential consistency
is not guaranteed if the same memory location is accessed by virtual aliases with
mismatched cacheability attributes. This opens up for vulnerabilities. The hyper-
visor may check a page table by fetching its content from the cache. However, if
the content of the page table in the cache is clean and different from what has been
placed by the attacker in the main memory and the page table is later evicted from
the cache, the MMU will use a configuration that is different from what has been
validated by the hypervisor.
Figure C.4 illustrates how a guest can use the aliasing of the physical memory
to bypass the validation needed to create a new page table. Hereafter we assume
that the guest and the hypervisor use two different virtual addresses to point to the
same memory location. Initially, the hypervisor (1) is induced to load a valid page
table in the cache. This can be done by writing a valid page table, requesting the
hypervisor to verify and allocate it and then requesting the hypervisor to deallocate
the table. Then, the guest (2) stores an invalid page table in the same memory
location. If the guest uses a non-cacheable virtual alias, the guest write (3) is
directly applied to the memory bypassing the cache. The guest (4) requests the
hypervisor to validate and allocate this memory area, so that it can later be used as
page table for the MMU. At this point, the hypervisor is in charge of verifying that
the memory area contains a valid page table and of revoking any direct access of the
guest to this memory. In this way, a validated page table can be later used securely
by the MMU. Since the hypervisor (4) accesses the same physical location through
the cache, it can potentially validate stale data, for example the ones fetched during
the step (1). At a later point in time, the validated data is evicted from the cache.
This data is not written back to the memory since the hypervisor has only checked
the page table content and thus the corresponding cache lines are clean. Finally,
the MMU (5) uses the invalid page table and its settings become untrusted.
Note that this attack is different from existing “double mapping” attacks. In
double-mapping attacks the same physical memory is mapped “simultaneously” to
multiple virtual memory addresses used by different agents; the attack occurs when
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Figure C.4: Compromising integrity of a direct paging mechanism using incoherent
memory. The MMU is configured to use a page table that was not validated by the
hypervisor.
the untrusted agent owns the writable alias, thus being able to directly modify
the memory accessed by the trusted one. Here, the attacker exploits the fact that
the same physical memory is first allocated to the untrusted agent and then re-
allocated to the trusted one. After that the ownership is transferred (after step A1),
the untrusted agent has no mapping to this memory area. However, if the cache
contains stale data the trusted agent may be compromised. Moreover, the attack
does not depend on misconfiguration of the TLBs; the hypervisor is programmed
to completely clean the TLBs whenever the MMU is reconfigured.
We implemented a malicious guest that managed to bypass the hypervisor val-
idation using the above mechanism. The untrusted data, that is used as configu-
ration of the MMU, is used to obtain writable access to the master page table of
the hypervisor. This enables the attacker to reconfigure its own access rights to all
memory pages and thus to completely take over the system.
Not all hypervisors are subject to this kind of vulnerability. For example, if a
hypervisor uses shadow paging, then guest pages are copied into the hypervisor’s
own memory where they are transformed into so-called shadow page tables. The
guest has no access to this memory area and the hypervisor always copies cached
data (if present), so the attack described above cannot be replicated. On the other
hand, the adversary can still attack secure services hosted by the hypervisor, for
example a virtual machine introspector. In [51] the hypervisor is used to implement
a run-time monitor to protect an untrusted guest from its internal threats. The
monitor is deployed in a separate partition to isolate it from the untrusted guest.
The policy enforced by the monitor is executable space protection: each page in the
memory can be either writable or executable but not both at the same time. The
monitor, via the hypervisor, intercepts all changes to the executable codes. This
allows to use standard signature checking to prevent code injection. Each time the
guest operating system tries to execute an application, the monitor checks if the
binary of the application has a valid signature. In case the signature is valid, the
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y := 1
for i = m down to 1
y = Square(y)
y = ModReduce(y, N)
if e_i == 1
y = Mult(y,x)
y = ModReduce(y, N)
Figure C.5: Square and multiply algorithm
monitor requests the hypervisor to make executable the physical pages that contain
the binary code. The security of this system depends on the fact that the adversary
cannot directly modify a validated executable due to executable space protection.
However, if a memory block of the application code is accessed using virtual aliases
with mismatched cacheability attributes, the untrusted guest can easily mislead the
monitor to validate wrong data and execute unsigned code.
C.4.3 Extraction of Exponent From a Modular Exponentiation
Procedure
The square and multiply algorithm of Figure C.5 is often used to compute
the modular exponentiation xe modN , where em . . . e1 are the bits of the binary
representation of e. This algorithm has been exploited in access-driven attacks,
since the sequence of function calls directly leaks e, which corresponds to the private
key in several decryption algorithms. Here we demonstrate that an attacker that
is interleaved with a victim can infer e using the storage channel described in
Section C.3.3.
The attack was implemented on Raspberry Pi 2. We build a setting where
a malicious process (e.g. a just in time compiler) can self-modify its own code.
Moreover, we implement a scheduler that allows the attacker to be scheduled after
every loop of the victim.1
The attacker uses the vector presented in Figure C.3, repeating the filling and
probing phases for every way of the instruction cache and for every line index
where the code of the functions Mult and ModReduce can be mapped. Due to the
separate instruction and data L1 caches, the presence of the L2 cache does not
interfere with the probing phase. However, we must ensure that the instruction
overwritten in the step (A2) does not sit in the L1 data-cache when the step (A4)
is executed. Since user processes cannot directly invalidate or clean cache lines, we
satisfy this requirement by adding a further step (A3.b). This step writes several
addresses whose line indices in the L1 data-cache are the same of the address &A8,
thus forcing the eviction from the L1 data-cache of the line that has contains the
instruction stored at &A8.
1Forcing the scheduler of a general purpose OS to grant such high frequency of measurements
is out of the scope of this paper. The interested reader can refer to [158, 232].
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We repeated the attack for several randomly generated values of e and in each
case the attacker correctly identified the execution path of the victim. This accuracy
is due to the simple environment (no other process is scheduled except the victim
and the attacker) and the lack of noise that is typical in attacks that use time
channels.
C.5 Countermeasures
Literature on access-based timing channel attacks suggests a number of well-known
countermeasures. Specifically, for attacks on the confidentiality of AES encryption,
a rather comprehensive list of protective means is provided in [224]. Some of the
approaches are specific to AES, e.g., using registers instead of memory or dedicated
hardware instructions for the SBox table look-up. Others are specific to the timing
attack vector, e.g., reducing the accuracy of timing information available to the
attacker. Still, there are well-known solutions addressing the presence of caches in
general, thus they are suitable to defend against attacks built on the cache storage
channel described in this paper.
In what follows we identify such known general countermeasures (Sections C.5.1
and C.5.3.1-5) and propose new ones that are specific to the attack vector using
uncacheable aliases (Sections C.5.2, C.5.3.6, and C.5.4). In addition it is examined
which countermeasures are suitable to protect against the integrity threat posed
by incoherent aliases in the memory system and propose a fix for the hypervisor
example.
Different countermeasures are evaluated by implementing them for the AES
and hypervisor scenarios introduced in the previous section and analysing their
performance. The corresponding benchmark results are shown in Tables C.1 and
C.2. Since our main focus is on verifying systems in the presence of caches, for
each group of countermeasures we also sketch how a correctness proof would be
conducted. Naturally, such proofs require a suitable model of the memory system
including instruction and data caches.
It should be emphasised that the verification of the countermeasures is meant to
be performed separately from the verification of the overall system which is usually
assuming a much simpler memory model for feasibility. The goal is to show that the
countermeasures neutralise the cache storage channels and re-establish a coherent
memory model. The necessary program verification conditions from such a proof
can then be incorporated into the overall verification methodology, supporting its
soundness.
C.5.1 Disabling Cacheability
The simplest way to eliminate the cache side channel is to block an attacker from
using the caches altogether. In a virtualization platform, like an operating system
or a hypervisor, this can be achieved by enforcing the memory allocated to un-
trusted guest partitions to be uncacheable. Consequently, cache-driven attacks on
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confidentiality and integrity of a system are no longer possible. Unfortunately, this
countermeasure comes at great performance costs, potentially slowing down a sys-
tem by several orders of magnitude. On the other hand, a proof of the correctness
of the approach is straight-forward. Since the attacker cannot access the caches,
they are effectively invisible to him. The threat model can then be specified using
a coherent memory semantics that is a sound abstraction of a system model where
caches are only used by trusted code.
C.5.2 Enforcing Memory Coherency
Given the dramatic slowdown expected for a virtualization platform, it seems out of
the question to completely deny the use of caches to untrusted guests. Nevertheless,
the idea of enforcing that guest processes cannot break memory coherency through
uncacheable aliases still seems appealing.
Always Cacheable Guest Memory
When making all guest memory uncacheable is prohibitively expensive, an intuitive
alternative could be to just make all guest memory cacheable. Indeed, if guests are
user processes in an operating system this can be easily implemented by adapting
the page table setup for user processes accordingly, i.e., enforcing cacheability for
all user pages. Then user processes cannot create uncacheable aliases to measure
cache contents and start cache-based time-of-check-to-time-of-use attacks on their
host operating system.
However, for hypervisors, where guests are whole operating systems, the ap-
proach has several drawbacks. First of all, operating systems are usually control-
ling memory mapped I/O devices which should be operated through uncacheable
memory accesses. If a hypervisor would make all memory accesses of a guest OS
cacheable, the OS will not be able to properly control I/O devices and probably not
work correctly. Thus, making all untrusted guest memory cacheable only works for
(rather useless) operating systems that do not control I/O devices. Furthermore,
there are cases when a guest can optimise its performance by making seldomly used
pages uncacheable [171].
C ⊕ U Policy
Instead of making all guest pages cacheable, a hypervisor could make sure that at
all times a given physical page can either be accessed in cacheable or uncacheable
mode (C ⊕U policy). To this end it would need to monitor the page table setup of
the guests and forbid them to define both cacheable and uncacheable aliases of the
same physical address. Then guests may set up uncacheable virtual pages only if no
cacheable alias exists for the targeted physical page. Moreover, the hypervisor has
to flush a cacheable page from the caches when it becomes uncacheable, in order
to remove stale copies of the page that might be abused to set up an alias-driven
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LMbench micro benchmark Native Hyp ACPT SelFl Flush
null syscall 0.41 1.75 1.76 1.77 1.76
read 0.84 2.19 2.20 2.20 2.38
write 0.74 2.09 2.10 2.15 2.22
stat 3.22 5.61 5.50 5.89 5.92
fstat 1.19 2.53 2.55 2.56 2.65
open/close 6.73 14.50 14.42 14.86 14.71
select(10) 1.86 3.29 3.30 3.33 3.42
sig handler install 0.85 2.87 2.89 2.92 2.95
sig handler overhead 4.43 14.45 14.48 15.11 14.91
protection fault 2.66 3.73 3.83 3.91 3.70
pipe 21.83 48.78 47.79 47.62 692.91
fork+exit 1978 5106 5126 6148 38787
fork+execve 2068 5249 5248 6285 39029
pagefaults 3.76 11.21 11.12 21.55 332.82
Application benchmark Native Hyp ACPT SelFl Flush
tar (500K) 70 70 70 70 190
tar (1M) 120 120 120 120 250
tar (2M) 230 210 200 210 370
dd (10M) 90 140 140 160 990
dd (20M) 190 260 260 570 1960
dd (40M) 330 500 450 600 3830
jpg2gif(5KB) 60 60 60 60 130
jpg2gif(250KB) 920 810 820 830 1230
jpg2gif(750KB) 930 870 870 880 1270
jpg2bmp(5KB) 40 40 40 40 110
jpg2bmp(250KB) 1350 1340 1340 1350 1720
jpg2bmp(750KB) 1440 1420 1420 1430 1790
jpegtrans(270’, 5KB) 10 10 10 10 80
jpegtrans(270’, 250KB) 220 240 240 250 880
jpegtrans(270’, 750KB) 380 400 400 420 1050
bmp2tiff(90 KB) 10 10 10 10 60
bmp2tiff(800 KB) 20 20 20 20 80
ppm2tiff(100 KB) 10 10 10 10 70
ppm2tiff(250 KB) 10 10 10 20 80
ppm2tiff(1.3 MB) 20 30 30 30 90
tif2rgb(200 KB) 10 20 20 20 120
tif2rgb(800 KB) 40 40 40 50 270
tif2rgb(1.200 MB) 130 160 160 180 730
sox(aif2wav 100KB) 20 20 20 30 140
sox(aif2wav 500KB) 40 60 60 60 180
sox(aif2wav 800KB) 60 100 100 110 220
Table C.1: Hypervisor Micro and Application Benchmarks. LMbench micro bench-
marks [µs] and application benchmarks [ms] for the Linux kernel v2.6.34 running
natively on BeagleBone Black, paravirtualized on the hypervisor without protec-
tion against the integrity threat (Hyp), with always cacheable page tables (ACPT),
with selective flushing (SelFl), and with full cache flushes on entry (Flush).
cache attack. In this way, the hypervisor would enforce memory coherency for the
guest memory by making sure that no content from uncacheable guest pages is ever
cached and for cacheable pages cache entries may only differ from main memory if
they are dirty.
A Trust-zone cryptoservice that intends to prevent a malicious OS to use mem-
ory incoherency to measure the Trust-zone accesses to the cache can use TZ-
RKP [18] and extend its run-time checks to force the OS to respect the C ⊕ U
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policy.
Second-Stage MMU
Still, for both the static and the dynamic case, the C ⊕U policy may be expensive
to implement for fully virtualizing hypervisors that rely on a second stage of address
translation. For example, the ARMv8 architecture provides a second stage MMU
that is controlled by the hypervisor, while the first stage MMU is controlled by the
guests. Intermediate physical addresses provided by the guests are then remapped
through the second stage to the actual physical address space. The mechanism
allows also to control the cacheability of the intermediate addresses, but it can only
enforce non-cacheability. In order to enforce cacheability, the hypervisor would need
to enforce it on the first stage of translation by intercepting the page table setup
of its guests, which creates an undesirable performance overhead and undermines
the idea of having two independently operated stages of address translation.
W ⊕X Policy
Unfortunately, enforcing cacheability of memory accesses does not protect against
the instruction-cache-based confidentiality threat described earlier. In order to
prevent an attacker from storing incoherent copies for the same instruction address
in the memory system, the hypervisor would also need to prohibit self-modifying
code for the guests, i.e., ensure that all guest pages are either writable or executable
(W ⊕X policy). Since operating systems regularly use self-modification, e.g., when
installing kernel updates or swapping in pages, the association of pages to the
executable or writable attribute is dynamic as well and must be monitored by
the hypervisor. It also needs to flush instruction caches when an executable page
becomes writable.
Overall, the solutions presented above seem to be more suitable for paravirtual-
izing hypervisors, that are invoked by the guests explicitly to configure their virtual
memory. Adding the required changes to the corresponding MMU virtualization
functionality seems straightforward. In fact, for the paravirtualizing hypervisor
presented in this paper a tamper-proof security monitor has been implemented and
formally verified, which enforces executable space protection on guest memory and
checks code signatures in order to protect the guests from malicious code injection
[51].
Always Cacheable Page Tables
To protect the hypervisor against the integrity threat a lightweight specialization of
the C⊕U policy introduced above was implemented. It is based on the observation
that uncacheable aliases can only subvert the integrity of the hypervisor if they are
constructed for the inputs of its MMU virtualization functions. Thus the hypervisor
needs only to enforce the C ⊕ U policy, and consequently memory coherency, on
its inputs. While this can be achieved by flushing the caches appropriately (see
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AES encryption 5 000 000 × 16B 10 000 × 8KBTime Throughput Time Throughput
Original SBoxes 23s 3.317 MB/s 13s 6.010 MB/s
Compact Last SBox 24s 3.179 MB/s 16s 4.883 MB/s
Scrambled Last SBox 30s 2.543 MB/s 20s 3.901 MB/s
Uncached Last SBox 36s 2.119 MB/s 26s 3.005 MB/s
Scrambled All SBoxes 132s 0.578 MB/s 125s 0.625 MB/s
Uncached All SBoxes 152s 0.502 MB/s 145s 0.539 MB/s
Table C.2: AES Encryption Benchmarks. AES encryption on Raspberry Pi 2 of
one block (128 bits = 16 Bytes) and 512 blocks for different SBox layouts.
Section C.5.3), a more efficient approach is to allocate the page tables of the guests
in regions that are always cacheable. These regions of physical memory are fixed
for each guest and the hypervisor only validates a page table for the guest if it is
allocated in this area. In all virtual addresses mapping to the area are forced to be
cacheable. Obviously, also the guest system needs to be adapted to support the new
requirement on the allocation of page tables. However, given a guest system that
was already prepared to run on the original hypervisor, the remaining additional
changes should be straight-forward. For instance, the adaptation of the hypervisor
required changes to roughly 35 LoC in the paravirtualized Linux kernel and an
addition of 45 LoC to the hypervisor for the necessary checks.
The performance of the hypervisor with always cacheable page tables (ACPT)
can be observed in Table C.1. Compared to the original hypervisor there are ba-
sically no performance penalties. In some cases the new version even outperforms
the original hypervisor, due to the ensured cacheability of page tables. It turns out
that in the evaluated Linux kernel, page tables are not always allocated in cacheable
memory areas. The correctness of the approach is discussed in detail in Section C.6.
The main verification condition to be discharged in a formal proof of integrity is
that the hypervisor always works on coherent memory, hence any correctness proof
based on a coherent model also holds in a more detailed model with caches.
C.5.3 Repelling Alias-Driven Attacks
The countermeasures treated so far were aimed at restricting the behaviour of
the attacker to prevent him from harvesting information from the cache channel
or break memory coherency in an attack on integrity. A different angle to the
problem lies in focusing on the trusted victim process and ways it can protect itself
against an unrestricted attacker that is allowed to break memory coherency of its
memory and run alias-driven cache attacks. The main idea to protect integrity
against such attacks is to (re)establish coherency for all memory touched by the
trusted process. For confidentiality, the idea is to adapt the code of the victim in a
way that its execution leaks no additional information to the attacker through the
cache channel. Interestingly, many of the techniques described below are suitable
for both purposes, neutralizing undesirable side effects of using the caches.
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Complete Cache Flush
One of the traditional means to tackle cache side channels is to flush all instruction
and data caches before executing trusted code. In this way, all aliases in the cache
are either written back to memory (in case they are dirty) or simply removed from
the cache (in case they are clean). Any kind of priming of the caches by the
attacker becomes ineffective since all his cache entries are evicted by the trusted
process, foiling any subsequent probing attempts using addresses with mismatched
cacheability. Similarly, all input data the victim reads from the attacker’s memory
are obtained from coherent main memory due to the flush, thus thwarting alias-
driven attacks on integrity.
A possible correctness proof that flushing all caches eliminates the information
side channel would rely on the assertion that, after the execution of the trusted ser-
vice, an attacker will always make the same observation using mismatched aliases,
i.e., that all incoherent lines were evicted from the cache. Thus he cannot infer any
additional knowledge from the cache storage channel. Note, that here it suffices to
flush the caches before returning to the attacker, but to protect against the integrity
threat, data caches need to be flushed before any input data from the attacker is
read.
For performance evaluation the flushing approach was implemented in the AES
and hypervisor examples. At each call of an AES encryption or hypervisor function,
all data and instruction caches are flushed completely. Naturally this introduces
an overhead for the execution of legitimate guest code due to an increased cache
miss rate after calls to trusted processes. At the same time the trusted process gets
slowed down for the same reason, if normally some of its data and instructions were
still allocated in the caches from a previous call. Additionally the flushing itself is
often expensive, e.g., for ARM processors the corresponding code has to traverse
all cache lines in all ways and levels of cache to flush them individually. That all
these overheads can add up to a sizeable delay of even one order of magnitude is
clearly demonstrated by the benchmarks given in Tables C.2 and C.1.
Cache Normalization
Instead of flushing, the victim can eliminate the cache information side channel
by reading a sequence of memory cells so that the cache is brought into a known
state. For instruction caches the same can be achieved by executing a sequence of
jumps that are allocated at a set of memory locations mapping to the cache lines to
be evicted. In the context of timing channels this process is called normalization.
If subsequent memory accesses only hit the normalized cache lines, the attacker
cannot observe the memory access pattern of the victim, because the victim always
evicts the same lines. However the correctness of this approach strongly depends
on the hardware platform used and the replacement policy of its caches. In case
several memory accesses map to the same cache line the normalization process may
in theory evict lines that were loaded previously. Therefore, in the verification a
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detailed cache model is needed to show that all memory accesses of the trusted
service hit the cache ways touched during normalization.
Selective Eviction
The normalization method shows that cache side effects can be neutralized without
evicting the whole cache. In fact, it is enough to focus on selected cache lines that
are critical for integrity or confidentiality. For example, the integrity threat on the
hypervisor can be eliminated by evicting the cache lines corresponding to the page
table provided by the attacker. The flushing or normalization establishes memory
coherency for the hypervisor’s inputs, thus making sure it validates the right data.
The method of selective flushing was implemented for the hypervisor scenario and
benchmark results in Table C.1 show, as one would expect, that it is more efficient
than flushing the whole cache, but still slower than our specialized ACPT solution.
To ensure confidentiality in the AES example it suffices to evict the cache lines
occupied by the SBoxes. Since the incoherent entries placed in the same cache
lines are removed by the victim using flushing or normalization, the attacker subse-
quently cannot measure key-dependent data accesses to these cache lines. For the
modular exponentiation example the same technique can be used, evicting only the
lines in the instruction cache where the code of the functions Mult and ModReduce
is mapped.
The correctness of selective eviction of lines for confidentiality depends on the
fact that accesses to other lines do not leak secret information through the cache
side channel, e.g., for the AES encryption algorithm lines that are not mapped to an
SBox are accessed in every computation, independent of the value of the secret key.
Clearly, this kind of trace property needs to be added as a verification condition
on the code of the trusted service. Then the classic confidentiality property can
be established, that observations of the attacker are the same in two computations
where only the initial values of the secret are different (non-infiltration [108]).
Secret-Independent Memory Accesses
The last method of eliminating the cache information side channel is a special case
of this approach. It aims to transform the victim’s code such that it produces a
memory access trace that is completely independent of the secret, both for data
accesses and instruction fetches. Consequently, there is no need to modify the cache
state set up by the attacker, it will be transformed in the same way even for different
secret values, given the trusted service receives the same input parameters and all
hidden states in the service or the cache model are part of the secret information.
As an example we have implemented a modification of AES suggested in [224],
where a 1KB SBox look-up table is scrambled in such a way that a look-up needs
to touch all cache lines occupied by the SBox. In our implementation on Raspberry
Pi 2 each L1 cache line consists of 64 Bytes, hence a 32bit entry is spread over
16 lines where each line contains two bits of the entry. While the decision which
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2 bits from every line are used is depending on the secret AES key, the attacker
only observes that the encryption touches the 16 cache lines occupied by the SBox,
hence the key is not leaked.
Naturally the look-up becomes more expensive now because a high number of
bitfield and shift operations is required to reconstruct the original table entry. For
a single look-up, a single memory access is substituted by 16 memory accesses, 32
shifts, 16 additions and 32 bitfield operations. The resulting overhead is roughly
50% if only the last box is scrambled (see Table C.2). This is sufficient if all
SBoxes are mapped to the same cache lines and the attacker cannot interrupt
the trusted service, probing the intermediate cache state. Scrambling all SBoxes
seems prohibitively expensive though, slowing the encryption down by an order
of magnitude. However, since the number of operations depends on the number of
lines used to store the SBox, if the system has bigger cache lines the countermeasure
becomes cheaper.
Reducing the Channel Bandwidth
Finally for the AES example there is a countermeasure that does not completely
eliminate the cache side channel, but makes it harder for the attacker to derive the
secret key. The idea described in [224] is to use a more compact SBox that can
be allocated on less lines, undoing an optimization in wolfSSL for the last round
of AES. There the look-up only needs to retrieve one byte instead four, still the
implementation word-aligns these bytes to avoid bit masking and shifting. By byte-
aligning the entries again, the table shrinks by a factor of four, taking up four lines
instead of 16 on Raspberry Pi 2. Since the attacker can distinguish less entries by
the cache line they are allocated on, the channel leaks less information. This theory
is confirmed in practice where retrieving the AES key required about eight times
as many encryptions compared to the original one. At the same time, the added
complexity resulted in a performance delay of roughly 23% (see Table C.2).
Detecting Memory Incoherency
A reference monitor (e.g. the hypervisor) can counter the integrity threat by pre-
venting the invocation of the critical functions (e.g. the MMU virtualization func-
tions) if memory incoherency is detected. The monitor can itself use mismatched
cache attributes to detect incoherency as follows. For every address that is used as
the input of a critical function, the monitor checks if reading the location using the
cacheable and non-cacheable aliases yield the same result. If the two reads differs,
then memory incoherency is detected and the monitor rejects the request, otherwise
then request is processed.
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C.5.4 Hardware Based Countermeasures
The cache-based storage channels rely on misbehaviour of the system due to mis-
configurations. For this reason, the hardware could directly take care of them. The
vector based on mismatched cacheability attributes can be easily made ineffective
if the processor does not ignore unexpected cache hits. For example, if a physical
address is written using a non-cacheable alias, the processor can invalidate every
line having the corresponding tag. Virtually indexed caches are usually equipped
with similar mechanisms to guarantee that there can not be aliases inside the cache
itself.
Hardware inhibition of the vector that uses the instruction cache can be achieved
using a snooping mechanism that invalidates instruction cache lines whenever self-
modification is detected, similar to what happens in x64 processors. In architectures
that perform weakly ordered memory accesses and aggressive speculative execution,
implementing such a mechanism can become quite complex and make the out-of-
order execution logic more expensive. There is also a potential slow-down due to
misspeculation when instructions are fetched before they are overwritten.
Overall, the presented countermeasures show that a trusted service can be ef-
ficiently secured against alias-driven cache attacks if two properties are ensured:
(1) for integrity, the trusted service may only accesses coherent memory (2) for
confidentiality, the cache must be transformed in a way such that the attacker
cannot observe memory accesses depending on secrets. In next section, a verifica-
tion methodology presented that aims to prove these properties for the code of the
trusted service.
C.6 Verification Methodology
The attacks presented in Section C.4 demonstrate that the presence of caches can
make a trustworthy, i.e. formally verified, program vulnerable to both confiden-
tiality and security threats. These vulnerabilities depend on the fact that for some
resources (i.e. some physical addresses of the memory) the actual system behaves
differently from what is predicted by the formal model: we refer to this misbe-
haviour as “loss of sequential consistency”.
As basis for the study we assume a low level program (e.g. a hypervisor, a
separation kernel, a security monitor, or a TrustZone crypto-service) running on a
commodity CPU such as the ARMv7 Cortex A7 of Raspberry Pi 2. We refer to the
trusted program as “the kernel”. The kernel shares the system with an untrusted
application, henceforth “the application”. We assume that the kernel has been
subject to a pervasive formal verification that established its functional correctness
and isolation properties using a model that reflects the ARMv7 ISA specification
to some level of granularity. For instance for both seL4 and the Prosper kernel the
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processor model is based on Anthony Fox’s cacheless L3 model of ARMv7 2.
We identify two special classes of system resources (read: Memory locations):
• Critical resources: These are the resources whose integrity must be protected,
but which the application needs access to for its correct operation.
• Confidential resources: These are the resources that should be read protected
against the application.
There may in addition be resources that are both critical and confidential. We
call those internal resources. Examples of critical resources are the page tables of
a hypervisor, the executable code of the untrusted software in a run-time moni-
tor, and in general the resources used by the invariants needed for the verification
of functional correctness. Confidential (internal) resources can be cryptographic
keys, internal kernel data structures, or the memory of a guest colocated with the
application.
The goal is to repair the formal analysis of the kernel, reusing as much as possible
of the prior analysis. In particular, our goals are:
1. To demonstrate that critical and internal resources cannot be directly affected
by the application and that for these resources the actual system behaves ac-
cording to the formal specification (i.e. that sequential consistency is preserved
and the integrity attacks described in Section C.3.2 cannot succeed).
2. To guarantee that no side channel is present due to caches, i.e. that the
real system exposes all and only the channels that are present in the formal
functional specification that have been used to verify the kernel using the
formal model.
C.6.1 Repairing the Integrity Verification
For simplicity, we assume that the kernel accesses all resources using cacheable
virtual addresses. To preserve integrity we must ensure two properties:
• That an address belonging to a critical resource cannot be directly or indi-
rectly modified by the application.
• Sequential consistency of the kernel.
The latter property is equivalent to guaranteeing that what is observed in presence
of caches is exactly what is predicted by the ISA specification.
The verification depends on a system invariant that must be preserved by all
executions: For every address that belongs to the critical and internal resources, if
there is a cache hit and the corresponding cache line differs from the main memory
then the cache line must be dirty. The mechanism used to establish this invariant
2In case of Prosper, augmented with a detailed model of the MMU [157].
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depends on the specific countermeasure used. It is obvious that if the caches are
disabled (Section C.5.1) the invariant holds, since the caches are always empty. In
the case of “Always Cacheable Memory” (Section C.5.2) the invariant is preserved
because no non-cacheable alias is used to access these resources: the content of the
cache can differ from the content of the memory only due to a memory update that
changed the cache, thus the corresponding cache line is dirty. Similar arguments
apply to the C ⊕ U Policy, taking into account that the cache is cleaned whenever
a resource type switch from cacheable (C) to uncacheable (U) and vice versa.
More complex reasoning is necessary for other countermeasures, where the at-
tacker can build uncacheable aliases in its own memory. In this case we know that
the system is configured so that the application cannot write the critical resources,
since otherwise the integrity property cannot be established for the formal model
in the first place. Thus, if the cache contains critical or internal data different
from main memory it must have been written there by the kernel that only uses
cacheable memory only, hence the line is dirty as well.
To show that a physical address pa belonging to a critical resource cannot not
be directly or indirectly modified by the application we proceed as follows. By the
assumed formal verification, the application has no direct writable access to pa,
otherwise the integrity property would not have been established at the ISA level.
Then, the untrusted application can not directly update pa neither in the cache nor
in the memory. The mechanism that can be used to indirectly update the view of
the kernel of the address pa consists in evicting a cache line that has a value for pa
different from the one stored in the memory and that is not dirty. However, this
case is prevented by the new invariant.
Proving that sequential consistency of the kernel is preserved is trivial: The
kernel always uses cacheable addresses so it is unable to break the new invariant:
a memory write always updates the cache line if there is a cache hit.
C.6.2 Repairing the Confidentiality Verification
Section C.3 demonstrates the capabilities of the attacker: Additionally to the re-
sources that can be accessed in the formal model (registers, memory locations access
to which is granted by the MMU configuration, etc) the attacker is able to measure
which cache lines are evicted. Then the attacker can (indirectly) observe all the
resources that can affect the eviction. Identifying this set of resources is critical
to identify the constraints that must be satisfied by the trusted kernel. For this
reason, approximating this set (e.g. by making the entire cache observable) can
strongly reduce the freedom of the trusted code. A more refined (still conservative)
analysis considers observable by the attacker the cache line tag3 and whether a
cache line is empty (cache line emptiness). Then to guarantee confidentiality it
3On direct mapped caches, we can disregard the line tag, because they contain only one way
for each line. In order to observe the tags of addresses accessed by the kernel, the attacker requires
at least two ways per cache line: one that contains an address accessible by the kernel and one
that the attacker can prime in order to measure whether the first line has been accessed.
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is necessary to ensure that, while the application is executing, the cache line tag
and emptiness never depend on the confidential resources. We stress that this is
a sufficient condition to guarantee that no additional information is leaked due to
presence of caches with respect to the formal model
Showing that the condition is met by execution of the application is trivial. By
the assumed formal verification we already know that the application has no direct
read access (e.g. through a virtual memory mapping) to confidential resources. On
the other hand, the kernel is able to access these resources, for example to perform
encryption. The goal is to show that the caches do not introduce any channel
that has not been taken into account at the level of the formal model. Due to
the overapproximation described above, this task is reduced to a “cache-state non-
interference property”, i.e. showing that if an arbitrary functionality of the kernel
is executed then the cache line emptiness and the line tags in the final state do not
depend on confidential data.
The analysis of this last verification condition depends on the countermeasure
used by the kernel. If the kernel always terminates with caches empty, then the
non-interference property trivially holds, since a constant value can not carry any
sensible information. This is the case if the kernel always flushes the caches before
exiting, never use cacheable aliases (for both program counter and memory accesses)
or the caches are completely disabled.
In other cases (e.g. “Secret-Independent Memory Accesses” and “Selective Evic-
tion”) the verification condition is further decomposed to two tasks:
1. Showing that starting from two states that have the same cache states, if two
programs access at the same time the same memory locations then the final
states have the same cache states.
2. Showing that the sequence of memory accesses performed by the kernel only
depends on values that are not confidential.
The first property is purely architectural and thus independent of the kernel. Here-
after we summarise the reasoning for a system with a single level of caches, with
separated instruction and data caches and whose caches are physically indexed
and physically tagged (e.g. the L1 memory subsystem of ARMv7 CPUs). We use
σ1, σ
′
1, σ2, σ
′
2 to range over machine states and σ1 → σ′1 to represent the execution
of a single instruction. From an execution σ1 → σ2 · · · → σn we define two pro-
jections: piI(σ1 → σ2 · · · → σn) is the list of encountered program counters and
piD(σ1 → σ2 · · · → σn) is the list of executed memory operations (type of operation
and physical address). We define P as the biggest relation such that if σ1 P σ2
then for both data and instruction cache
• a line in the cache of σ1 is empty if and only if the same line is empty in σ2,
and
• the caches of σ1 and σ2 have the same tags for every line.
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The predicate P is preserved by executions σ1 → . . . and σ2 → . . . if the corre-
sponding projections are cache safe: (i) the instruction tag and index of piI(σ1 →
. . . )[i] is equal to the instruction tag and index of piI(σ2 → . . . )[i] (ii) if piD(σ1 →
. . . )[i] is a read (write) then piD(σ2 → . . . )[i] is a read (write) (iii) the cache line
tag and index of the address in piD(σ1 → . . . )[i] is equal to the cache line tag and
index of the address in piD(σ2 → . . . )[i]
Consider the example in Figure C.1a, where va3 and va4 are different addresses.
In our current setting this is secure only if va3 and va4 share the same data cache
index and tag (but they could point to different positions within a line). Similarly,
the example in Figure C.3 is secure only if the addresses of both targets of the con-
ditional branch have the same instruction cache index and tag. Notice that these
conditions are less restrictive than the ones imposed by the program counter secu-
rity model. Moreover, these restrictions dot not forbid completely data-dependent
look-up tables. For example, the scrambled implementation of AES presented In
Section C.5.3 satisfies the rules that we identified even if it uses data-dependent
look-up tables.
In practice, to show that the trusted code satisfies the cache safety policy, we
rely on a relational observation equivalence and we use existing tools for relational
verification that support trace based observations. In our experiments we adapted
the tool presented in [24]. The tool executes two analyses of the code. The first
analysis handles the instruction cache: we make every instruction observable and
we require that the matched instructions have the same set index and tag for the
program counter. The second analysis handles the data cache: we make every
memory access an observation and we require that the matched memory accesses
use the same set index and tag (originally the tool considered observable only
memory writes and required that the matched memory writes access the same
address and store the same value). Note that the computation of set index and tag
are platform-dependent, thus when porting the same verified code to a processor,
whose caches use a different method for indexing lines, the code might not be cache
safe anymore. To demonstrate the feasibility of our approach we applied the tool to
one functionality of the hypervisor described in Section C.4.2, which is implemented
by 60 lines of assembly and whose analysis required 183 seconds.
C.7 Related Work
Kocher [134] and Kelsey et al. [125] were the first to demonstrate cache-based side-
channels. They showed that these channels contain enough information to enable
an attacker to extract the secret key of cryptographic algorithms. Later, Page
formally studied cache side-channels and showed how one can use them to attack
naïve implementations of the DES cryptosystem [163]. Among the existing cache
attacks, the trace-driven and access-driven attacks are the most closely related to
this paper since they can be reproduced using the vectors presented in Section C.3.
In trace-driven attacks [163] an adversary profiles the cache activities while the
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victim is executed. Acıiçmez showed a trace-driven cache attack on the first two
rounds of AES [6], which has been later improved and extended by X. Zhao [234]
to compromise a CLEFIA block cipher. A similar result is reported in [36]. In an
access-driven, or Prime+Probe, attack the adversary can determine the cache sets
modified by the victim. In several papers this technique is used to compromise real
cryptographic algorithms like RSA [166, 118] and AES [102, 158, 208].
Due to the security concerns related to cache channels, research on the security
implications of shared caches has so far been focusing on padding [231] and miti-
gation [7] techniques to address timing channels. Notably, Godfrey and Zulkernine
have proposed efficient host-based solutions to close timing channels through selec-
tive flushing and cache partitioning [90]. In the StealthMem approach [129] each
guest is given exclusive access to a small portion of the shared cache for its security
critical computations. By ensuring that this stealth memory is always allocated in
the cache, no timing differences are observable to an attacker.
In literature, few works investigated cache based storage channels. In fact, all
implementations of the above attacks use timing channels as the attack vector.
Brumley [44] recently conjectured the existence of a storage channel that can be
implemented using cache debug functionality on some ARM embedded micropro-
cessors. However, the ARM technical specification [62] explicitly states that such
debug instructions can be executed only by privileged software in TrustZone, mak-
ing practically impossible for an attacker to access them with the exception of a
faulty hardware implementation.
The attack based on mismatched cacheability attributes opens up for TOCT-
TOU like vulnerabilities. Watson [223] demonstrated this vulnerability for Linux
system call wrappers. A similar approach is used in [43] to invalidate security
guarantees, attestation of a platform’s software, provided by a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM). TPM takes integrity measurements only before software is loaded
into the memory, and it assumes that once the software is loaded it remains un-
changed. However, this assumption is not met if the attacker can indirectly change
the software before is used.
Cache-related architectural problems have been exploited before to bypass mem-
ory protection. In [226, 78] the authors use a weakness of some Intel x86 imple-
mentations to bypass SMRAM protection and execute malicious code in System
Management Mode (SMM). The attack relies on the fact that the SMRAM protec-
tion is implemented by the memory controller, which is external to the CPU cache.
A malicious operating system first marks the SMRAM memory region as cacheable
and write-back, then it writes to the physical addresses of the SMRAM. Since the
cache is unaware of the SMRAM configuration, the writes are cached and do not
raise exceptions. When the execution is transferred to SMM, the CPU fetches the
instructions from the poisoned cache. While this work shows similarities to the
integrity threat posed by cache storage channels, the above attack is specific to
certain Intel implementations and targets only the highest security level of x86. On
ARM, the cache keeps track which lines have been filled due to accesses performed
by TrustZone SW. The TrustZone SW can configure via its page tables the memory
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regions that are considered “secure” (e.g. where its code and internal data structure
are stored). A TrustZone access to a secure memory location can hit a cache line
only if it belongs to TrustZone.
The attack vectors for data caches presented in this paper abuse undefined
behaviour in the ISA specification (i.e., accessing the same memory address with
different cacheability types) and deterministic behaviour of the underlying hardware
(i.e., that non-cacheable accesses completely bypass the data caches and unexpected
cache hits are ignored). While we focused on an ARMv7 processor here, there is
a strong suspicion that other architectures exhibit similar behaviour. In fact, in
experiments we succeeded to replicate the behaviour of the memory subsystem on an
ARMv8 processor (Cortex-A53), i.e., uncacheable accesses do not hit valid entries
in the data cache. For Intel x64, the reference manual states that memory type
aliases using the page tables and page attribute table (PAT) “may lead to undefined
operations that can result in a system failure” ([119], Vol. 3, 11.12.4). It is also
explicitly stated that the accesses using the (non-cacheable) WC memory type may
not check the caches. Hence, a similar behaviour as on ARM processors should
be expected. On the other hand, some Intel processors provide a self-snooping
mechanism to support changing the cacheability type of pages without requiring
cache flushes. It seems to be similar in effect as the hardware countermeasure
suggested in Section C.5.4. In the Power ISA manual ([169], 5.8.2), memory types
are assumed to be unique for all aliases of a given address. Nevertheless this is
a software condition that is not enforced by the architecture. When changing the
storage control bits in page table entries the programmer is required to flush the
caches. This also hints to the point that no hardware mechanisms are mandated
to handle unexpected cache hits.
Recently, several works successfully verified low level execution platforms that
provide trustworthy mechanisms to isolate commodity software. In this context
caches are mostly excluded from the analysis. An exception is the work by Barthe
et al. [28] that provide an abstract model of cache behaviour sufficient to repli-
cate various timing-based exploits and countermeasures from the literature such as
StealthMEM.
The verification of seL4 assumes that caches are correctly handled [132] and
ignores timing channels. The bandwidth of timing channels in seL4 and possible
countermeasures were examined by Cock et al [56]. While storage based channels
have not been addressed, integrity of the kernel seems in practice to be preserved
by the fact that system call arguments are passed through registers only.
The VerisoftXT project targeted the verification of Microsoft Hyper V and a se-
mantic stack was devised to underpin the code verification with the VCC tool [58].
Guests are modelled as full x64 machines where caches cannot be made transpar-
ent if the same address is accessed in cacheable and uncacheable mode, however no
implications on security have been discussed. Since the hypervisor uses a shadow
page algorithm, where guest translations are concatenated with a secure host trans-
lation, the integrity properties do not seem to be jeopardised by any actions of the
guest.
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Similarly the Nova [199, 203] and CertiKOS [97] microvisors do not consider
caches in their formal analysis, but they use hardware which supports a second
level address translation which is controlled by the host and cannot be affected
by the guest. Nevertheless the CertiKOS system keeps a partition management
software in a separate partition that can be contacted by other guests via IPC
to request access to resources. This IPC interface is clearly a possible target for
attacks using uncacheable aliases.
In any case all of the aforementioned systems seem to be vulnerable to cache
storage channel information leakage, assuming they allow the guest systems to set
up uncacheable memory mappings. In order to be sound, any proof of information
flow properties then needs to take the caches into account. In this paper we show
for the first time how to conduct such a non-interference proof that treats also
possible data cache storage channels.
C.8 Concluding Remarks
We presented novel cache based attack vectors that use storage channels and we
demonstrated their usage to threaten integrity and confidentiality of real software.
To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that cache-based storage channels
are demonstrated on commodity hardware.
The new attack vectors partially invalidate the results of formal verification per-
formed at the ISA level. In fact, using storage-channels, the adversary can extract
information without accessing variables that are external to the ISA specification.
This is not the case for timing attacks and power consumption attacks. For this
reason it is important to provide methodologies to fix the existing verification ef-
forts. We show that for some of the existing countermeasures this task can be
reduced to checking relational observation equivalence. To make this analysis prac-
tical, we adapted an existing tool [24] to check the conditions that are sufficient
to prevent information leakage due to the new cache-channels. In general, the ad-
ditional checks in the code verification need to be complemented by a correctness
proof of a given countermeasure on a suitable cache model. In particular it has to
be shown that memory coherency for the verified code is preserved by the counter-
measure and that an attacker cannot observe sensitive information even if it can
create non-cacheable aliases.
The attack presented in Section C.3.2 raises particular concerns, since it poses
integrity threats that cannot be carried out using timing channels. The possible
victims of such an attack are systems where the ownership of memory is transferred
from the untrusted agent to the trusted one and where the trusted agent checks the
content of this memory before using it as parameter of a critical function. After
that the ownership is transferred, if the cache is not clean, the trusted agent may
validate stale input while the critical function uses different data. The practice
of transferring ownership between security domains is usually employed to reduce
memory copies and is used for example by hypervisors that use direct paging, run-
162 PAPER C. CACHE STORAGE CHANNELS
time monitors that inspect executable code to prevent execution of malware, as well
as reference monitors that inspect the content of IP packets or validate requests for
device drivers.
There are several issues we leave out as future work. We did not provide a
mechanism to check the security of some of the countermeasures like Cache Nor-
malisation and we did not apply the methodology that we described to a complete
software. Moreover, the channels that we identified probably do not cover all the
existing storage side channels. Branch prediction, TLBs, sharebility attributes are
all architectural details that, if misconfigured, can lead to behaviours that are in-
consistent with the ISA specification. If the adversary is capable of configuring
these resources, like in virtualized environments, it is important to identify under
which conditions the trusted software preserves its security properties.
From a practical point of view, we focused our experiments on exploiting the L1
cache. For example, to extract the secret key of the AES service on Raspberry Pi
2 we have been forced to flush and clean the L2 cache. The reason is that on this
platform the L2 cache is shared with the GPU and we have little to no knowledge
about the memory accesses it performs. On the other hand, shared L2 caches open
to the experimentation with concurrent attacks, where the attacker can use a shader
executed on the GPU. Similarly, here we only treated cache channels on a single
processor core. Nevertheless the same channels can be built in a multi-core settings
using the shared caches (e.g. L2 on Raspberry Pi 2). The new vectors can then be
used to replicate known timing attacks on shared caches (e.g. [118]).
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Abstract
Formal verification of systems-level software such as hypervisors and oper-
ating systems can enhance system trustworthiness. However, without taking
low level features like caches into account the verification may become un-
sound. While this is a well-known fact w.r.t. timing leaks, few works have ad-
dressed latent cache storage side-channels. We present a verification method-
ology to analyse soundness of countermeasures used to neutralise cache stor-
age channels. We apply the proposed methodology to existing countermea-
sures, showing that they allow to restore integrity and prove confidentiality of
the system. We decompose the proof effort into verification conditions that
allow for an easy adaption of our strategy to various software and hardware
platforms. As case study, we extend the verification of an existing hypervisor
whose integrity can be tampered using cache storage channels. We used the
HOL4 theorem prover to validate our security analysis, applying the verifica-
tion methodology to formal models of ARMv7 and ARMv8.
D.1 Introduction
Formal verification of low-level software such as microkernels, hypervisors, and
drivers has made big strides in recent years [3, 10, 225, 71, 109, 233, 199, 97].
We appear to be approaching the point where the promise of provably secure,
practical system software is becoming a reality. However, existing verification uses
models that are far simpler than contemporary state-of-the-art hardware. Many
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features pose significant challenges: Memory models, pipelines, speculation, out-
of-order execution, peripherals, and various coprocessors, for instance for system
management. In a security context, caches are notorious. They have been known
for years to give rise to timing side channels that are difficult to fully counteract
[88]. Also, cache management is closely tied to memory management, which—
since it governs memory mapping, access control, and cache configuration through
page-tables residing in memory—is one of the most complex and security-critical
components in the computer architecture flora.
Computer architects strive to hide this complexity from application program-
mers, but system software, device drivers, and high-performance software, for which
tuning of cache usage is critical, need explicit control over features like cacheability
attributes. In virtualization scenarios, for instance, it is critical for performance
to be able to delegate cache management authority for pages belonging to a guest
OS to the guest itself. With such a delegated authority a guest is free to config-
ure its share of the memory system as it wishes, including configurations that may
break conventions normally expected for a well-behaved OS. For instance, a guest
OS will usually be able to create memory aliases and to set cacheability attributes
as it wishes. Put together, these capabilities can, however, give rise to memory
incoherence, since the same physical address can now be pointed to by two virtual
addresses, one to cache and one to memory. This opens up for cache storage at-
tacks on both confidentiality and integrity, as was shown in [100]. Similarly to cache
timing channels that use variations in execution time to discover hardware hidden
state, storage channels use aliasing to profile cache activities and to attack system
confidentiality. However, while the timing channels are external to models used for
formal analysis and do not invalidate verification of integrity properties, storage
channels simply make the models unsound: Using them for security analysis can
lead to conclusions that are false.
This shows the need to develop verification frameworks for low-level system
software that are able to adequately reflect the presence of caches. It is particularly
desirable if this can be done in a manner that allows to reuse existing verification
tools on simpler models that do not consider caches. This is the goal we set our-
selves in this paper. We augment an existing cacheless model by adding a cache
and accompanying cache management functionality in MMU and page-tables. We
use this augmented model to derive proof obligations that can be imposed to ensure
absence of both integrity and confidentiality attacks. This provides a verification
framework that we use to analyse soundness of countermeasures. The counter-
measures are formally modelled as new proof obligations that can be analysed on
the cacheless model to ensure absence of vulnerabilities due to cache storage chan-
nels. Since these obligations can be verified using the cacheless model, existing
tools [24, 47, 196] (mostly not available on a cache enabled model) can automate
this task to a large extent. We then complete the paper by repairing the verifica-
tion of an existing and vulnerable hypervisor [101], sketching how the derived proof
obligations are discharged.
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D.2 Related Work
Formal Verification Existing work on formal verification do not takes into ac-
count cache storage channels. The verification of seL4 assumes a sequential memory
model and leaves cache issues to be managed by means external to model [133, 132].
Cock et al [56] examined the bandwidth of timing channels in seL4 and possible
countermeasures including cache coloring. The verification of the Prosper kernel
[71, 101] assumes that caches are invisible and correctly handled. Similarly Barthe
et al. [29] ignores caches for the verification of an isolation property for an idealised
hypervisor. Later, in [30] the authors extended the model to include an abstract
account of caches and verified that timing channels are neutralised by cache flush-
ing. The CVM framework [10] treats caches only in the context of device manage-
ment [110]. Similarly, the Nova [199, 203, 34] and CertiKOS [99, 98, 97] microvisors
do not consider caches in their formal analysis. In a follow-up paper [65] the verifi-
cation was extended to machine code level, using a sequential memory model and
relying on the absence of address aliasing.
In scenarios such as OS virtualization, where untrusted software is allowed to
configure cacheability of its own memory, all of the above systems can be vulnerable
to cache storage channel attacks. For instance, these channels can be used to create
illicit information flows among threads of seL4.
Timing Channels Timing attacks and countermeasures have been formally
verified to varying degrees of detail in the literature. Almeida et al. [12] prove
functional correctness and leakage security of MEE-CBC in presence of timing at-
tackers. Barthe et al. [28] provide an abstract model of cache behaviour sufficient
to replicate various timing-based exploits and countermeasures from the literature
such as StealthMEM [129]. In a follow-up work Barthe et al. [27] formally showed
that cryptographic algorithms that are implemented based-on StealthMEM ap-
proach and thus are S-constant-time1 are protected against cache-timing attacks.
FlowTracker [194] detects leaks using an information flow analysis at compile time.
Similarly, Ford et al. [97] uses information flow analysis based on explicit labeling
to detect side-channels, and Vieira uses a deductive formal approach to guarantee
that side-channel countermeasures are correctly deployed [215]. Other related work
includes those adopting formal analysis to either check the rigour of countermea-
sures [77, 100, 207] or to examine bandwidth of side-channels [135, 76]. Zhou [236]
proposed page access based solutions to mitigate the access-driven cache attacks
and used model checking to show these countermeasure restore security. Illicit in-
formation flows due to caches can also be countered by masking timing fluctuations
by noise injection [221] or by clock manipulation [115, 212, 170]. A extensive list
of protective means for timing attacks is given in [224, 89].
By contrast, we tackle storage channels. These channels carry information
through memory and, additionally to permit illicit information flows, can be used to
1An implementation is called S-constant-time, if it does not branch on secrets and only memory
accesses to stealth addresses can be secret-dependent.
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V1) D = access(va1)
A1) write(va2,1);
free(va2)
V2) D = access(va1)
V3) if not policy(D)
reject
[evict va1]
V4) use(va1)
(a) Integrity
A1) write(va1, 1)
A2) write(va2, 0)
V1) if secret
access(va3)
else
access(va4)
A3) D = access(va2)
(b) Confidentiality
Figure D.1: Mismatched memory attribute threats
compromise integrity. Storage channels have been used in [100] to show how cache
management features could be used to attack both integrity and confidentiality of
several types of application.
D.3 Threats and Countermeasures
The presence of caches and ability to configure cacheability of virtual alias enable
the class of attacks called “alias-driven attacks” [100]. These attacks are based on
building virtual aliases with mismatched cacheability attributes to break memory
coherence; i.e, causing inconsistency between the values stored in a memory location
and the corresponding cache line, without making the cache line dirty. We present
here two examples to demonstrate how integrity and confidentiality can be attacked
using this vector.
D.3.1 Integrity
Figure D.1a demonstrates an integrity threat. Here, we assume the cache is direct-
mapped, physically indexed and write-back. Also, both the attacker and victim are
executed interleaved on a single core. Virtual addresses va1 and va2 are aliasing the
same memory pa, va1 is cacheable and va2 is uncacheable. Initially, the memory
pa contains the value 0 and the corresponding cache line is empty. In a sequential
model reads and writes are executed in order and their effects are instantly visible:
V1) a victim accesses va1, reading 0; A1) the attacker writes 1 into pa using va2
and releases the alias va2; V2) the victim accesses again va1, this time reading 1;
V3) if 1 does not respect a security policy, then the victim rejects it; otherwise V4)
the victim passes 1 to a security-critical functionality.
On a CPU with a weaker memory model the same code behaves differently:
V1) using va1, the victim reads 0 from the memory and fills the cache; A1) the
attacker uses va2 to directly write 1 in memory, bypasses the cache, and then frees
the mapping; V2) the victim accesses again va1, reading 0 from the cache; V3) the
security policy is evaluated based on 0; possibly, the cache line is evicted and, since
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it is not dirty, the memory is not affected; V4) next time the victim accesses pa it
reads 1, but 1 is not the value that has been checked against the security policy.
This permits the attacker to bypass the policy.2
Intuitive countermeasures against alias-driven attacks are to forbid the attacker
from allocating cacheable aliases at all or to make cacheable its entire memory. A
lightweight specialization of these approaches is “always cacheability”: A fixed re-
gion of memory is made always cacheable and the victim rejects any input pointing
outside this region. Coherency can also be achieved by flushing the entire cache
before the victim accesses the attacker memory. Unfortunately, this countermea-
sure comes with severe performance penalties [100]. “Selective eviction” is a more
efficient solution and consists in removing from the cache every location that is
accessed by the victim and that has been previously accessed by the attacker. Al-
ternatively, the victim can use mismatched cache attributes itself to detect memory
incoherence and abort dangerous requests.
D.3.2 Confidentiality
Figure D.1b shows a confidentiality threat. Both va1 and va2 point to the location
pa and say idx is the cache line index of pa. All virtual addresses except va2 are
cacheable, and we assume that both pa and the physical address pointed by va3 are
allocated in the same cache line. The attacker writes A1) 1 in the cache, making
the line dirty, and A2) 0 in the memory. From this point, the value stored in the
memory after the execution of the victim depends on the victim behaviour; if the
victim accesses at least one address (e.g. va3) whose line index is idx, then the
dirty line is evicted and 1 is written back to the memory; otherwise the line is not
evicted and pa still contains 0. This allows the attacker to measure evicted lines
and thus to launch an access-driven attack. In the following we summarise some of
the countermeasures against cache storage channels presented in [100] and relevant
to our work.
Similarly, to ensure that no secret can leak through the cache storage channel,
one can forbid allocating cacheable aliases or always flush the cache after executing
victim functionalities. An alternative is cache partitioning, where each process
gets a dedicated part of the cache and there is no intersection between any two
partitions. This makes it impossible for the victim activities to affect the attacker
behaviour, thus preventing the attacker to infer information about victim’s internal
variables. A further countermeasure is secret independent memory accesses, which
aims at transforming the victim’s code so that the victim accesses do not depend
on secret.
Cache normalisation can also be used to close storage channels. In this approach,
the cache is brought to a known state by reading a sequence of memory cells. This
2Note that the attacker release its alias va2 before returning the control to the victim, making
this attack different from the standard double mapping attacks.
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guarantees the subsequent secret dependent accesses only hit the normalised cache
lines, preventing the attacker from observing access patterns of the victim.
D.4 High-Level Security Properties
In this work we consider a trusted system software (the “kernel”) that shares the
system with an untrusted software (the “application”). Possible instances for the
kernel include hypervisors, runtime monitors, low-level operating system routines,
and cryptographic services. The application is a software that requests services
from the kernel and can be a user process or even a complete operating system.
The hardware execution mode used by the application is less privileged than the
mode use by the kernel. The application is potentially malicious and takes the role
of the attacker here.
Some system resources are owned by the kernel and are called “critical”, some
other resources should not be disclosed to the application and are called “confiden-
tial”. The kernel dynamically tracks memory ownership and provides mechanisms
for secure ownership transfer. This enables the application to pass data to the
kernel services, while avoiding expensive copy operations: the application prepares
the input inside its own memory, the ownership of this memory is transferred to the
kernel, and the corresponding kernel routine operates on the input in-place. Two
instances of this are the direct-paging memory virtualization mechanism introduced
by Xen [26] and runtime monitors that forbid self-modifying code and prevent ex-
ecution of unsigned code [51]. In these cases, predictability of the kernel behaviour
must be ensured, regardless of any incoherent memory configuration created by the
application.
In such a setting, a common approach to formalise security is via an integrity
and a confidentiality property. We use σ ∈ Σ to represent a state of the system and
to denote a transition relation. The transition relation models the execution of
one instruction by the application or the execution of a complete handler of the
kernel. The integrity property ensures functional correctness (by showing that a
state invariant I is preserved by all transitions) and that the critical resources can
not be modified by the application (by showing a relation ψ):
Property 10 (Correctness). For all σ if I (σ) and σ σ′ then I (σ′) and ψ(σ, σ′)
The confidentiality property ensures that confidential resources are not leaked
to the application and is expressed using standard non-interference. Let O be the
application’s observations (i.e., the resources that are not confidential) and let ∼O
be observational equivalence (which requires states to have the same observations),
then confidentiality is expressed by the following property
Property 11 (Confidentiality). Let σ1, σ2 are initial states of the system such that
σ1 ∼O σ2. If σ1 ∗ σ′1 then ∃σ′2. σ2 ∗ σ′2 and σ′1 ∼O σ′2
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The ability of the application to configure cacheability of its resources can lead
to incoherency, making formal program analysis on a cacheless model unsound.
Nevertheless, directly verifying properties 10 and 11 using a complete cache-aware
model is unfeasible for any software of meaningful size. Our goal is to show that
the countermeasures can be used to restore coherency. We demonstrate that if
the countermeasures are correctly implemented by the kernel then verification of
the security properties on the cache-aware model can be soundly reduced to proof
obligations on the cacheless model.
D.5 Formalisation
As basis for our study we define two models, a cacheless and a cache-aware model.
The cacheless model represents a memory coherent single-core system where all
caches are disabled. The cache-aware model is the same system augmented by a
single level data cache.
D.5.1 Cacheless Model
The cacheless model is ARM-flavoured but general enough to apply to other ar-
chitectures. A state σ = 〈reg, psrs, coreg,mem〉 ∈ Σ is a tuple of general-purpose
registers reg (including program counter pc), control registers psrs, coprocessor
state coreg, and memory mem. The core executes either in non-privileged mode
U or privileged mode P, Mode(σ) ∈ {U ,P}. The control registers psrs encode the
execution mode and other execution parameters such as the arithmetic flags. The
coprocessor state coreg determines a range of system configuration parameters. The
word addressable memory is represented by mem : PA → Bw, where B = {0, 1},
PA be the sets of physical addresses, and w is the word size.
The set R identifies all resources in the system, including registers, control
registers, coprocessor states and physical memory locations (i.e. PA ⊆ R). We
use Cv : Σ × R → B∗ to represent the core-view of a resource, which looks up the
resource and yields the corresponding value; e.g., for a physical address pa ∈ PA,
Cv returns the memory content in pa, Cv(σ, pa) = σ.mem(pa).
All software activities are restricted by a hardware monitor. The monitor con-
figuration can depend on coprocessor states (e.g., control registers for a TrustZone
memory controller) and on regions of memory (e.g., page-tables for a Memory Man-
agement Unit (MMU)). We use the predicate Mon(σ, r,m, acc) ∈ B to represent
the hardware monitor, which holds if in the state σ the access acc ∈ {wt, rd} (for
write and read, respectively) to the resource r ∈ R is granted for the execution mode
m ∈ {U ,P}. In ARM the hardware monitor consists of a static and a dynamic part.
The static access control is defined by the processor architecture, which prevents
non-privileged modifications to coprocessor states and control registers and whose
model is trivial. The dynamic part is defined by the MMU and controls memory
accesses. We use Mmu(σ, va,m, acc) ∈ (PA× B) ∪ {⊥} to model the memory man-
agement unit. This function yields for a virtual address va the translation and the
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cacheability attribute if the access permission is granted and ⊥ otherwise. There-
fore, Mon(σ, pa,m, acc) is defined as ∃va. Mmu(σ, va,m, acc) = (pa,−). Further,
MD : Σ → R is the function determining resources (i.e., the coprocessor registers,
the current master page-table, the linked page-tables) which affect the monitor’s
behaviour.
The behaviour of the system is defined by an LTS→m⊆ Σ× Σ, where m ∈ {U ,P}
and if σ →m σ′ then Mode(σ) = m. Each transition represents the execution of a
single instruction. When needed, we let σ →m σ′ [dop] denote that the instruction
executed has dop effects on the data memory subsystem, where dop can be wt(R),
rd(R), or cl(R) to represent update, read and cache cleaning of resources R ⊆ R.
Finally, we use σ0 σn to represent the weak transition relation that holds if there
is a finite execution σ0 −→ · · · −→ σn such that Mode(σn) = U and Mode(σj) 6= U
for 0 < j < n (i.e., the weak transition hides internal states of the kernel).
D.5.2 Cache-Aware Model
We model a single-core processor with single level unified cache. A state σ¯ ∈
Σ¯ has all the components of the cacheless model together with the cache, σ¯ =
〈reg, psrs, coreg,mem, cache〉. The function Mmu and transition relation→m⊆ Σ¯× Σ¯
are extended to take into account caches. Other definitions of the previous subsec-
tion are extended trivially. In the following we use c-hit(σ¯, pa) to denote a cache
hit for address pa, c-dirty(σ¯, pa) to identify dirtiness of the corresponding cache-
line (i.e., if the value of pa has been modified in cache but not written back in the
memory), and c-cnt(σ¯, pa) to obtain value for pa stored in the cache.
Both the kernel and the hardware monitor (i.e., MMU) have the same view of
the memory. In fact, the kernel always uses cacheable virtual addresses and the
MMU always consults first the cache when it fetches a page table descriptor.3 This
allows us to define the core-view for memory resources pa ∈ PA in presence of
caches:
Cv(σ¯, pa) =
{
c-cnt(σ¯, pa) : c-hit(σ¯, pa)
σ¯.mem(pa) : otherwise
D.5.3 Security Properties
Since the application is untrusted, we assume its code is unknown and that it can
break its memory coherence at will. Therefore, the behaviour of the application
in the cacheless and the cache-aware models can differ significantly. In particular,
memory incoherence caused by mismatched cacheability may lead a control variable
of the application to have different values in these two models, causing the appli-
cation to have different control flows. This makes the long-established method of
verification by refinement [177] not feasible for analysing behaviour of the attacker.
3This is for instance the case of ARM Cortex-A53 and ARM Cortex-A8.
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To accomplish our security analysis we identify a subset of resources that are
critical: resources for which integrity must be preserved and on which critical
functionality depends. The security type of registers, control and coprocessor reg-
isters is statically assigned. The security type of memory locations, however, can
dynamically change due to transfer of memory ownership; i.e., the type of these
resources depends on the state of the system. The function CR : (Σ¯ ∪ Σ) → 2R
retrieves the subset of resources that are critical. Function CR usually depends
on a subset of resources, for instance the internal kernel data-structures used
to store the security type of memory resources. The definition of function CR
must be based on the core-view to make it usable for both the cacheless and
cache-aware models. We also define (for both cacheless and cache-aware state)
Extcr(σ) = {(a,Cv(σ, a)) | a ∈ CR(σ)}, this is the function that extracts the value
of all critical resources. Finally, the set of resources that are confidential is stati-
cally defined and identified by CO ⊆ R. This region of memory includes all internal
kernel data-structures whose value can depend on secret information.
Property 10 requires to introduce a system invariant I¯ that is software-dependent
and defined per kernel. The invariant specifies: (i) the shape of a sound page-table
(e.g., to prohibit the non-privileged writable accesses to the kernel memory and
the page-tables themselves), (ii) properties that permits the kernel to work prop-
erly (e.g., the kernel stack pointer and its data structures are correctly configured),
(iii) functional properties specific for the selected countermeasure, and (iv) cache-
related properties that allow to restore coherency. A corresponding invariant I for
the cacheless model is derived from I¯ by excluding properties that constrain caches.
Property 10 is formally demonstrated by two theorems: one constraining the be-
haviour of the application and one showing functional correctness of the kernel.
Let ex-entry(σ¯) be a predicate identifying the state of the system immediately after
switching to the kernel (i.e., when an exception handler is executed the mode is
privileged and the program counter points to the exception table). Theorem D.5.1
enforces that the execution of the application in the cache enabled setting cannot
affect the critical resources.
Theorem D.5.1 (Application-integrity). For all σ¯, if I¯ (σ¯) and σ¯ →U σ¯′ then
I¯ (σ¯′), Extcr(σ¯) = Extcr(σ¯′), and if Mode(σ¯′) 6= U then ex-entry(σ¯′)
While characteristics of the application prevents establishing refinement for non-
privileged transitions, for the kernel we show that the use of proper countermeasures
enables transferring the security properties from the cacheless to the cache-aware
model. This demands proving that the two models behave equivalently for kernel
transitions. We prove the behavioural equivalence by showing refinement between
two models using forward simulation. We define the simulation relationRsim (guar-
anteeing equality of critical resources) and show that both the invariant and the
relation are preserved by privileged transitions:
Theorem D.5.2 (Kernel-integrity). For all σ¯1 and σ1 such that I¯ (σ¯1), σ¯1 Rsim σ1,
and ex-entry(σ¯1) if σ¯1 σ¯2 then ∃σ2. σ1 σ2, σ¯2 Rsim σ2 and I¯ (σ¯2)
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Applying a similar methodology, in Section D.7 we prove the confidentiality
property (i.e., Theorem D.5.3) in presence of caches. Here, we use bisimulation
(equality of the application’s observations) as unwinding condition:
Theorem D.5.3 (Confidentiality). For all σ¯1 and σ¯2 such that I¯ (σ¯1), I¯ (σ¯2), and
σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2, if σ¯1 σ¯′1 then ∃σ¯′2. σ¯2 σ¯′2 and σ¯′1 ∼O σ¯′2 as well as I¯ (σ¯′1), I¯ (σ¯′2).
D.6 Integrity
Our strategy to demonstrate correctness of integrity countermeasures consists of two
steps. We first decompose the proof of Theorems D.5.1 and D.5.2 and show that the
integrity properties are met if a set of proof conditions are satisfied. The goal of this
step is to provide a theoretical framework that permits to analyse soundness of a
countermeasure without the need of dealing with the complex transition relation of
the cache-aware model. Then, we demonstrate correctness of two countermeasures
of Section D.3.1, namely always cacheability and selective eviction, by showing that
if they are correctly implemented by the kernel then verification of the integrity
properties can be soundly reduced to analysing properties of the kernel in the
cacheless model.
D.6.1 Integrity: Application Level (Theorem D.5.1)
To formalise the proof we introduce the auxiliary definitions of coherency, deriv-
ability and safety.
Definition (Coherency). In σ¯ ∈ Σ¯ a set of memory resources R ⊆ PA is coherent
(Coh(σ¯, R)), if for all pa ∈ R, such that pa hits the cache and its value differs from
the memory (i.e. σ¯.mem(pa) 6= c-cnt(σ¯, pa)), the corresponding cache line is dirty
(c-dirty(σ¯, pa)).
Coherency of the critical resources is essential to prove integrity. In fact, for
an incoherent resource the core-view can be changed indirectly without an explicit
memory write, i.e., through evicting the clean cache-line corresponding to the re-
source which has different values in the cache and memory. Moreover, in some
cores, (e.g., ARMv7/v8) the MMU looks first into the caches when it fetches a
descriptor. Then if the page-tables are coherent, a cache eviction cannot indirectly
affect the behaviour of the MMU.
To allow the analysis of specific countermeasures to abstract from the complex
cache-aware transition system, we introduce the notion of derivability. This is a
relation overapproximating the effects over the memory and cache for instructions
executed in non-privileged mode. Derivability is an architectural property and it is
independent of the software executing.
Definition (Derivability). We say σ¯′ is derivable from σ¯ in non-privileged mode
(denoted as σ¯U σ¯′) if σ¯.coreg = σ¯′.coreg and for every pa ∈ PA one of the following
properties holds:
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D∅(σ¯, σ¯′, pa)
def≡M ′(pa) 6= M(pa)⇒ (c-dirty(σ¯, pa) ∧M ′(pa) = c-cnt(σ¯, pa))
∧ W (σ¯′, pa) 6= W (σ¯, pa)⇒
(¬c-hit(σ¯′, pa) ∧ (c-dirty(σ¯, pa)⇒M ′(pa) = c-cnt(σ¯, pa)))
Drd(σ¯, σ¯′, pa)
def≡ Mon(σ¯, pa,U , rd)
∧ M ′(pa) = M(pa) ∧W (σ¯′, pa) 6= W (σ¯, pa)⇒
(c-cnt(σ¯′, pa) = M(pa) ∧ ¬c-hit(σ¯, pa))
Dwt(σ¯, σ¯′, pa)
def≡ Mon(σ¯, pa,U ,wt)
∧ (W (σ¯′, pa) 6= W (σ¯, pa)⇒ c-dirty(σ¯′, pa))
∧ (M ′(pa) 6= M(pa)⇒
(¬c-dirty(σ¯′, pa)⇒ ∃va.Mmu(σ¯, va,U ,wt) = (pa, 0)))
Figure D.2: Derivability. Here M = σ¯.mem, M ′ = σ¯′.mem, and W (σ¯, pa) =
〈c-hit(σ¯, pa), c-dirty(σ¯, pa), c-cnt(σ¯, pa)〉 denotes the cache-line corresponding to pa
in σ¯.cache.
D∅(σ¯, σ¯′, pa): Independently of the access rights for the address pa, the correspond-
ing memory can be changed due to an eviction of a dirty line and subsequent
write-back of the cached value into the memory. Moreover, the cache can
always change due to an eviction.
Drd(σ¯, σ¯′, pa): If non-privileged mode can read the address pa, the cache state can
change through a fill operation which loads the cache with the value of pa in
the memory.
Dwt(σ¯, σ¯′, pa): If non-privileged mode can write the address pa, it can either write
directly into the cache, making it dirty, or bypass it, by using an uncacheable
alias.
Figure D.2 reports the formal definition of these predicates.
Definition (Safety). A state σ¯ is safe, safe(σ¯), if for every state σ¯′, resource r,
mode m and access request acc if σ¯U σ¯′ then Mon(σ¯, r,m, acc) = Mon(σ¯′, r,m, acc).
A state is safe if non-privileged executions cannot affect the hardware monitor,
i.e., only the kernel can change page-tables.
To decompose proof of Theorem D.5.1, the invariant I¯ must be split in three
parts: a functional part I¯fun which only depends on the core-view for the critical re-
sources, an invariant I¯coh which only depends on coherency of the critical resources,
and an optional countermeasure-specific invariant I¯cm which depends on coherency
of non-critical memory resources such as resources in an always-cacheable region.
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Proof Obligation D.6.1. For all σ¯, I¯ (σ¯)= I¯fun(σ¯)∧I¯coh(σ¯)∧I¯cm(σ¯) and:
1. for all σ¯′ if Extcr(σ¯)=Extcr(σ¯′) then I¯fun(σ¯)= I¯fun(σ¯′);
2. for all σ¯′ if Coh(σ¯,CR(σ¯)), Coh(σ¯′,CR(σ¯′)), and Extcr(σ¯) = Extcr(σ¯′) then
I¯coh(σ¯)= I¯coh(σ¯′);
3. for all σ¯′ if I¯ (σ¯) and σ¯ U σ¯′ then I¯cm(σ¯′).
Also, the function CR must be correctly defined: i.e. resources affecting the set
of critical resources are critical themselves.
Proof Obligation D.6.2. For all σ¯, σ¯′ if Extcr(σ¯) = Extcr(σ¯′) then CR(σ¯) =
CR(σ¯′)
Safety is essential to prove integrity: if a state is not safe, the application
can potentially elevate its permissions by changing configurations of the hardware
monitor and get access to resources beyond its rights.
Lemma D.6.1. If I¯ (σ¯) then safe(σ¯)
Proof of Lemma D.6.1 depends on the formal model of the hardware monitor
and guarantees provided by the invariant. Using the invariant I¯ , we identify three
main proof obligations that are needed to prove this lemma.
1. The functional part of the invariant must guarantee that the resources that
control the hardware monitor are considered critical.
Proof Obligation D.6.3. If I¯fun(σ¯) then MD(σ¯) ⊆ CR(σ¯)
2. The application should not be allowed to directly affect the critical resources.
This means there is no address writable in non-privileged mode that points
to a critical resource.
Proof Obligation D.6.4. If I¯fun(σ¯) and r ∈ CR(σ¯) then ¬Mon(σ¯, r,U ,wt)
3. Finally, to prevent the application from indirectly affecting the hardware mon-
itor, e.g., by line eviction, the invariant must ensure coherency of critical
resources.
Proof Obligation D.6.5. If I¯coh(σ¯) then Coh(σ¯,CR(σ¯))
We overapproximate the reachable states in non-privileged mode to prove prop-
erties that do not depend on the software platform or countermeasure. This elimi-
nates the need for revalidating properties of the instruction set (i.e., properties that
must be verified for every possible instruction) in every new software scenario.
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Lemma D.6.2. For all σ¯ such that safe(σ¯) and Coh(σ¯,MD(σ¯)),
if σ¯ →U σ¯′ then 4
1. σ¯ U σ¯′, i.e. non-privileged transitions from safe states can only lead into
derivable states
2. if Mode(σ¯′) 6=U then ex-entry(σ¯′), i.e., the mode can only change by entering
an exception handler
Corollary 3 shows that derivability can be used as sound overapproximation of
the behaviour of non-privileged transitions if the invariant holds.
Corollary 3. For all σ¯ if I¯ (σ¯) and σ¯ →U σ¯′ then σ¯ U σ¯′
Proof . The statement directly follows by Lemma D.6.2.1 which is enabled by
Lemma D.6.1, Obligation D.6.3, and Obligation D.6.5. 
We now proceed to show that the hardware monitor enforces access policy cor-
rectly; i.e., the application transitions cannot modify critical resources.
Lemma D.6.3. For all σ¯, σ¯′ such that I¯ (σ¯) if σ¯ U σ¯′ then Extcr(σ¯) = Extcr(σ¯′)
Proof . Since I¯ (σ¯) holds, the hardware monitor prohibits writable accesses of the
application to critical resources (Obligation D.6.4) and safe(σ¯) holds (Lemma D.6.1).
Also, derivability shows that the application can directly change only resources that
are writable according to the monitor. Thus, the application cannot directly up-
date CR(σ¯). Beside, the invariant guarantees coherency of critical resources in σ¯
(Obligation D.6.5). This prevents indirect modification of these resources. 
To complete the proof of Theorem D.5.1 we additionally need to show that
coherency of critical resources (Lemma D.6.4) and invariant (Lemma D.6.5) are
preserved by non-privileged transitions.
Lemma D.6.4. For all σ¯ if I¯ (σ¯) and σ¯ U σ¯′ then Coh(σ¯′,CR(σ¯′))
Proof . The proof depends on Obligation D.6.5 and Obligation D.6.4: coherency
can be invalidated only through non-cacheable writes, which are not possible since
aliases to critical resources that are writable by non-privileged mode are forbidden.

Lemma D.6.5. For all σ¯ and σ¯′ if I¯ (σ¯) and σ¯ →U σ¯′ then I¯fun(σ¯′)
Proof . To show that non-privileged transitions preserve the invariant we use
Corollary 3, Lemma D.6.3, and Obligation D.6.1.1. 
Finally, Lemma D.6.2.2, Corollary 3, Lemma D.6.3, Lemma D.6.4, Lemma D.6.5,
and Obligation D.6.1 imply Theorem D.5.1, completing the proof of integrity for
non-privileged transitions.
4In [127] the authors proved a similar theorem for the HOL4 ARMv7 model provided by
Anthony Fox et. al. [82].
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Figure D.3: Verification of kernel integrity
D.6.2 Integrity: Kernel Level (Theorem D.5.2)
The proof of kernel integrity (Theorem D.5.2) is done by: (i) showing that the
kernel preserves the invariant I in the cacheless model (Obligation D.6.6); (ii) re-
quiring a set of general proof obligations (e.g., the kernel does not jump outside
its address space) that must be verified at the cacheless level (Obligation D.6.7),
(iii) demonstrating that the simulation relation permits transferring the invariant
from the cache-aware model to the cacheless one (Obligation D.6.8), (iv) verifying a
refinement between the cacheless model and the cache-aware model (Lemma D.6.7)
assuming correctness of the countermeasure (Obligation 1), and finally (v) proving
that the refinement theorem allow to transfer the invariant from the cacheless model
to the cache-aware model (Lemma D.6.8). Figure D.3 indicates our approach to
prove kernel integrity.
Our goal is to lift the code verification to the cacheless model, so that existing
tools can be used to discharge proof obligations. The first proof obligation requires
to show that the kernel is functionally correct when there is no cache:
Proof Obligation D.6.6. For all σ such that I (σ) and ex-entry(σ) if σ σ′ then
I (σ′).
To enable the verification of simulation, it must be guaranteed that the kernel’s
behaviour is predictable: (D.6.7.1) the kernel cannot execute instructions outside
the critical region (this property is usually verified by extracting the control flow
graph of the kernel and demonstrating that it is contained in a static region of the
memory), and (D.6.7.2) the kernel does not change page-tables entries that maps
the kernel virtual memory (here this region is assumed to be static and identified
by Kvm) which must be accessed only using cacheable aliases.
Proof Obligation D.6.7. For all σ such that I (σ) and ex-entry(σ) if σ →∗P σ′
then
1. if Mmu(σ′, σ′.reg.pc,P, acc) = (pa,−) then pa ∈ CR(σ)
2. for every va ∈ Kvm and acc if Mmu(σ, va,P, acc) = (pa, c) then
Mmu(σ′, va,P, acc) = (pa, c) and c = 1
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In order to establish a refinement, we introduce the memory-view Mv of the
cache-aware model. This function models what can be observed in the memory
after a cache line eviction and is used to handle dynamic growth of the critical
resources, which are potentially not coherent when a kernel handler starts.
Mv(σ¯, r) def≡

c-cnt(σ¯, pa) : r ∈ PA ∧ c-dirty(σ¯, pa)
σ¯.mem(pa) : r ∈ PA ∧ ¬c-dirty(σ¯, pa)
Cv(σ¯, r) : otherwise
Note that Mv only differs from Cv in memory resources that are cached, clean,
and have different values stored in the cache and memory, i.e., incoherent memory
resources. In particular, we can prove the following lemma about coherency:
Lemma D.6.6. Given a memory resource pa ∈ PA and cache-aware state σ¯ then
Coh(σ¯, {pa}) ⇔ (Cv(σ¯, pa) = Mv(σ¯, pa)), i.e., memory resources are coherent, iff
both views agree on them.
We define the simulation relation between the cacheless and cache-aware models
using the memory-view: σ¯ Rsim σ ≡ ∀r ∈ R. Cv(σ, r) = Mv(σ¯, r). The functional
invariant of the cache-aware model and the invariant of the cacheless model must be
defined analogously, that is the two invariants are equivalent if the critical resources
are coherent, thus ensuring that functional properties can be transfered between
the two models.
Proof Obligation D.6.8. For all σ¯ and σ, such that I¯coh(σ¯) and σ¯ Rsim σ, holds
I¯fun(σ¯)⇔ I (σ)
A common problem of verifying low-level software is coupling the invariant with
every possible internal states of the kernel. This is a major concern here, since the
set of critical resources changes dynamically and can be stale while the kernel is
executing. We solve this problem by defining a internal invariant II (σ¯, σ¯′) which
allows us to define properties of the state σ¯′ in relation with the initial state of the
kernel handler σ¯. This invariant II (similarly II for the cacheless model) includes:
(i) I¯ (σ¯) holds, (ii) the program counter in σ¯′ points to the kernel memory, (iii) co-
herency of resources critical in the initial state (i.e. Coh(σ¯′,CR(σ¯))) (iv) all virtual
addresses in Kvm are cacheable and their mapping in σ¯ and σ¯′ is unchanged, and
(v) additional requirements that are countermeasure specific and will be described
later.
Lemma D.6.7. For all σ¯ and σ such that I¯ (σ¯) , ex-entry(σ¯), and σ¯ Rsim σ, if
σ¯ →nP σ¯′ and σ →nP σ′ then σ¯′ Rsim σ′, II (σ¯, σ¯′), and II (σ, σ′)
Proof . By induction on the execution length. The base case is trivial, since no
step is taken. For the inductive case we first show that the instruction executed is
the same in both the models: Rsim guarantees that the two states have the same
program counter, Obligation D.6.7.1 ensures that the program counter points to
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the kernel memory contained in the critical resources, property (iii) of the invariant
guarantees that this memory region is coherent, and Lemma D.6.6 shows that the
fetched instruction is the same.
Proving that the executed instruction preserves kernel virtual memory map-
ping is trivial, since Obligation D.6.7.2 ensures that the kernel does not change
its own memory layout and that it only uses cacheable aliases. Showing that the
resources accessed by the instruction have the same value (thus guaranteeing Rsim
is preserved) in the cache-aware and cacheless states depends on demonstrating
their coherency. This is countermeasure specific and is guaranteed by proof obli-
gation D.6.9.1. Similarly, showing the internal invariant is maintained by privi-
leged transitions depends on the specific countermeasure that is in place (Obliga-
tion D.6.9.2). 
Proof Obligation D.6.9. For all states σ¯ and σ¯′ that satisfy the refinement (i.e.
I¯ (σ¯), ex-entry(σ¯), and σ¯ Rsim σ), after any number n of instructions of the kernel
that preserve the refinement and the internal invariants ( σ¯ →nP σ¯′, σ →nP σ′,
σ¯′ Rsim σ′, II (σ¯, σ¯′), and II (σ, σ′) )
1. if the execution of the n + 1-th instruction in the cacheless model accesses
resources R (σ′ →P σ′′ [dop] and either dop = rd(R) or dop = wt(R)) then
Coh(σ¯′, R)
2. the execution of the n + 1-th instruction in the cacheless and cache-aware
models (σ′ →P σ′′ and σ¯′ →P σ¯′′) preserves the internal invariants (II (σ, σ′′)
and II (σ¯, σ¯′′))
Additionally, the internal invariant must ensure the countermeasure specific
requirements of coherency for all internal states of the kernel.
Proof Obligation D.6.10. For all σ¯ and σ¯′ if II (σ¯, σ¯′) then I¯cm(σ¯′)
Finally, we show that the invariant I¯ holds in a cache-aware state when the
control is returned to non-privileged mode, i.e. when the invariant is re-established
in the cacheless model.
Lemma D.6.8. For all σ¯, σ¯′, and σ′ if I (σ′), σ¯′ Rsim σ′, and II (σ¯, σ¯′) then I¯ (σ¯′)
holds.
Proof . The three parts of invariant I¯ (σ¯′) are demonstrated independently. Obli-
gation D.6.10 establishes I¯cm(σ¯′). Property (iii) of II (σ¯, σ¯′) guarantees I¯coh(σ¯′).
Finally, Obligation D.6.8 demonstrates I¯fun(σ¯). 
D.6.3 Correctness of countermeasures
Next, we turn to show that selected countermeasures for the integrity attacks pre-
vent usage of cache to violate the integrity property. Thus, we show that the
countermeasures help to discharge the coherency related proof obligations reducing
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verification of integrity to analysing properties of the kernel code using the cacheless
model.
Always Cacheability We use Mac ⊆ PA to statically identify the region of
physical memory that should be always accessed using cacheable aliases. The ver-
ification that the always cacheability countermeasure is in place can be done by
discharging the following proof obligations at the cacheless level: (D.6.11.1) the
hardware monitor does not permit uncacheable accesses to Mac, (D.6.11.2.a) the
kernel never allocates critical resources outside Mac, thus restricting the application
to use Mac to communicate with the kernel, and (D.6.11.2.b) the kernel accesses
only resources in Mac:
Proof Obligation D.6.11. For all σ such that I (σ)
1. for every va, m and acc if Mmu(σ, va,m, acc) = (pa, c) and pa ∈ Mac then
c = 1,
2. if σ →∗P σ′ then
a) CR(σ′) ⊆ Mac and
b) if σ′ →P σ′′ [dop] and R are the resources in dop then R ⊆ Mac
These three properties, together with Obligation D.6.8, enable us to prove that
the resources accessed by the instructions executed in the privileged mode have
the same value in the cache-aware and cacheless states (Obligation D.6.9.1). In a
similar vein, we instantiate part (v) of the internal invariant as Coh(σ¯′,Mac), and
then we use Obligations D.6.7 and D.6.11.2.a to show that the internal invariant is
preserved by kernel steps (Obligation D.6.9.2). To discharge coherency related proof
obligations for non-privileged mode, we set I¯coh and I¯cm to be Coh(σ¯,Mac∩CR(σ¯))
and Coh(σ¯,Mac\CR(σ¯)) respectively. This makes the proof of Obligations D.6.1.2,
D.6.5, and D.6.10 trivial.
We use Lemma D.6.1 to guarantee that derivability preserves page-tables and,
thus, cacheability of the resources in Mac, and we use Lemma D.6.3 and Obliga-
tion D.6.2 to demonstrate that derivability preserves CR. Finally, Obligation D.6.11.1
enforces that all aliases to Mac are cacheable, demonstrating Obligations D.6.1.3.
Selective Eviction This approach requires to selectively flush the lines that
correspond to the memory locations that become critical when the kernel acquire
ownership of a region of memory. To verify that the kernel correctly implements
this countermeasure we need to track evicted lines, by adding to the cacheless model
a history variable h.
σ→Pσ′ [cl(R)]
(σ,h)→P(σ′,h ∪ R) [cl(R)]
σ→Pσ′ [dop] ∧ dop 6=cl(R)
(σ,h)→P(σ′,h) [dop]
All the kernel accesses must be restricted to resources that are either critical or
have been previously cleaned (i.e. are in h).
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Proof Obligation D.6.12. For all σ such that I (σ) if (σ, ∅)→∗P (σ′, h′), (σ′, h′)→P
(σ′′, h′′) [dop], and either dop = rd(R) or dop = wt(R) then R ⊆ CR(σ) ∪ h′
Moreover, it must be guaranteed that the set of critical resources always remains
coherent.
Proof Obligation D.6.13. For all σ such that I (σ) and ex-entry(σ) if (σ, ∅)
(σ′, h′) then CR(σ′) ⊆ CR(σ) ∪ h′
This ensures that the kernel accesses only coherent resources and allows to es-
tablish Obligation D.6.9.1. To discharge Obligation D.6.9.2, we first define part (v)
of the internal invariant as Coh(σ¯′,CR(σ¯)∪h′) and then use Obligations D.6.7 and
D.6.12 to discharge it. To discharge proof obligations of non-privileged mode in the
cache-aware model, for state σ¯ the invariant must ensure I¯coh(σ¯) = Coh(σ¯,CR(σ¯))
and I¯cm(σ¯) = true. This makes the proof of Obligations D.6.1.2, D.6.5 and D.6.10
trivial. Part (v) of the internal invariant and Obligation D.6.13 ensure that I¯coh is
established when the kernel returns to the application.
D.7 Confidentiality
This section presents the proof of the confidentiality property. The proof relies on
the cache behaviour, hence we briefly present the cache model.
D.7.1 Generic Data Cache Model
We have formally defined a generic model which fits a number of common processor
data-cache implementations. The intuition behind is that most data-caches are
direct mapped or set-associative caches, sharing a similar structure: (1) Memory
is partitioned into sets of lines which are congruent w.r.t. to a set index, (2) data-
caches contain a number of ways which can hold one corresponding line for every
set index, being uniquely identified by a tag, (3) writes can make lines dirty, i.e.,
potentially different from the associated data in memory, (4) there is a small set of
common cache operations, e.g., filling the cache with a line from memory, (5) an
eviction policy controls the allocation of ways for new lines, and the eviction of old
lines if the cache is full.
In addition to the cache contents, partitioned into line sets, we keep history
H ∈ A∗ of internal cache actions performed for each line set. An action a ∈ A can
be (1) a read or write access to a present line, (2) a line eviction, or (3) a line fill.
All actions also specify the tag of the corresponding line.
As each line set can only store limited amounts of entries, eviction policy
evict?(H, t) returns the tag of the line to be replaced at a line fill for a given
tag t, or ⊥ if eviction is not required. Evicted dirty lines are then written back into
the memory.
We assume here that the eviction policy is only depending on the action history
of a line set and the tag of the line to be filled in. This is trivially the case for
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direct-mapped caches, where each line set at most contains one entry and no choice
of eviction targets is possible, and for purely random replacements strategies, where
the cache state and history is completely ignored. Also more sophisticated eviction
policies, like LRU or pseudo-LRU, usually only depend on preceding operations on
the same line set.
Another observation for these replacement strategies is that they only depend
on finite subsequences of the history. For instance, LRU only depends on the
past actions on the entries currently present in a given set and after a cache flush
subsequent line fills and evictions are not influenced by operations from before the
flush. We formalize this notion as the filtered history on which a given eviction
policy depends, computed from the full history by policy-specific filter ϕ : A∗ →
A∗. The idea is that the eviction policy makes the same decisions for filtered and
unfiltered histories.
Assumption D.7.1. If ϕ is a policy-specific filter then for all H ∈ A∗ and tag t
holds, evict?(H , t) = evict?(ϕ(H ), t).
We use this property in combination with our countermeasures in the confiden-
tiality proof, in order to make cache states indistinguishable for the attacker. A
complete formalization of the cache state and semantics is omitted here, as these
details are irrelevant for the general proof strategy outlined below (see Appendix
for the detailed model).
D.7.2 Observations in the Cache-Aware Model
The kernel and untrusted application share and control parts of the memory and
the caches. Our goal is to ensure that through these channels the application cannot
infer anything about the confidential resources of the kernel. We fix the confidential
resources of the kernel as a static set CO ⊂ R and demand that they cannot be
directly accessed by the application (Obligation D.7.2).
The observations of the application are over-approximated by the set O = {r |
r /∈ CO}. Note, that some of the observable resources may be kernel resources that
are not directly accessible by the application, but affect its behaviour (e.g., page
tables). Two cacheless states σ1 and σ2 are considered observationally equivalent,
if all resources in O have the same core-view. Formally we define σ1 ∼O σ2 ≡ ∀r ∈
O. Cv(σ1, r) = Cv(σ2, r).
In the cache-aware model, naturally, also the cache has to be taken into ac-
count. Specifically, for addresses readable by the attacker, both the corresponding
cache line and underlying main memory content can be extracted using uncacheable
aliases. For all other cache lines, we overapproximate the observable state, assum-
ing that the attacker can infer whether a tag is present in the cache (tag state5),
5Tags of kernel accesses can be identified when a line set contains both a line of the attacker
and the kernel, and subsequent secret-dependent accesses may either cause a hit on that line or a
miss which evicts the attacker’s line.
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measure whether an entry is dirty, and derive the filtered history6 of cache actions
on all line sets. For caches and memories C1, C2, M1, and M2 we denote obser-
vational equivalence w.r.t. a set A ⊆ PA by (C1,M1) ≈A (C2,M2). The relation
holds if:
1. the memories agree for all pa ∈ A, i.e., M1(pa) = M2(pa),
2. the line sets with any index i in C1, C2:
a) agree on the tags of their entries (same tag state),
b) agree on the dirtiness of their entries
c) agree on the contents of those entries that have tags pointing to addresses
in A, and
d) agree on their filtered history (“ϕ(H1(i)) = ϕ(H2(i))”).
Notice that ≈A implies core-view equivalence for any address in A.
Now we distinguish observable resources which are always coherent, from po-
tentially incoherent non-critical memory resources NC ⊆ PA ∩ O. Intuitively, this
set contains all observable addresses that the application may access through un-
cacheable aliases. For coherent observable resources we introduce relation
σ¯1 ∼coh σ¯2 def≡ ∀r ∈ O \NC . Cv(σ¯1, r) = Cv(σ¯2, r) ,
and define observational equivalence for the cache-aware model:
σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2 def≡ σ¯1 ∼coh σ¯2
∧ (σ¯1.cache, σ¯1.mem) ≈NC (σ¯2.cache, σ¯2.mem) .
Note that we are overloading notation here and that ∼coh and ∼O are equivalence
relations. Allowing to apply relation ∼coh also to cacheless states, we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 4. For all σ1, σ2, if σ1 ∼O σ2 then σ1 ∼coh σ2.
Confidentiality (Theorem D.5.3) is demonstrated by showing that relation ∼O is
a bisimulation (i.e., it is preserved for pairs of computations starting in observation-
ally equivalent states). Below, we prove this property separately for of application
and kernel steps.
6The history of kernel cache operations may be leaked in a similar way as the tag state,
affecting subsequent evictions in the application, however only as far as the filter for the eviction
policy allows it.
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D.7.3 Confidentiality: Application Level
As relation ∼O is countermeasure-independent, verification for application’s tran-
sition can be shown once and for all for a given hardware platform, assuming the
kernel invariant guarantees several properties for the hardware configuration. First,
the hardware monitor must ensure that confidential resources are only readable in
privileged mode.
Proof Obligation D.7.2. For all σ¯ such that I¯ (σ¯) if r ∈ CO then ¬Mon(σ¯, r,U , rd).
Secondly, the invariant needs to guarantee that the hardware monitor data is
always observable. This implies that in observationally equivalent states the same
access permissions are in place.
Proof Obligation D.7.3. For all σ¯, if I¯ (σ¯) then MD(σ¯) ⊂ O.
In addition, the monitor never allows the application to access coherent resources
through uncacheable aliases.
Proof Obligation D.7.4. For all σ¯ such that I¯ (σ¯) for every va, access right acc if
Mmu(σ¯, va,U , acc) = (pa, c) and pa ∈ PA \NC then c = 1.
By this property it is then easy to derive the coherency of resources outside of
NC , assuming that the hardware starts in a coherent memory configuration and
that the kernel never makes memory incoherent itself (Obligation D.6.7.2).
Proof Obligation D.7.5. For all σ¯, if I¯ (σ¯) then Coh(σ¯,PA \NC ).
Finally, it has to be shown that non-privileged cache operations preserve the
equivalence of coherent and incoherent resources.
Lemma D.7.1. Given a set of potentially incoherent addresses A ⊂ O ∩ PA and
cache-aware states σ¯1 and σ¯2 such that
1. Coh(σ¯1, (O ∩ PA) \A) and Coh(σ¯2, (O ∩ PA) \A),
2. ∀pa ∈ (O ∩ PA) \A. Cv(σ¯1, pa) = Cv(σ¯2, pa), and
3. (σ¯1.cache, σ¯1.mem) ≈A (σ¯2.cache, σ¯2.mem),
if σ¯1 →U σ¯′1 [dop] and σ¯2 →U σ¯′2 [dop], and dop is cacheable, then
1. Coh(σ¯′1, (O ∩ PA) \A) and Coh(σ¯′2, (O ∩ PA) \A),
2. ∀pa ∈ (O ∩ PA) \A. Cv(σ¯′1, pa) = Cv(σ¯′2, pa), and
3. (σ¯′1.cache, σ¯′1.mem) ≈A (σ¯′2.cache, σ¯′2.mem).
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This lemma captures three essential arguments about the underlying hardware:
(1) on coherent memory, observational equivalence is preserved w.r.t. the core-view
and thus independent of whether the data is currently cached, (2) cacheable accesses
cannot break the coherency of these resources, and (3) on potentially incoherent
memory (addresses A), observational equivalence is preserved if cache and mem-
ory are equivalent for the corresponding lines, i.e., they have the same tag states,
contents, and filtered history.
These properties inherently depend on the specific cache architecture, in partic-
ular on the eviction policy and its history filter. For any two equal filtered histories
the eviction policy selects the same entry to evict (Assumption D.7.1), therefore
corresponding cache states stay observationally equivalent. Moreover, they rely on
the verification conditions that evictions do not change the core-view of a coher-
ent memory resource and that cache line fills for coherent addresses read the same
values from main memory.
We have formally verified Lemma D.7.1 for an instantiation of our cache model
that uses an LRU replacement policy (see Appendix).
Based on the proof obligations lined out above we can now prove confidentiality
for steps of the application
Lemma D.7.2. For all σ¯1, σ¯2, σ¯′1 where I¯ (σ¯1) and I¯ (σ¯2) hold, if σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2 and
σ¯1 →U σ¯′1, then ∃σ¯′2. σ¯2 →U σ¯′2 and σ¯′1 ∼O σ¯′2.
Proof Lemma D.7.2. We perform a case split over all possible hardware steps in
non-privileged mode. Observational equivalence on cache, memory, and program
counterprovide that the same instruction is fetched and executed in both steps.7
For hardware transitions that do not access memory, we conclude as in the proof
on the cacheless model (Obligation D.7.6, similar theorems were proved in [187]).
In case of memory instructions, since general purpose registers are equivalent,
the same addresses are computed for the operation. Obligations D.7.2 and D.7.3
yield that the same access permissions are in place in σ¯1 and σ¯2 such that the
application can only directly read observationally equivalent memory resources.
Then we distinguish cacheable and uncacheable accesses to an address pa.
In the latter case, by Obligation D.7.4 and we know that pa ∈ NC , and we
obtain σ¯1.mem(pa) = σ¯2.mem(pa) from σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2. Now, since the access bypasses
the caches, they are unchanged. Moreover, the memory accesses in both states
yield the same result and the equivalence of cache and memory follows trivially.
In case of cacheable accesses we know by Obligation D.7.5 that resources (O ∩
PA) \ NC are coherent and we apply Lemma D.7.1 to deduce the observational
equivalence of cache and memory for addresses in (O∩ PA) \NC and NC . As also
register resources are updated with the same values, we conclude σ¯′1 ∼O σ¯′2. 
7We do not model instruction caches in the scope of this work, but assume a unified data and
instruction cache. In fact, instruction caches allow further storage-channel-based attacks [100]
that would need to be addressed at this point in the proof.
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D.7.4 Confidentiality: Kernel Level
Kernel level confidentiality ensures that the execution of kernel steps does not leak
confidential information to the application. Specifically, this entails showing that
at the end of the kernel execution observational equivalence of resources in O is
(re)established. First, the kernel should not leak confidential resources in absence
of caches:
Proof Obligation D.7.6. For all σ1, σ2, σ′1 such that I (σ1), I (σ2) ex-entry(σ1),
ex-entry(σ2), and σ1 ∼O σ2 if σ1 σ′1 then ∃σ′2 . σ2 σ′2 and σ′1 ∼O σ′2.
The goal is now to show that the chosen countermeasure against information
leakage through the caches allows transferring the confidentiality property to the
cache-aware model. Formally, this countermeasure is represented by a two-state
property CM (σ, σ′) on the cacheless and CM (σ¯, σ¯′) on the cache-aware model.
Here the first argument is the starting state of the kernel execution, while the
second argument is some arbitrary state that is reached from there by a privileged
computation. Property CM (σ, σ′) should only cover functional properties of the
countermeasure that can be verified on the cacheless model as part of the kernel’s
internal invariant.
Proof Obligation D.7.7. For all σ, σ′ with σ →∗P σ′ and ex-entry(σ), if II (σ, σ′)
then CM (σ, σ′)
The countermeasure property on the cache-aware model, on the other hand,
extends CM with conditions on the cache state that prevent information leakage
to the application. We demand that it can be established through the bisimulation
between cacheless and cache-aware model for a given countermeasure.
Proof Obligation D.7.8. For all σ, σ′, σ¯, σ¯′ where σ →∗P σ′, σ¯ →∗P σ¯′, ex-entry(σ),
σ¯ Rsim σ, and σ¯′ Rsim σ′, if II (σ, σ′) then CM (σ¯, σ¯′)
Hereafter, to enable transferring non-interference properties from the cacheless
model to the cache-aware model we assume that the transition relations →P are
total functions for both models. As we want to reuse Lemma D.6.7 in the follow-
ing proofs, we require a number of properties of the simulation relation and the
invariants.
Lemma D.7.3. For all σ¯1, σ¯2, σ1, σ2, such that I¯ (σ¯1), I¯ (σ¯2), I¯ (σ1), and I¯ (σ2) as
well as σ¯1 Rsim σ1 and σ¯2 Rsim σ2:
(1) σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2 ⇒ σ1 ∼O σ2 (2) σ¯1 ∼coh σ¯2 ⇔ σ1 ∼coh σ2
The properties follow directly from the definition of Rsim, the coherency of
resources in O \NC (Obligation D.7.5), and Lemma D.6.6.
In addition we require the following technical condition on the relation of the
cacheless and cache-aware invariant.
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Figure D.4: Transferring confidentiality property. Dashed lines indicate proof obli-
gations.
Proof Obligation D.7.9. For each cache-aware state σ¯ with I¯ (σ¯), there exists a
cacheless state σ such that σ¯ Rsim σ and I (σ).
Now we can use Lemma D.6.7 to transfer the equivalence of coherent resources
after complete kernel executions.
Lemma D.7.4. For all σ¯1, σ¯′1, σ¯2 such that I¯ (σ¯1), I¯ (σ¯2), ex-entry(σ¯1), ex-entry(σ¯2),
and σ¯1 σ¯′1, if σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2 then ∃σ¯′2. σ¯2 σ¯′2 and σ¯′1 ∼coh σ¯′2.
Proof . We follow the classical approach of mapping both initial cache-aware states
to simulating ideal states by Obligation D.7.9, transferring observational equiva-
lence by Lemma D.7.3.1, and using Lemma D.6.7 to obtain a simulating computa-
tion σ1 σ′1 for σ¯1 σ¯′1 on the cacheless level (cf. Fig. D.4). Obligation D.7.6
yields an observationally equivalent cacheless computation σ2 σ′2 starting in the
state simulating σ¯2. Applying Lemma D.6.7 again results in a corresponding cache-
aware computation σ¯2 σ¯′2. We transfer equivalence of the coherent resources in
the final states using Corollary 4 and Lemma D.7.3.2. 
It remains to be shown that the kernel execution also maintains observational
equivalence for the potentially incoherent memory resources. This property depends
on the specific countermeasure used, but can be proven once and for all for a given
hardware platform and cache architecture.
Proof Obligation D.7.10. For all σ¯1, σ¯′1, σ¯2, and σ¯′2 with σ¯1 σ¯′1 and σ¯2 σ¯′2
as well as I¯ (σ¯1), I¯ (σ¯2), ex-entry(σ¯1), ex-entry(σ¯2), CM (σ¯1, σ¯′1) and CM (σ¯2, σ¯′2), if
σ¯1 ∼O σ¯2 then
(σ¯′1.cache, σ¯′1.mem) ≈NC (σ¯′2.cache, σ¯′2.mem).
Finally, we combine above results to prove that the confidentiality of the system
is preserved on the cache-aware level.
Proof Theorem D.5.3. Performing an induction on the computation length,
we distinguish application and complete kernel steps. In the first case we ap-
ply Lemma D.7.2. The invariants on both states are preserved by Lemmas D.6.1,
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D.6.2.1, and D.6.5. For kernel computations, we first step into non-privileged states
σ¯′′1 , σ¯′′2 deducing I¯ (·) and ex-entry(·) for both states by Theorem D.5.1, as well as
σ¯′′1 ∼O σ¯′′2 by Lemma D.7.2. By Lemma D.7.4 we show the existence of a cache-
aware computation σ¯′′2 σ¯′2 that preserves the equivalence of coherent resources.
Using Lemma D.6.7 we obtain a corresponding cacheless computation. By Obli-
gation D.7.8 we get CM (σ¯′′1 , σ¯′1) and CM (σ¯′′2 , σ¯′2). Invariants I¯ (σ¯′1) and I¯ (σ¯′2) hold
due to Obligation D.6.6 and Lemma D.6.8. We conclude by Obligation D.7.10. 
The core requirements that enable this result are Proof Obligations D.7.7, D.7.8,
and D.7.10. Below we discuss how to discharge them for two common countermea-
sures.
D.7.5 Correctness of Countermeasures
For a given cache leakage countermeasure, one needs to define predicates CM , CM
and discharge the related proof obligations. Here we describe the countermeasures
of secret-independent code and cache flushing that are well-known to work against
cache timing channels. However, in the presence of uncacheable aliases they are
not sufficient to prevent information leakage. In particular, if a secret-dependent
value in memory is overshadowed by secret-independent dirty cache entry for the
same address, the application can still extract the memory value by an uncacheable
read.
To tackle this issue we require that all countermeasures sanitise writes of the ker-
nel to addresses in NC by a cache cleaning operation. Then if the core-views of NC
are equivalent in two related states, so are the memories. A sufficient verification
condition on the cacheless model is imposed as follows.
Proof Obligation D.7.11. For all σ, σ′ such that CM (σ, σ′) and σ σ′ performs
dop1 · · · dopn with dopi = wt(Ri) and pa ∈ Ri, if pa ∈ NC then there is a j > i
such that dopj = cl(Rj) and pa ∈ Rj.
This condition is augmented with countermeasure-specific proof obligations that
guarantee the observational equivalence of caches.
Secret-Independent Code
The idea behind this countermeasure is that no information can leak through the
data caches, if the kernel accesses the same memory addresses during all computa-
tions from observationally equivalent entry states, i.e., the memory accesses do not
depend on the confidential resources. We approximate this functional requirement
by predicate CM (σ, σ′):
Proof Obligation D.7.12. If a complete kernel execution σ σ′ performs dop1 · · ·
dopn on resources R1 · · ·Rn, then for all σ2, σ′2 with σ ∼O σ2 and σ2 σ′2 operations
dop′1 · · · dop′n on R′1 · · ·R′n are performed such that addresses in Ri and R′i map to
the same set of tags.
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Note that this allows to access different addresses depending on a secret, as long
as both addresses have the same tag. Such trace properties can be discharged by a
relational analysis at the binary level [24]. On the cache-aware level, the property
is refined by:
CM (σ¯, σ¯′) def≡ ∀σ¯2, σ¯′2. σ¯ σ¯′ ∧ σ¯ ≈NC σ¯2 ∧ σ¯2 σ¯′2 ⇒ σ¯′ ≈NC σ¯′2
The refinement (Obligation D.7.8) is proven similar to Lemma D.7.4 using the
Lemma D.6.7 and the determinism of the hardware when applying the confidential-
ity of the system in the cacheless model (Lemma D.7.6) as well as Obligation D.7.11.
Then, proving Obligation D.7.10 is straightforward.
Cache Flushing
A simple way for the kernel to conceal its secret-dependent operations is to flush the
cache before returning to the application. The functional requirement CM (σ, σ′)
implies:
Proof Obligation D.7.13. For any kernel computation σ σ′ performing data
operations dop1 · · · dopn:
1. there exists a contiguous subsequence dopi · · · dopj of clean operations on all
cache lines,
2. operations dop1 · · · dopj do not write resources in NC ,
3. operations dopj+1 · · · dopn accessed address tags and written values for NC do
not depend on confidential resources,
Condition (3) is formalised and proven like the secret-independent code coun-
termeasure discussed above. Condition (1) can be verified by binary code analysis,
checking that the expected sequence of clean operations is eventually executed. We
identify the resulting state by fl(σ). Condition (2) is not strictly necessary, but it
reduces the overall verification effort. Then we demand by CM (σ¯, σ¯′):
Definition. For all σ¯′′ such that σ¯ →∗P σ¯′′ →∗P σ¯′:
1. if fl(σ¯′′) or σ¯′′ is a preceding state in the computation, then for all pa ∈ NC
it holds that Mv(σ¯′′, pa) = Mv(σ¯, pa),
2. if fl(σ¯′′), all cache lines and their filtered histories are empty,
3. if fl(σ¯′′) and σ¯′′ σ¯′, then for all computations σ¯2 σ¯′2 with σ¯′′ ≈NC σ¯2 we
have σ¯′ ≈NC σ¯′2.
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Here, Condition (1) holds as resources NC are not written and are affected
only by cache evictions which preserve the memory-view. Condition (2) follow
directly from the cache-flush semantics. Condition (3) is discharged using Lemma
D.6.7 and Obligation D.7.13.3. In the proof of Obligation D.7.10 we establish
memory equivalence between intermediate states σ¯′′1 and σ¯′′2 where fl(σ¯′′1 ) and σ¯′′2
using Condition (1). By Condition (2) we obtain σ¯′′1 ≈NC σ¯′′2 and conclude by
Condition (3).
D.8 Case Study
As a case study we use a real hypervisor capable of hosting a Linux guest along
with security services that has been formally verified previously on a cacheless
model [71, 101] and vulnerable to attacks based on cache storage channel [100].
A hypervisor is a system software which controls access to resources and can be
used to create isolated partitions on a shared hardware. The hypervisor paravir-
tualizes the platform for several guests. Only the hypervisor executes in privileged
mode, while guests entirely run in non-privileged mode and need to invoke hypervi-
sor functionalities to modify critical resources, such as page-tables. The hypervisor
uses direct paging [157] to virtualize the memory subsystem. Using this approach
a guest prepares a page-table in its own memory, which after validation, is used by
the hypervisor to configure the MMU, without requiring memory copy operations.
For validated page-tables the hypervisor ensures that the guest has no writable
accesses to the page-tables, thus ensuring that the guest cannot change the MMU
configuration. This mechanism makes the hypervisor particularly relevant for our
purpose since the critical resources change dynamically and ownership transfer is
used for communication.
To efficiently implement direct paging, the hypervisor keeps a type (either page-
table or data) and a reference counter for each physical memory page. The counter
tracks (i) for a data-page the number of virtual aliases that enable non-privileged
writable accesses to this page, and (ii) for a page-table the number of times the
page is used as page-table. The intuition is that the hypervisor can change type
of a page (e.g., when it allocates or frees a page-table) only if the corresponding
reference counter is zero.
The security of this system can be subverted if page-tables are accessed using
virtual aliases with mismatched cacheability attributes: The application can po-
tentially mislead the hypervisor to validate stale data and to make a non-validated
page a page-table. The hypervisor must counter this threat by preventing inco-
herent memory from being a page-table. Here, we fix the vulnerability forcing the
guest to create page-tables only inside an always cacheable region of the memory.
We instantiate the general concepts of Section D.5.1 for the case study hypervi-
sor. The hypervisor uses a static region of physical memory HM to store its stack,
data structures and code. This region includes the data structure used to keep the
reference counter and type for memory pages. Let T (σ, pa) = pt represent that the
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hypervisor data-structure types the page containing the address pa as page-table,
then the critical resources are CR(σ) = HM ∪ {pa. T (σ, pa) = pt}.
The state invariant I¯ guarantees: (i) soundness of the reference counter, (ii) that
the state of the system is well typed; i.e., the MMU uses only memory pages that
are typed page-table, and page-tables forbid non-privileged accesses to pages outside
HM or not typed data. Since the hypervisor uses always cacheability, the invariant
also requires (iii) that HM ⊆ Mac, if T (σ, pa) = pt then pa ∈ Mac, coherency of
Mac, and that all aliases to Mac are cacheable.
Obligation D.6.1.1 is demonstrated by showing that the functional part of the
invariant only depends on page-tables and the internal data-structures, which are
critical and contained in HM . Obligations D.6.1.2 and D.6.1.3 are demonstrated
by correctness of always cacheability. Obligation D.6.2 trivially holds, since type
of memory pages only depends on the internal data structure of the hypervisor,
which is always considered critical. Property (ii) of the invariant guarantees Obli-
gation D.6.3, since the MMU can use only memory blocks that are typed page-table,
which are considered critical. The same property ensures that all critical resources
are not writable by the application, thus guaranteeing Obligation D.6.4. Moreover,
Obligations D.6.5 and 1 are guaranteed by soundness of the countermeasure. Obli-
gation D.6.8 is proved by showing that the functional invariants for the two models
are defined analogously using the core-view. Finally, property (iii) guarantees coun-
termeasure specific Obligations D.6.11.1 and D.6.11.2.a.
There remains to verify obligations on the hypervisor code. This can be done
using a binary analysis tool, since the obligations are defined solely on the cache-
less model: (Obligation D.6.6) the hypervisor handlers are correct, preserving the
functional invariant, (Obligation D.6.7) the control flow graph of the hypervisor
is correct and the hypervisor never changes its own memory mapping, (Obliga-
tion D.6.11.2.b) all memory accesses of the hypervisor are in the always cacheable
region.
D.9 Implementation
We used the HOL4 interactive theorem prover [114] to validate our security analysis.
We focused the validation on Theorems D.5.1 and D.5.2, since the integrity threats
posed by storage channels cannot be countered by means external to model (e.g.,
information leakage can be neutralised by introducing noise in the cache state).
Following the proof strategy of Section D.6, the proof has been divided in
three layers: an abstract verification establishing lemmas that are platform- and
countermeasure-independent, the verification of soundness of countermeasures, and
a part that is platform-specific. For the latter, we instantiated the models for both
ARMv7 and ARMv8, using extensions of the models of Anthony Fox [82, 2] that
include the cache model of Section D.11.1. The formal specification used in our
analysis consists of roughly 2500 LOC of HOL4, and the complete proof consists of
10000 LOC.
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For the case study we augmented the existing hypervisor [71, 101] with the
always cacheability countermeasure. This entailed some engineering effort to adapt
the memory allocator of the Linux kernel to allocate page-tables inside Mac. The
adaptation required changes to 45 LoC in the hypervisor and an addition of 35 LoC
in the paravirtualized Linux kernel and imposes a negligible performance overhead.
The formal model of the hypervisor has been modified to include the additional
checks performed by the hypervisor to prevent allocation of page-tables outside
Mac and to forbid uncacheable aliases to Mac. Similarly, we extended the functional
invariant with the new properties guaranteed by the adopted countermeasure. The
model of the hypervisor has been used to show that the new design preserves the
functional invariant. The invariant and the formal model of ARMv7 processor have
been used to validate the proof obligations that do not require binary code analysis.
We did not analyse the binary code of the hypervisor. However, we believe that
the proof of the corresponding proof obligations can be automated to a large extent
using binary analysis tools (e.g. [101]) or using refinement techniques (e.g. [190]).
Finally, we validated the analysis of Section D.7.3, instantiating the verification
strategy for the formal model of ARMv7 processor and the flushing countermeasure.
D.10 Conclusion
We presented an approach to verify countermeasures for cache storage channels. We
identified the conditions that must be met by a security mechanism to neutralise
the attack vector and we verified correctness of some of the existing techniques to
counter both integrity and confidentiality attacks.
The countermeasures are formally modelled as new proof obligations that can
be imposed on the cacheless model to ensure the absence of vulnerability due to
cache storage channels. The result of this analysis are theorems in Section D.5.3.
They demonstrate that a software satisfying a set of proof obligations (i.e., correctly
implementing the countermeasure) is not vulnerable because of cache storage chan-
nels. Since these proof obligations can be verified using a memory coherent setting,
existing verification tools can be used to analyse the target software. For example,
the proof obligations required to demonstrate that a countermeasure is in place
(e.g. D.6.11, D.6.12, D.7.11, D.7.12) can be verified using existing binary analysis
tools.
While this paper exemplifies the approach for unified single-level data-caches,
our methodology can be extended to counter leakage through timing channels and
accommodate more complex scenarios and other hardware features too. For in-
stance our approach can be used to counter storage channels due to enabling multi-
core processing, multi-level caches, instruction caches, and TLB.
In a multi-core setting the integrity proof can be straightforwardly adopted.
However, for confidentiality new countermeasures such as stealth memory or cache
partitioning must be used to ensure that secret values cannot be leaked. This entails
defining new proof obligations to make sure that the countermeasures are correctly
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implemented and protect secret values. In the StealthMem approach [129] each
core is given exclusive access to a small portion of the shared cache for its security
critical computations. By ensuring that this stealth memory is always allocated
in the cache, and thus no eviction can happen, one can guarantee that no storage
channel can be built.
Multi-level caches can be handled iteratively in a straightforward fashion, start-
ing from the cacheless model and adding CPU-closer levels of cache at each iter-
ation. Iterative refinement has three benefits: Enabling the use of existing (cache
unaware) analysis tools for verification, enabling transfer of results of sections D.6.2,
D.6.3, D.7.4 and D.7.5 to the more complex models, and allowing to focus on each
hardware feature independently, so at least partially counteracting the pressure
towards ever larger and more complex global models. For non-privileged transi-
tions the key tools are derivability and Lemmas D.6.2 and D.7.1. These fit new
hardware features well. For instance, for separate instruction- and data-caches,
coherency should be extended to require that instruction-cache hits are equal to
core-view (and when this is not the case the address should then become attacker
observable). Since derivability is not instruction dependent, Lemma D.6.2 (and
consequently Theorem D.5.1) can be easily re-verified.
It worth noting that sometimes it is possible to transfer by refinement also
properties for non-privileged transitions. This is the case for TLBs without virtual-
isation extensions: As non-privileged instructions are unable to directly modify the
TLB, incoherent behaviours can arise only by the assistance of kernel transitions.
If a refinement has been proved for kernel transitions (i.e., that the TLB is properly
handled by the kernel), then a refinement can be established for the non-privileged
transitions too.
In general, the verification of refinement for privileged transitions requires to
show (i) that the refinement is established if a countermeasure is in place, (ii) that
the countermeasure ensures the kernel to not leave secret dependent footprints in
incoherent resources, and (iii) that the kernel code implements the countermeasures.
For instance, instruction-caches require that instructions fetched by the kernel is
the same in both models, e.g., because the kernel code is not self-modifying or
because the caches are flushed before executing modified code. For confidentiality,
pc-security can be shown to guarantee that instruction-cache is not affected by
secrets.
Note also that the security analysis requires trustworthy models of hardware,
which are needed to verify platform-dependent proof obligations. Some of these
properties (e.g., Assumption D.7.1) require extensive tests to demonstrate that
corner cases are correctly handled by models. For example, while the conventional
wisdom is that flushing caches can close side-channels, a new study [88] showed
flushing does not sanitise caches thoroughly and leaves some channels active, e.g.
instruction cache attack vectors.
There are several open questions concerning side-channels due to similar shared
low-level hardware features such as branch prediction units, which undermine the
soundness of formal verification. This is an unsatisfactory situation since formal
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proofs are costly and should pay off by giving reliable guarantees. Moreover, the
complexity of contemporary hardware is such that a verification approach allowing
reuse of models and proofs as new hardware features are added is essential for formal
verification in this space to be economically sustainable. Our results represent a first
step towards giving these guarantees in the presence of low level storage channels.
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SL(C, i) ≡ C(i).slice, W (C, i, t) ≡ (SL(C, i))(t), H (C, i) ≡ C(i).hist,
c-cnt(C, pa) ≡W (C, i, t).D(wi), c-hit(C, pa) ≡W (C, i, t) 6= ⊥,
c-dirty(C, pa) ≡ c-hit(C, pa) ∧W (C, i, t).d
Figure D.5: Abbreviations; for pa∈PA mapped by va∈VA and where i, t and wi
are the corresponding set index, tag and word index, and C∈C.
D.11 Appendix
D.11.1 Generic Data Cache Model
Below with give the definition of our generic cache model which is the basis for
discharging Assumptions D.7.1, D.7.1 and Proof Obligations D.7.8, D.7.10.
Our cache model does not fix the cache size, the number of ways, the format of
set indices, lines, tags, or the eviction policy. Moreover, cache lines can be indexed
according to physical or virtual addresses, but are physically tagged, and our model
allows both write-back and write-through caching.
Let n and m are the bitsize of virtual and physical addresses, then VA = Bn−α
and PA = Bm−α are the sets of word-aligned addresses where 2α is the word size
in number of bytes (e.g. in a 64-bit architecture α = 3). Our cache has 2N sets, its
lines are of size 2L words and we use functions si : VA×PA→ BN , tag : PA→ BT ,
and widx : VA × PA → BL to compute the set indices, tags and word indices of
the cache. We have T = m − (N + L) for physically-indexed and T = m − L for
virtually-indexed caches.
We define a cache slice as a mapping from a tag to a cache line, SL = BT → L ∪ {⊥};
⊥ if no line is cached for the given tag. A line ln ∈ L is a pair (ln.D, ln.d) ∈ D×B,
D is the mapping from word-indices to data, and d indicates the line dirtiness.
Then, a cache C ∈ C maps a set index i to a slice C(i).slice ∈ SL and a history
of actions performed C(i).hist ∈ A∗ on that slice, i.e., C = BN → SL× A∗. The
history records internal cache actions of type A = {touchr|w t, evict t, lfill t}, where
t ∈ BT denotes the tag associated with the action.
Here, touchr|w t denotes a read or write access to a line tagged with t, lfill t occurs
when a line for tag t is loaded from memory and placed in the cache. Similarly,
evict t represents the eviction of a line with tag t. To simplify formalization of
properties, we define a number of abbreviations in Figure D.5. Note that in case of
virtual indexing, we assume an unaliased cache, i.e., each physical address is cached
in at most one cache slice.
The semantics of internal cache actions on a cache slice and history are given
by the corresponding functions in Figure D.6. If tag t hits the cache in the line
set i, then touch and evict update the cache C ∈ C as follows, where D′i =
W (C, i, t).D[wi 7→ v′] is the resulting line of a write operation at word index wi
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touch : SL× A∗ × BT × BL × (Bw ∪ {⊥})→ SL× A∗
lfill : SL× A∗ ×M× PA→ SL× A∗
evict : SL× A∗ × BT → SL× A∗
wriba : L×M→M evict? : A∗ × BT → BT ∪ ⊥
Figure D.6: Internal operations of the cache. The fifth input of touch is either ⊥
for read accesses or the value v′ ∈ Bw being written to the cache line.
with value v′:
(SL(C ′, i), H (C ′, i)) :=
 (SL(C, i) ,H (C, i)@(touchr t)) : touchr t(SL(C, i)[t 7→ (D′i, 1)] ,H (C, i)@(touchw t)) : touchw t(SL(C, i)[t 7→ ⊥] ,H (C, i)@(evict t)) :evict t
For cache misses on a physical address pa with tag t, function lfill loads memory
content v = mem[pa + L · 2α − 1 : pa] and places it as a clean line into the cache:
(SL(C ′, i),H (C ′, i)) := (SL(C, i)[t 7→ (λi.v[i], 0)], H (C, i)@(lfill t)).
As the cache can only store limited amounts of lines, eviction policy evict?(H , t)
returns the tag of the line to be replaced at a line fill for tag t, or ⊥ if eviction
is not required. Evicted dirty lines are then written back into the memory using
function wriba. As explained in the main text, the eviction policy is only depend-
ing on a finite subset of the history represented by filter function ϕ : A∗ → A∗
(Assumption D.7.1).
The definitions above provide the minimal building blocks to define a detailed
cached memory system that responds to reads, writes, and eviction requests from
the core. Below we give an example.
D.11.2 Operational Write-back Cache Semantics
With the help of functions in Fig. D.6 and abbreviations of Fig. D.5. we give
semantics to a write-back cache with LRU replacement strategy. Figure D.7 lists the
interface available to the core to control the cache. When one of these functionalities
is called, the cache uses the internal actions to update its state according to the
requested operation. In what follows we set t = tag(va, pa) and i = si(va, pa).
Function fill(C,M, va, pa) loads the cache C ∈ C by invoking lfill. However,
if the cache is full the eviction policy determines the line to evict to make space.
Using wriba, the evicted line is then written back in the memory M ∈ M. We
denote this conditional eviction by alloc(C,M, va, pa), which is defined as:{
(C[i 7→ evict(SL(C, i),H (C, i), t′)],wriba(W (C, i, t′),M)):evict?(H (C, i), t) = t′
(C,M) :evict?(H (C, i), t) = ⊥
We save the result of this function as the pair (C¯, M¯). Moreover, if an alias for the
filled line is present in another cache slice, i.e., a line with the same tag, that line
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fill : C×M→ VA×PA→ C×M
read : C×M×VA×PA→ C×M×Bw
write : C×M×VA×PA×Bw → C×M
invba : C×M×VA×PA→ C×M
clnba : C×M×VA×PA→ C×M
Figure D.7: Core accessible interface. Functions clnba and invba clean and invali-
date cache lines for given virtual and physical addresses; clnba only resets the dirty
bit and writes back dirty lines, while invba also evicts the line. Function fill is used
to pre-load lines into the cache.
has to be evicted as well. We define this condition as follows:
alias?(C, t, i, i′) ≡ ∃va′, pa′. i′ = si(va′, pa′) ∧ i 6= i′ ∧W (C, si(va′, pa′), t) 6= ⊥
Then alias detection and eviction alias(C,M, va, pa) is defined as:{
(C[i′ 7→ evict(SL(C, i′),H (C, i′), t)],wriba(W (C, i′, t),M)) : alias?(C, t, i, i′)
(C,M) : otherwise
The result of this function applied to (C¯, M¯) is saved as (Cˆ, Mˆ). The combination
of these actions with a line fill is denoted by fillwb(C,M, va, pa) and defined below.{
(Cˆ[i 7→ lfill(SL(Cˆ, i),H (Cˆ, i),M, pa)], Mˆ) : ¬c-hit(C, pa)
(C,M) : otherwise
Thus, (C˜, M˜) = fillwb(C,M, pa, va). Now the definition of reading, writing, flush-
ing, and cleaning the cache is straightforward, for x = C,M, va, pa we have:
read(x) = (C˜[i 7→ touch(SL(C˜, i),H (C˜, i), t, i,⊥), M˜ , c-cnt(C˜, pa))
write(x, v) = (C˜[i 7→ touch(SL(C˜, i),H (C˜, i), t, i, v), M˜)
invba(x) = (C[i 7→ evict(SL(C, i),H (C, i), t)],wriba(W (C, i, t),M))
clnba(x) = (C[i 7→ SL(C, i)[t 7→W (C, i, t)[d 7→ 0]]],wriba(W (C, i, t),M))
Other cache functionalities can be defined similarly. It remains to instantiate
the eviction policy and its filter ϕ. We choose the Least Recently Used (LRU)
policy, which always replaces the element that was not used for the longest time if
there is no space. In a k set associative cache we model LRU as a decision queue
q ∈ Q of size k. This queue maintains an order on how the tags in a cache set
are accessed. In this ordering the queue’s front is the one that has been touched
most recently and its back points to the tag to be replaced next upon a miss (or
an empty way).
We assume two functions to manipulate queue content: 1. push : Q× BT → Q
adjusts the queue to make room for the coming tag, inserting the tag at the front of
the queue, and 2. pop : Q× BT → Q removes the input tag and shifts all elements
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to the front. Additionally back : Q → BT ∪ ⊥ returns the back (k − 1th) element
in the queue or ⊥ if there is still space. We construct the queue recursively from
the history h with the function Cons : h→ Q:
Cons(ε) = ∅
Cons(h@a) =

popt(Cons(h)) : a = evict t
pusht(Cons(h)) : a = lfill t
pusht(popt(Cons(h))) : a = touchr|w t
Then the eviction policy evict? is defined by:
evict?lru(h, t) := back(Cons(h))
Proposition 1. On each cache slice, the LRU replacement strategy depends only
on the action history for the (at most k) present tags, since their lines were last
filled into the cache.
We capture this part of the action history through the filter function ϕlru : A∗ →
A∗. Its definition depends on a number of helper functions. First we introduce the
last action last(h, t) on a tag t in history h and the set of tags Th ⊂ BT that are
currently present in a slice according to history information. For action a ∈ A,
tag(a) returns the associated tag.
last(ε, t) = ⊥ last(h@a, t) =
{
a : tag(a) = t
last(h, t) : otherwise
Th = {t | last(h, t) /∈ {⊥, evict t}}
For a set of tags T ⊂ BT we define the LRU filter includes the least recent fills
and subsequent touches to tags in the set, but leaves out evictions and actions on
irrevelant tags.
ϕlru(ε, T ) = ε ϕlru(h, ∅) = ε
ϕlru(h@a, T ) =

ϕlru(h, T )@a : ∃t. a = touchr|w t ∧ t ∈ T
ϕlru(h, T \ {t})@a : ∃t. a = lfill t ∧ t ∈ T
ϕlru(h, T ) : otherwise
Then we set ϕlru(h) := ϕlru(h, Th).
D.11.3 Proof of Assumption D.7.1
Proving the claim
evict?(h, t) = evict?(ϕlru(h), t)
boils down to the following property.
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Lemma D.11.1. For all h ∈ A∗, Cons(h) = Cons(ϕlru(h)).
It is proven by induction on the length of h, with one additional induction
hypothesis:
∀t ∈ Th. popt(Cons(h), t) = Cons(ϕlru(h, Th \ {t}))
We need two invariants of the cache semantics for histories h′ = h@a: 1. if a is
an eviction or a touch on tag t, then t ∈ Th, and 2. if a is a line fill of tag t then
t /∈ Th. Moreover, we use idempotence and commutativity properties of applying
ϕlru(h, T ) several times.
ϕlru(h, T ) = ϕlru(ϕlru(h, T ), T )
ϕlru(ϕlru(h, T ), T ′) = ϕlru(ϕlru(h, T ′), T )
With these arguments the detailed proof becomes a straightforward exercise. We
also introduce the following lemmas for later use.
Lemma D.11.2. For two histories h1, h2 and two tag sets T and T ′ ⊆ T , if
ϕlru(h1, T ) = ϕlru(h2, T ) then ϕlru(h1, T ′) = ϕlru(h2, T ′).
We prove this property by induction on the length of the filtered histories using
the definition of ϕlru(h, T ).
Lemma D.11.3. All cache actions preserve the following invariant on slices i of
cache C:
TH(C,i) = {t |W (C, i, t) 6= ⊥}
This follows directly from the semantics of the cache actions.
D.11.4 Proof of Assumption D.7.1
Before we conduct the proof we first give a formal definition of observational equiv-
alence of cache and memory wrt. a set of addresses A. Let TGA = {tag(a) | a ∈ A}
and SIA = {si(a) | a ∈ A} denote the sets of tags and set indices corresponding to
addresses in A, then:
(C1,M1) ≈A (C2,M2) def≡
∀pa ∈ A. M1(pa) = M2(pa)
∧ ∀i, t. W (C1, i, t) = ⊥ ⇔W (C2, i, t) = ⊥
∧ ∀i, t. W (C1, i, t).d = W (C2, i, t).d
∧ ∀i ∈ SIA, t ∈ TGA.
W (C1, i, t) 6= ⊥ ⇒W (C1, i, t) = W (C2, i, t)
∧ ∀i. ϕ(H (C1, i)) = ϕ(H (C2, i))
Now let C1 = σ¯1.cache, C2 = σ¯2.cache, M1 = σ¯1.mem, M2 = σ¯2.mem, and similar
for the primed states, then it needs to be shown:
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∀σ¯1, σ¯2, σ¯′1, σ¯′2, dop.
Coh(σ¯1, (O ∩ PA) \A)
∧ Coh(σ¯2, (O ∩ PA) \A)
∧ ∀pa ∈ (O ∩ PA) \A. Cv(σ¯1, pa) = Cv(σ¯2, pa)
∧ (C1,M1) ≈A (C2,M2)
∧ σ¯1 →U σ¯′1 [dop]
∧ σ¯2 →U σ¯′2 [dop]
=⇒
Coh(σ¯′1, (O ∩ PA) \A)
∧ Coh(σ¯′2, (O ∩ PA) \A)
∧ ∀pa ∈ (O ∩ PA) \A. Cv(σ¯′1, pa) = Cv(σ¯′1, pa)
∧ (C ′1,M ′1) ≈A (C ′2,M ′2)
In general, cache operations cannot make coherent resources incoherent, thus
we can focus on the last two claims. All memory instructions are broken down into
a sequence of internal cache actions so it suffices to make a case split on the possible
cache actions a ∈ A. We outline the general proof strategy for each case below.
a = touchr t — A read hit does not change contents of cache and memory at all.
We only need to consider the changes to the action history of the affected
slice i. By definition of ϕlru we have:
ϕlru(H (C ′1, i)) = ϕlru(H (C1, i)@a)
= ϕlru(H (C1, i))@a
= ϕlru(H (C2, i))@a
= ϕlru(H (C2, i)@a)
= ϕlru(H (C ′2, i))
a = touchw t — The case of write hits is analoguous to the read case, with the
exception that the data content and dirty bit may change. Nevertheless the
written line is present in both caches with the same contents and the dirty
bit becomes 1 in both states after the write operation. Since the same value
is written, we can also show the claim that the data content for tags t ∈ TGA
are equal.
a = lfill t — A line fill leaves the memory and dirty bits unchanged and since we
have the same tag states, the line fill occurs in both caches.
For tags t /∈ TGA that belong to coherent addresses we know that the core-
view stays unchanged because a line is only fetched if it was not present in
the cache before and the memory content that was visible in the core-view
of the pre-state is loaded into the cache to be visible in the core-view of the
post-state.
For t ∈ TGA, relation ≈A guarantees the equivalence of the memory contents
directly for addresses A and again the same line is filled into the cache.
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In both cases, the tag states stay equivalent because the same tag is added
into the cache slice. Concerning the history of the cache slice, we get from
the definition of ϕlru with h1 = H (C1, i) and h2 = H (C2, i):
ϕlru(H (C ′1, i)) = ϕlru(h1@a)
= ϕlru(h1@a, Th1@a)
= ϕlru(h1@a, Th1 ∪ {a})
= ϕlru(h1, Th1)@a
= ϕlru(h1)@a
= ϕlru(h2)@a
= ϕlru(h2, Th2)@a
= ϕlru(h2@a, Th2 ∪ {a})
= ϕlru(h2@a, Th2@a)
= ϕlru(h2@a)
= ϕlru(H (C ′2, i))
a = evict t— For coherent resources evictions do not change the core-view, as any
line that is evicted was either dirty before and thus written back to memory,
maintaining its addresses’ core-view, or it was clean but coherent with the
corresponding memory content that becomes visible in the core-view after
the eviction. If a confidential line is evicted there is nothing more to show.
For tags in a line i tag states and filtered histories are equal. By Assump-
tion D.7.1 the eviction policy yields the same result in both states, thus if a
line is evicted it is done so in both caches and these lines have the same tag.
For evicted coherent lines or confidential lines we argue as above. For lines
belonging to the set A we know that they have the same contents, so if they
are dirty, memory changes in the same way. In case they are clean, memories
stay unchanged and are still equivalent.
In all cases the tag state is manipulated in the same way, as the same tags
are evicted, thus they stay equal. The filtered histories for line i are still the
same by definition of ϕlru and the equality of tag states.
ϕlru(H (C ′1, i) = ϕlru(h1@a)
= ϕlru(h1@a, Th1@a)
= ϕlru(h1@a, Th1 \ {a})
= ϕlru(h1, Th1 \ {a})
= ϕlru(h1, Th2 \ {a}) (Lemma D.11.3)
= ϕlru(h2, Th2 \ {a}) (Lemma D.11.2)
= ϕlru(h2@a, Th2 \ {a})
= ϕlru(h2@a, Th2@a)
= ϕlru(h2@a)
= ϕlru(H (C ′2, i))
This concludes the proof of Assumption D.7.1.
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